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ABSTRACT 
One of the consequences of traumatic brain injury is the postconcussion 
syndrome. The symptoms in this syndrome include headache, dizziness, poor 
memory, poor concentration, easy fatigue, drowsiness, irritability, sensitivity to 
light, sensitivity to noise, low alcohol tolerance, visual problems, auditory 
problems, nausea, vomiting, anxiety, and depression. Several factor analytic 
studies have shown that these symptoms load onto cognitive and noncognitive 
factors (Bohnen, Twijnstra, & Jolles, 1992). The aim of this study was to determine 
whether patients who report different symptoms also evidence differences in 
cognitive deficits, as indexed by reaction time. 
For this purpose 106 subjects (mean age 25.92 years; SD=6.05) of both 
sexes were tested on 8 reaction time tasks adapted from Shum, McFarland, Bain, 
and Humphreys (1990). There were 54 traumatic brain injury patients (mean age 
26.40 years; SD=6.23) drawn from three Pretoria hospitals. They were 
heterogeneous with respect to diagnosis and severity of injury. For the controls 
(N=52), the mean age was 25.43 years (SD=5.88). The eight reaction time tasks 
constituted 4 task variables, each with 2 levels. From these tasks, 36 reaction time 
indexes were derived. The indexes were classified into 4 groups, viz., reaction 
time (RT), movement time (MT), total reaction time (TT), and subtraction scores 
(SB, the difference between the 2 levels for each task variable). 
RT reflects the decision component and MT reflects the response execution 
component of reaction time. Partial correlation coefficients for all symptoms 
(p :c;; 0,01) showed that some symptoms were most frequently associated with RT 
whilst others were most frequently associated with MT. On factor analysis with 
varimax rotation, symptoms loaded predominantly with SB scores. Symptoms also 
loaded with different task variable:!; suggesting that they correlated with deficits on 
different stages of information processing. Taking into account possible 
methodological constraints that were discussed, these results confirm that different 
symptoms within the postconcussion syndrome correlate with different cognitive 
deficits. The correlations between symptoms and indices of reaction time are 
Xlll 
moderated by the characteristics of the symptoms (frequency & intensity), and the 
duration since injury. These findings have significance for understanding the 
aetiology of the postconcussion symptoms and for planning treatment. 
J 
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Traumatic brain injury is a major source of disability both in South Africa 
and other parts of the world. Amongst the complications from these injuries are 
physical disability (Miller, 1990), personality change (DiCesare, Parente, & 
Anderson-Parente, 1990), the postconcussion syndrome (Brown, Fann, & Grant, 
1994) and cognitive deficits (Burton & Volpe, 1994 ). All of these complications are 
important and legitimate subjects for investigation. In the course of one 
investigation, it is however not possible to study all the complications of traumatic 
brain injury in depth. 
In the present investigation, I focus on the postconcussion syndrome. 
Factor analytic studies have shown that some of the symptoms load onto a 
cognitive factor whilst others do not. In the study by Levin, Gary, et al. (1987) for 
example, the symptoms poor concentration and poor memory loaded onto the 
cognitive-depression factor, whilst headache and dizziness loaded on the somatic 
factor. Bohnen, Twijnstra, and Jolles (1992) recently reported that the symptoms 
loaded onto two factors, namely, post-concussive-cognitive complaints and 
emotional-vegetative complaints. The aim of this study is to determine whether 
patients who report different symptoms also evidence differences in cognitive 
deficits, as indexed by reaction time. 
The Postconcussion syndrome 
Adams and Victor (1989) gi{e the classic definition of concussion as an 
immediate traumatic event characterized by a loss of consciousness for a variable 
time, with transient physiologic changes, a period of retrograde amnesia, an 
absence of anatomic changes, and eventual recovery without deficit. This 
definition is accepted by those who subscribe to the view that the postconcussion 
syndrome is largely psychological in origin (Miller, 1961; Mittenberg, DiGiulio, 
Perrin, & Bass, 1992). It will be made clear however, from Chapters 2 and 3, that 
concussion is associated neither with an absence of anatomic changes nor 
recovery without deficit. 
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After sustaining a concussion, some patients go on to develop what Strauss 
and Savitsky (1934) labeled as the postconcussion syndrome. Benton (1989) 
defined this syndrome as follows: 
\. 
It is generally understood to refer to a condition in which a person 
who has sustained a concussion complains of a variety of somatic, 
cognitive, motor, or sensory disabilities which he attributes to the 
concussion. At the same time, convincing historical and clinical 
evidence of significant brain damage cannot be elicited. The typical 
history indicates that at the time of the accident and shortly 
thereafter, the person was comatose for a very brief period, if at all, 
and showed practically no retrograde and very little post-traumatic 
amnesia (Benton, 1989, p.3). 
Benton further observed that there is often a striking discrepancy between 
the supposedly objective assessment of the physician and the subjective 
complaints of the patient. The symptoms that make up the syndrome include the 
following: Headache, dizziness, poor memory, poor concentration, easy fatigue, 
drowsiness, irritability, sensitivity to light, sensitivity to noise, low alcohol tolerance, 
visual problems, auditory problems, nausea, vomiting, anxiety, and depression 
(Cartlidge & Shaw, 1981; Jennett & Teasedale, 1981; Strauss & Savitsky, 1934; 
World Health Organization, 1992). 
Estimates of the incidence of postconcussion symptoms after traumatic 
brain injury vary greatly. Studies hive reported incidences of between 20% and 
80% (Richardson, 1990; Rimel, Giordani, Barth, Boll & Jane, 1981; Rutherford, 
1989). Rutherford, Merritt, and McDonald, (1977) reported that within three months 
of injury, an estimated 51 % to 84% of patients reported postconcussion 
symptoms. The number of patients reporting these symptoms drops to 15% to 
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33% after one year (Rutherford, Merritt, & McDonald, 1978). The wide variation of 
estimates of the incidence of postconcussion symptoms has been attributed to 
methodological differences such as differences in the definition of mild head injury, 
the measures used to assess the symptoms, and the duration since injury 
(Dikmen, Mclean & Temkin, 1986; Rutherford, 1989). Further confounding factors 
were recently enumerated by Jacobson (1995). These include the fact that studies 
differ widely in their use of controls, the inclusion of patients with past head injury, 
psychiatric history or substance abuse, timing of assessment, method of eliciting 
symptoms, presence of compensation claims, and attrition on follow-up. 
The individual postconcussion symptoms themselves differ in their 
frequency of occurrence. For example, Oddy, Humphrey, and Uttley (1978) 
reported on the frequencies of the different postconcussion symptoms complained 
of by a group of 50 young adults who had been injured six weeks previously and 
had a PT A exceeding 24 hours. They found that 38% of the patients complained of 
having trouble remembering things, 35% complained of often losing temper, 35% 
reported becoming tired very easily, and 33% had difficulties concentrating when 
reading. Similarly, Mureriwa (1990) reported on a heterogeneous group of head 
trauma patients with a mean of 10 months since injury. Of the symptoms 
spontaneously reported by these patients, headache, dizziness, and anxiety were 
found to be the most frequent. Brown, Fann and Grant (1994) recently reviewed 
the literature and found that headache, dizziness, concentration, and memory 
problems were the most frequent symptoms following closed head injury. Of these 
symptoms, headache was the most common (Alves, Macciocchi, & Barth, 1993; 
Packard & Ham, 1994 ). 
The incidence of postconcussion symptoms is related to the duration since 
injury. Rutherford (1989) identified what he labeled as early and late 
postconcussion symptoms. The early symptoms include headaches, dizziness, 
vomiting, nausea, drowsiness, ancfblurred vision. The late symptoms consist of 
headaches, dizziness, irritability, anxiety, depression, poor memory, poor 
concentration, insomnia, fatigue, and poor vision. In order to place the incidence of 
postconcussion symptoms in perspective, it is necessary to note the presence of 
these symptoms in non head-injured populations. These symptoms have been 
reported to be common in the general population (Bohnen, Twijnstra, & Jolles, 
1992; Wong, Regennitter, & Barrios, 1994) and also in non-head injured patients 
(Fullerton, Harvey, Klein, & Howell, 1981; Gouvier, Uddo-Crane, & Brown, 1988). 
Fox, Lees-Haley, Earnest, and Dolezal-Wood (1995) reported that similar 
symptoms are also common amongst non head-injured psychiatric patients. 
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Researchers in South Africa have not paid much attention to the 
postconcussion syndrome. This is surprising when one considers the fact that 
research elsewhere in the world has shown that postconcussion symptoms are the 
most frequent reason for medical referral after traumatic brain injury. Richardson 
(1990) for example, reported that 50 to 80% of patients who are admitted to 
hospitals after traumatic brain injury will complain of one or more of these 
symptoms. Furthermore, the postconcussion syndrome deserves much research 
attention because it is persistent (Alves, Colahon, O'Leary, Rimel, & Jane, 1986; 
Merskey & Woodforde, 1972; Rutherford, 1989), and is resistant to current 
treatments (Duckro, Greenberg, Schultz, & Burton, 1992; McMordie, 1988). 
Cognitive Deficits 
The Importance of Attention 
Memory and attention are the most frequently cited cognitive deficits after 
traumatic brain injury (Evans, 1992). These two deficits are equally important, but 
attention was chosen as the focus of the present study because it is pr bably 
more ubiquitous. Sherrington (1940) described normal attention as pos ibly the 
highest form of mental integration. It plays an important role in many ot er 
psychological processes. Treisman and Gelade (1980), for example, po nted out 
that attention is crucial in perception, while Baddeley (1986) and Nisse (1986) 
pointed out that attention is importa'nt in learning and memory. Whyte (1992a) 
noted that attention improves the speed and accuracy of many tasks. R cently, 
LaBerge (1995a) summarized the major benefits of attention to the indi idual as 
follows: Attention enables individuals to make accurate perceptual judg 
actions; it enables individuals to make quick perceptual judgements an to act 
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quickly. Finally, attention enables individuals to engage in sustained p ocessing of 
a mental activity. 
Because attention plays such a crucial role in other psychologi al 
processes, when deficient, it can compromise attempts at rehabilitatio in other 
spheres (Gray, Robertson, Pentland, & Anderson, 1992). A final reaso for giving 
precedence to the study of attention is that as much as 10-15% of the population 
suffer from problems of attention (Mirsky, Anthony, Duncan, Ahearn, & Kellam, 
199J ). Deficits of attention are also found in many other psychological disorders 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Van Zomeren & Brouwer, 1994). Among 
these are attention-deficit and disruptive disorders, mood disorders, and anxiety 
disorders. In recent years, researchers have shown that problems of attention are 
prevalent in individuals with the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (Ingram, 
Bridge, Janssen, Stover, & Mirsky, 1990; Dunlop, Bjorklund, Abdelnoor & 
Myrvang, 1993). Any insights gained from investigating attention after head injury 
may therefore have wide application in other medical and psychological disorders. 
The Assessment of Attention 
There are many ways of assessing attention deficits, as will be shown in 
Chapter 4. The two broad approaches to the assessment of attention are the 
psychometric testing approach and the information processing approach (Shum, 
McFarland, & Bain, 1994a). In the former approach, psychologists use individual 
psychological tests or batteries of tests to confirm the presence of attention 
deficits. These tests are used to identify deficits in components of attention such 
as concentration, focused attention and divided attention (Ponsford & Kinsella, 
1992). Some writers have criticized the use of such global tests of attention 
because they were empirically, rather than theoretically derived (Reitan & Wolfson, 
1985; Shum, McFarland & Bain, 1994a). It has been suggested that the 
information processing approach is more theoretically tied to known cognitive 
concepts (Mirsky, Anthony, Duncan, Ahearn, & Kellam, 1991 ). In the information 
processing approach, the researchers measure the speed with which an individual 
performs specific and elementary cognitive operations. The speed of performance 
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on these operations is assessed through choice reaction time tasks. An important 
assumption in this approach is that information is processed in distinct, serial 
stages. 
Deficits on stages of information processing have recently been 
investigated by several researchers. These include studies by Shum, McFarland, 
Bain, and Humphreys (1990), Murray, Shum, and McFarland (1992), Schmitter-
Edgecombe, Marks, Fahy, and Long (1992), and Shum, McFarland, & Bain 
(1004b). The methodology used in these studies will be described in more detail in 
Chapter 4. The major criticism of the information processing approach is that by 
using highly specific laboratory tasks on comparatively small numbers of subjects, 
it lacks generality and clinical applicability (Lezak, 1985). In the present study, 
attention will be assessed using tasks adapted from the study by Shum, 
McFarland, Bain, and Humphreys (1990). 
Aims and Rationale of Present Study 
Because of the subjective nature of the postconcussion symptoms, 
discriminating the malingerer or the hypochondriac from a genuinely disabled 
patient is often difficult for clinicians (Gronwall, 1977; Youngjohn, Burrows, & 
Erdal, 199S). One way around this problem is to attempt to correlate the subjective 
symptoms with experimentally determined cognitive deficits. Only a few studies 
have examined the association between the presence of postconcussion 
symptoms and neuropsychological performance. These include the studies by 
Jakobsen, Baadsgaard, Thomsen, and Henriksen (1987), Leininger, Gramling, 
Farrel, Kreutzer, & Peck, (1990), and Gfeller, Chibnall & Duckro (1994). Jakobsen 
et al. successfully predicted the persistence of postconcussion symptoms by using 
reaction time tasks. These researchers gave simple reaction time tests to SS 
patients one to five days after conc!Jssion. They found that the reaction time 
measured during the first few days of injury were significantly prolonged in patients 
complaining of concussion one month after injury, than in patients who reported no 
symptoms. After three months, patients with symptoms had longer reaction times 
than patients without symptoms, but the difference did not reach significance. The 
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study by Gfeller, Chibnall, & Duckro (1994) found that patients who reported 
postconcussion symptoms exhibited greater impairment on almost half of all the 
neuropsychological measures administered. Leininger, Gramling, Farrel, Kreutzer, 
& Peck (1990) found that symptomatic minor head injury patients, as compared 
with uninjured controls had deficits on several neuropsychological tests. These 
included the Category Test, the Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test-Revised 
(PASAT-R), Auditory Verbal Learning Test, and both the copy and memory trials 
of t~e Complex Figure Test. 
In the present study, the intention is to contribute to the ongoing attempts to 
relate postconcussion symptoms to experimentally determined cognitive deficits. 
Further to this, the aim is to determine whether patients with different symptoms 
will show different cognitive deficits. Previous studies focussed on comparing 
patients and controls. In the present study on the other hand, the aim is to show 
that there are significant positive correlations between the presence of specific 
postconcussion symptoms and specific cognitive deficits. It is also the aim of this 
study to determine whether aspects of the postconcussion symptoms, viz., their 
presence, frequency, intensity, and severity correlate with indices of reaction time. 
The reasons for expecting these correlations will become clear from the literature 
review. 
Outline of the study 
The first three chapters deal with the review of the literature on traumatic 
brain injury, the postconcussion syndrome, and attention. The review of traumatic 
brain injury is done in Chapter 2 and begins with an overview of the ways in which 
the severity of traumatic brain injury is assessed. This is followed by a discussion 
of the mechanisms of traumatic brain injury, and the associated neuropathology 
and pathophysiology. One of the s~quelae of traumatic brain injury is the 
postconcussion syndrome and this is discussed at length in Chapter 3. The bulk of 
this chapter is devoted to discussing the aetiology of this syndrome. Problems of 
attention feature prominently in the postconcussion syndrome. In Chapter 4, the 
characteristics and mechanisms of normal attention are discussed. In this 
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discussion, special emphasis is given to the information processing approach to 
the conceptualization of attention. This is followed by an overview of the neural 
bases of attention deficits after traumatic brain injury. The chapter ends with a 
description of the methods for assessing attention deficits. A brief summary of the 
review of the literature is given in Chapter 5, followed by the statement of the 
hypotheses. The pilot study is described in Chapter 6. Finally, in Chapters 7, 8, 
and 9, the methods, results and discussion are respectively described. 
\ 
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CHAPTER TWO 
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY 
The phrase traumatic brain injury (TBI) refers to neural damage resulting 
frorR closed or open-head injuries following an accident involving the head 
(Stratton & Gregory, 1994). In open head injury, traumatic damage results from 
missiles such as bullets, or other sharp, pointed objects that forcibly penetrate the 
skull. The tissue damage is usually concentrated in the path of the intruding object 
(Strub & Black, 1988). Such injuries result in the exposure of the intradural 
contents to the atmosphere (Allen, 1986). Closed head injuries on the other hand, 
are non missile injuries (Hannay, 1982). These injuries are most frequently found 
after acceleration-deceleration processes, such as those from motor vehicle 
accidents. Closed head injuries are more frequently encountered in peacetime, 
whereas open head injuries are more common during war (McClelland, 1988). The 
present study focuses on closed head injury. In this chapter, I will discus four 
aspects of traumatic brain injury. These are the severity of traumatic brain injury, 
epidemiology, the mechanisms of traumatic brain injury, and the neuropathology 
and pathophysiology of traumatic brain injury. 
Severity of Injury 
The three main measures of severity of brain injury are the duration of 
coma, the depth of coma, and the duration of post-traumatic amnesia (PTA) 
(Alexander, 1995). The advantages and disadvantages of these different ways of 
assessing severity will be discussed below. 
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Duration of Coma 
Symonds (1928) first suggested that the duration of loss of consciousness 
(LOC) or coma is related to the severity of brain damage. He further suggested 
that the duration of unconsciousness depends on the amount, rather than on the 
location of brain lesions. Following on this, Russell (1971) proposed a four-
category classification of patients based on the duration of loss of consciousness: 
Subjects who were unconscious for less than one hour were classified as mildly 
injured; those who were unconscious from 1 hour to 24 hours were moderately 
injured; those unconscious for one to seven days were severely injured; and those 
unconscious for more than seven days were classified as very severe. Bond 
(1983) criticized Russell's (1971) schema, stating that it over classified severe 
cases. He proposed instead, that mild brain injury should refer to loss of 
consciousness for less than one day; moderate injury as loss of consciousness for 
1 to 7 days; severe injury as loss of consciousness for 7 to 28 days; and very 
severe injury as loss of consciousness for 28 days or more. Bond's classification 
can in turn be criticized for overclassifying mild cases. Current consensus is that 
mild traumatic brain injury involves loss of consciousness for 30 minutes or less 
(Kayetal., 1993). 
The duration of loss of consciousness as a measure of severity of injury has 
been criticized for several reasons. Firstly, loss of consciousness is more closely 
associated with diffuse injury than with focal injury. For this reason, individuals with 
severe focal injuries may not be correctly classified (Sarno, 1988). Secondly, 
according to the centripetal model of cerebral concussion, loss of consciousness 
occurs only in injuries severe enough to affect the mesencephalic core of the brain 
(Ommaya & Gennarelli, 1974). 'Consequently, mildly injured persons would not be 
properly classified because t_hese injuries may not necessarily affect the 
mesencephalic core of the brain. T~irdly, as Brooks, Bond, Jones and Rizvi (1980) 
pointed out, coma is usually brief and is seldom accurately measured. In such 
cases, one might incorrectly assume that an individual had not sustained brain 
injury. Finally, many studies have shown that the correlation of duration of coma 
and outcome is usually low. Damage that is insufficient to cause coma may 
nevertheless lead to impaired cortical functioning associated with decreased 
cognitive abilities (Brooks, Campsie, Symington, Beattie, & McKinlay, 1986; 
Dikmen, Reitan, & Temkin, 1983; Rimel, Giordani, Barth, Boll, & Jane, 1981; 
Esselman & Uomoto, 1995; Rimel, Giordani, Barth, & Jane, 1982). 
Depth of Coma. 
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A more widely used measure of severity of brain injury based on impaired 
consciousness is the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) (Jennett & Teasdale, 1977; 
Teasdale & Jennett, 1974). To determine a patient's Glasgow coma score, the 
examiner assesses the patient's eye opening response, the verbal output, and the 
motor responses. A fully conscious person shows spontaneous eye-opening, is 
oriented, and obeys commands. The patient in a deep coma on the other hand, 
will show no eye opening, no verbal response, and no motor response. Scores on 
the GCS range from 3 to 15. 
Researchers have proposed different cut-off points on the GCS to classify 
patients into those with mild, moderate, and severe injuries. Teasdale and Jennett 
(1974) suggested that a score of eight or less reflected severe injury. Rimel et al. 
(1981) classified patients with initial GCS 9 through 12 as having moderate injury 
and those with 13 through 15 as having minor head injury. Born (1988) argued 
that the GCS is of limited scope because in severe cases, the score is determined 
solely by the patient's motor response. He proposed that clinicians should use the 
Glasgow-Liege Scale, which combines the Glasgow Coma Scale with the 
quantitative analysis of five brainstem reflexes. Stambrook, Moore, Lubusko, 
Peters, and Blumenschein ( 1993) recently also pointed out other limitations of the 
GCS. These are that GCS scores are frequently contaminated by alcohol or drug 
ingestion and other, non-neurologilal organ system trauma. The GCS is also 
criticized for having a restricted range in survivors. The GCS was not designed to 
make sharp distinctions in patients with less severe brain injuries. Matheson 
( 1994) also pointed out that the duration of coma is frequently artificially prolonged 
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by medical treatment. 
.. Post-traumatic Amnesia (PTA). 
Russell (1932) described post traumatic amnesia as an early stage of 
recovery from TBI during which the patient is not sufficiently aware of the 
environment to be able to commit events to memory. Associated clinical features 
during PTA may include disorientation, defective attention, agitation, lethargy, and 
inappropriate and disinhibited behaviour and speech (Levin, 1989). Russell and 
Nathan (1946) measured PTA retrospectively to include the period from the time of 
injury to the time of full awareness, and the ability to retain a stable record of 
events. For the purpose of classifying the severity of head injury using PT A, 
Russell (1971) suggested that concussion with a PTA of less than one hour was 
mild. He proposed that concussion was moderate if the PT A was 1 to 24 hours 
and was severe if the PTA exceeded 24 hours. In most studies, the cut-off point 
for severe head injury is a PTA of 24 hours or more (McClelland, 1988b). This 
probably overclassifies severe cases. To overcome this, Matheson (1994) 
suggested the following classification: 
Less than 5 minutes 
5 to 60 minutes 
1to24 hours 
1to7 days 
1to4 weeks 
more than 4 weeks 
very mild 
mild 
moderate 
severe 
very severe 
extremely severe 
More recent assessment procedures for PT A are prospective and exclude 
the period of coma. The first such prospective measure of PT A was the Galveston 
Orientation and Amnesia Test (Levin, O'Donnell, & Grossman, 1979). In 
prospective assessments of PTA, the measurements begin while the patients is in 
and emerging from PTA (Forrester, Encel, & Geffen, 1994). This is in contrast to 
retrospective assessment which is carried out in an interview after the state of PT A 
has resolved. Retrospective assessments of PTA depend on the patient's 
subjective recollections, which makes them unreliable. 
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PT A has been shown to be a better predictor of outcome than duration of 
loss of consciousness (Brooks, 1984; Mandelberg & Brooks, 1975; Schacter & 
Crovitz, 1977). Long and Williams (1988) suggested that PTA might be a better 
predictor of outcome than duration of coma because it is of longer duration, and is 
closer in time to final outcome. Although PTA is a better predictor of outcome than · 
duretion of coma, it is nevertheless also a weak predictor (Brooks, 1976; Gronwall 
& Wrightson, 1981; Lishman, 1968; Mandelberg, 1976). Long and Williams (1988) 
suggested that the reason for this is that PTA is caused by diencephalic damage, 
a focal injury. According to the centripetal model of cerebral concussion (Ommaya 
& Gennarelli, 1974), diencephalic damage occurs only with moderate to severe 
injury. For this reason, PTA measures would not be a suitable measure for mild 
injuries. Despite these criticisms, PT A is still considered the best yardstick for 
predicting the severity of traumatic brain injury (Wilson, Teasdale, Hardie, 
Wiedman, & Lang, 1993). 
Combined Indices of Severity 
From the foregoing descriptions, it is clear that all the indices of severity of 
injury are inadequate for one reason or another. Nevertheless, as Alexander 
(1995) recently observed, "There is at present no biologically objective measure 
that quantifies the severity of neuropathology more accurately than the clinical 
measures of GCS, loss of consciousness (LOC), and PTA" (p. 1254). In order to 
increase the accuracy of outcome predictions, researchers and clinicians 
frequently use a combination of these indicators of severity. For example, Brown, 
Fann, and Grant (1994) defined mild traumatic brain injury as follows: "when the 
period of unconsciousness does ndt exceed 30 minutes, the GCS on admission is 
13-15 and never falls below 13 on continued observation, and both a clinical 
neurologic examination and cranial CT scan (one assumes MRI could be 
substituted) are normal" (p. 16). 
Wilson, Teasdale, Hadley, Wiedmann, and Lang ( 1994) justify the use of a 
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combination of indices by pointing out that these indices relate to different aspects 
of ~rain damage. They showed, for example, that although both PTA and coma 
were associated with lesions in central brain structures, only the PTA was related 
to hemispheric lesions as seen on magnetic resonance imagery (MRI). The 
definition of mild brain injury recommended by the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury 
Committee (1993) uses a combination of indices. They recommended thatmild 
head injury is manifested by at least one of the following: 
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1. any period of loss of consciousness; 
2. any loss of memory for events immediately before or after an accident; 
3. any alteration in mental state at the time of the accident (eg, feeling dazed, 
disoriented, or confused); and 
4. focal neurological deficit (s) that may or may not be transient; 
but where the severity does not exceed the following: 
loss of consciousness of approximately 30 minutes or less; 
after 30 minutes, an initial Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) of 13-15; and 
postraumatic amnesia (PTA) not greater than 24 hours (p. 86). 
For moderate head injury, Williams, Levin, and Eisenberg (1990) proposed 
an initial (and lowest) GCS of 9 to 12 with or without positive radiological findings 
and loss of consciousness equal to or less than to 20 minutes. Higher scores than 
moderate injury reflect severe injury. In other words, severe injury includes loss of 
consciousness for at least 30 minutes, a GCS equal to or less than 8, and PT A 
equals to or more than 24 hours. 
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Epidemiology of Traumatic Brain Injury 
.. South Africa 
South Africa has one of the highest accident rates in the world. Recently, 
Butchart, Nell, Yach, Brown, Anderson, Radebe, and Johnson (1991) reported 
thaUhe incidence of non-fatal trauma in Johannesburg was 2,886 per 100,000 
population. Of this number, 22,6% were injuries to the head and face. Injuries to 
the head and face are of special interest to neuropsychologists because such 
injuries may be associated with brain injury. The first major studies of TBI in South 
Africa date back to the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902 (De Villiers, 1984). According 
to De Villiers, the high rate of road accidents since then has been attributed to 
personal and extraneous factors. Amongst the personal factors are the high levels 
of alcohol consumption in South Africa; fatigue, which results from the fact that the 
country has long stretches of roads which connect sparsely scattered towns; and 
the low educational level of a large percentage of the population. The extraneous 
factors include the high traffic density in the cities and poor road design. 
De Villiers (1984) also observed that assault was on the increase in South 
Africa. He attributed this to the population explosion in the lower socio-economic 
groups which leads to overcrowding, unemployment; and deculturalization. De 
Villiers (1975, 1984) observed that head injury caused by a knife is a common 
occurrence in South Africa. Butchart et al. (1991) confirmed this in their recent 
study which showed that in Johannesburg, sharp instruments are predominantly 
used during interpersonal violence. 
Nell and Brown (1990) reported a major study on the epidemiology of 
traumatic brain injury in Johannesburg. Their study focused on morbidity, mortality 
and aetiology. The subjects of thei'tudy, who were aged between 15 and 65 years 
were classified into mild, moderate and severe on the basis of length of amnesia-
unconsciousness and the GCS. The mild cases had a GCS of 13-15, and LOC of 
for 60 minutes or less. Patients with a GCS of 7 -12 were classified as moderately 
injured. On the basis of GCS scores, this sample had 87.5% mild cases, and on 
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the basis of amnesia-unconsciousness 80. 7% were mildly injured. The severity of 
injury was found to be unevenly distributed by race, with a significantly higher 
proportion of severe cases amongst whites. The severity of injury was also found 
to increase significantly with age for all three race groups. Nell and Brown used 
ICD-9 (World Health Organization, 1977) criteria for determining head injury 
diagnoses, and found that 89.16% had concussion, 1.86% had cerebral laceration 
or contusion, 7.96% had intracerebral Haemorrhage and 1.02% had unspecified 
intr-Qcranial injury. The Nell and Brown (1990) study also found significant 
differences across age, sex, and race. 
With respect to morbidity, Nell and Brown (1990) found an overall TBI 
incidence of 316.42per100,000 population, with males out numbering females by 
4.80. Whites had the highest male to female ratio (40.15), followed by coloureds 
(7.81 ), and Africans (4.37). For all races combined, TBI increased with age from 
15 to 45 years, after which it declined. For African males, the highest risk age 
groups were the 15 to 24 year olds and 25 to 44 year olds. Amongst the whites on 
the other hand, it was the younger age group (15 to 24 years) that was most at 
risk. The overall mortality was 80. 73 per 100,000 population. The age range with 
the highest fatalities was the 25 to 44 year group, followed by those aged 45 to 64, 
and 15 to 24 years. For blacks, whites, coloureds, and Asians, the fatal TBI 
incidence was 88.47; 53.68; 45.01, and 46.23 respectively. There was thus a clear 
difference across race groups with respect to fatalities. Furthermore, for all race 
groups, there were more male than female fatalities. 
Nell and Brown (1990) found that interpersonal violence was the largest 
single source of traumatic brain injury amongst South African blacks. It accounted 
for 50.95% of African nonfatal TBI, 39.53% amongst coloureds, 25% amongst 
Asians, and 10.14% amongst whites. Blunt instruments were found to account for 
most assaults. Traffic accidents on the other hand were more frequent amongst 
whites (69.57%). Amongst the Asiins, coloureds, and blacks, traffic accidents 
accounted for 55.67%, 48.84%, and 25.56% respectively. The majority of white 
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motor vehicle accident victims were vehicle occupants, whilst the majority of black 
victims were pedestrians. 
.. . . Cross-national Comparisons 
The South African studies reviewed above clearly indicate that traumatic 
brain injury is a major health problem in this country and that it is distributed 
un~venly with respect to age, sex, and race. In order to place the South African 
context into proper perspective a limited review of the epidemiology of traumatic 
brain injury from one Western country, the USA, will be carried out. Several 
methodological constraints have been identified when attempting to make cross-
national comparisons of the epidemiology of traumatic brain injury {Kraus, 1980). 
Hauser {1986) identified three reasons for this difficulty. Firstly, brain injury 
frequently forms part of an overall traumatic condition. It may therefore be 
classified as another type of trauma. Secondly, many brain-injuries that recover 
quickly and have a good outcome are frequently not recorded. Thirdly, the quality 
of medical care and record-keeping for trauma varies from country to country. 
Kraus, Rock, and Hemyari {1990) also highlighted further difficulties in comparing 
epidemiological studies both nationally and cross nationally. These difficulties 
include inconsistencies in the scope and definition of brain injury, differences in 
procedures for case finding, and the varying ways in which severity is measured. 
In the USA, a major study, the National Head and Spinal Cord Injury Survey 
(HSCI) was carried out in 197 4 to determine the extent of the problem nationally 
(Anderson, Kalsbeek,& Hartwell, 1980; Kalsbeek, Mclaurin, Harris, & Miller, 
1980). The HSCI survey determined that the incidence of TBI in the USA was 200 
per 100,000 population. The incidence was twice as frequent in males than in 
.females and occurred mostly in the 15-24 year age group. The most frequent 
cause of head injury was found to t:fe motor vehicle accidents, which accounted for 
49% of all cases. Motor vehicle accidents were also associated with the more 
severe injuries. The second most frequent source of injuries was falls (28.43%). 
Other causes, including assault, made up the remaining 22.57%. The most 
frequent diagnosis after head injury was concussion, which made up 74.5%, 
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followed by contusion and /or laceration, and haematoma which constituted 6. 3% 
and 2.2% respectively. 
In other subsequent USA studies, traumatic brain injury has been found to 
be the third commonest cause of death in the general population after vascular 
disease and malignant neoplasms (Askenasy & Rahmani, 1988). In adults under 
the age of 35, TBI is the major cause of death (Adamovich, Henderson & 
Auerbach, 1984). In the USA, as in South Africa, there is a much higher incidence 
of "tinor head injury than severe head injury. Population based studies of mild 
head injury in the USA have reported an incidence range of 120 to 280 injuries per 
100,000 (Annegers, Grabow, Kurland, & Laws 1980; Kraus et al., 1984; Whitman, 
Coonley-Hoganson, & Desai, 1984). Recent studies have estimated that almost 
90% of new traumatic brain injury patients sustain minor brain injury (Goldstein, 
1990; Miller, 1993). South Africa is similar to the USA in that the victims of 
traumatic brain injury tend to be young males. The other similarity is that the 
majority of the victims sustain mild rather than severe injury. Finally, concussion 
constitutes the major TBI diagnosis. 
South Africa differs from the USA in that the incidence of trauma is much 
higher. Nell and Brown (1991) found that overall, TBI occurrence is 58.2% higher 
in Johannesburg than in the USA. Amongst the South African blacks, coloureds, 
and Asians, the incidence is 97.88% higher. In South Africa, interpersonal violence 
contributes more to the incidence of trauma than motor vehicle accidents. Finally, 
in South Africa, the number of males who sustain injuries from motor vehicle 
accidents and interpersonal violence outnumbers that of females by a much larger 
margin than is the case in the USA. 
_f 
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The Mechanisms of Traumatic Brain injury 
The mechanisms of traumatic brain injury are divided into two main 
categories, primary brain injury and secondary brain injury. Primary brain injury is 
the injury that occurs at the moment of impact, whereas secondary injury occurs 
after the impact. Secondary brain damage is a complication of primary brain injury. 
Thi\ duration during which secondary damage can occur varies from seconds to 
days. 
Primary Brain Injury 
History of the Study of Coup- Contrecoup Injuries 
Many of the mechanisms of primary traumatic brain injury were known by 
the 1950's. Courville (1950) summarized what was known at the time. The ancient 
Greek scholars and physicians were aware of the coup-contrecoup phenomenon, 
whereby a blow to one part of the skull produces a fracture under the site of the 
blow. Damage to the brain occurs directly below the impact site as well as on the 
opposite side of the head. Interest in contrecoup injuries of the brain, as opposed 
to those of the skull, was initiated in the French Royal Academy of surgeons 
around 1776. Six main theories were since put forward to explain contrecoup 
injuries of the brain. These are the vibration or "echo" theory, the theory of 
transmitted force, the brain displacement theory, the pressure gradient theory, and 
the rotation theory. 
The vibration theory. According to the vibration theory, the traumatic impact 
sets up vibrations which are reflected in damage to the opposite pole. The 
vibrations occur as an echo acrossfspace. 
Theory of transmitted force. The proponents of this theory suggested that 
the impact resulted in a transmission of the applied force through the tissue of the 
brain. This force causes the contralateral structures to be thrust against the wall of 
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the skull. 
Cranial deformation. The cranial deformation theory was also known as the 
structure hoop theory. According to this theory contusions result because the skull 
is like a resting hoop. When a resting hoop is struck on one side, the opposing arc 
approximates it. Because of this, the skull contralateral to the point of the blow is 
suddenly forced against the brain at this point, resulting in a bruise. 
Brain displacement. According to this theory, contrecoup injuries result from 
the~vulsion of the cerebral cortex from the overlying meninges. 
The pressure gradient theory. This theory was based on the observatior:t 
that there is a sudden fall in intracranial pressure opposite to the point of impact. 
This fall in pressure causes blood vessels at that point to rupture. 
The rotation theory. Proponents of the rotation theory suggested that after a 
blow the brain is set in centrifugal motion in the direction of the line of force. In so 
doing, the brain is thrust against the irregularities on the interior of the skull. Of all 
the theories enumerated by Courville (1950), the rotation theory has since become 
the most influential. Because of the importance of this theory, it is appropriate to 
single it out for a fuller description. 
Denny-Brown and Russell (1941) demonstrated the importance of rotation 
as a mechanism of injury by subjecting the heads of dogs and monkeys, which 
they used as experimental subjects, to a high rate of change. This procedure 
produced concussion, which they referred to as acceleration concussion. They 
further demonstrated that concussion produced by a crushing injury, in which the 
head is struck whilst it is supported on a hard surface (compression concussion), 
required a much greater force to produce the same effect. Following up on the 
work of Denny-Brown and Russell ( 1941 ), Holbourn ( 1943, 1945) applied 
rotational forces to gelatin models of the brain. He observed that contusions were 
produced, and that these contusions were maximal at the tips of the frontal and 
temporal lobes. Holbourn (1943) e~lained his results by suggesting that when the 
head receives a blow, the behaviour of the skull during and immediately after the 
blow, is determined by the physical properties of the skull and the brain, and 
Newton's laws of motion. Thus, following the blow, the brain rotates and forcibly 
comes into contact with the bony prominences of the skull. 
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Holbourn suggested that because of the brain's incompressibility and its 
feeble rigidity, it is injured by shear strains (the pulling apart of axons and the 
disruption of cell bodies) that develops as the brain is squeezed between the bony 
prominences. Although rotation was the main source of injury to the brain, a 
significant contribution was also made by other factors such as deformation of the 
skull, with or without skull fracture. Holbourne suggested that rotation and skull 
deformation were responsible for some intracranial haemorrhages and probably 
for ~oncussion. Early support for Holbourn's hypothesis was provided by Pudenz 
and Shelden (1946). These researchers removed part of the skull of their 
experimental animals and replaced it with a lucite calvarium, so that they could 
observe the movements of the brain within the skull. From this procedure, they 
observed that the movements of the brain lagged behind the movements of the 
skull. Furthermore, the brain was least able to move at the tips of the temporal and 
frontal lobes because of the presence of the bony prominences. In this way, the 
tips of the temporal and frontal lobes were subjected to greater sheer strains than 
the other parts of the brain. Subsequent experimental studies such as those of 
Adams, Graham, Scott, Parker, and Doyle (1980) and Chu, Lin, Huang and Lee 
(1994) have confirmed that contusions occur mostly in the fronto-temporal regions, 
irrespective of where the head is struck. 
Contemporary Theories 
Pang (1985) proposed that the mechanisms of traumatic brain injury can be 
classified into acceleration-dependent and non-acceleration dependent factors. 
The rotation theory for example is a description of accelerational forces. Pang's 
classification incorporates most of the factors previously described by Courville 
(1950). In the next few paragraphs, Pang's description of the acceleration-
dependent and non-acceleration dgpendent factors will be paraphrased. 
Acceleration-dependent factors. According to Pang, acceleration is of two 
types, translation or linear acceleration, and angular acceleration. In translation, 
the resultant vector of a force applied to a rigid body passes through the centre of 
gravity, so that all the particles within the body will travel at the same acceleration 
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and in the same direction. In this way, the particles will not sustain intermolecular 
stress. Although the particles do not sustain intermolecular stress, translational 
acceleration nevertheless causes brain damage. This comes about because the 
acceleration causes both the skull and the brain to move, but with the brain 
moving more slowly than the skull. The differential speed has the effect of causing 
the brain to crowd towards the impact pole. When this happens, a pressure 
gradient is created at the impact pole and negative pressure is created at the 
anttPole. 
As the negative pressure at the anti-pole continues to a point below the 
vapour pressure, the liquid boils and forms bubbles as it turns into the gaseous 
state. Deceleration leads to condensation of gases and the bubbles will disappear. 
The rapid succession of formation and collapse of bubbles is called cavitation. 
Cavitation is responsible for damage to the anti-pole where it ruptures blood 
vessels and tears neural tissues diffusely. According to Pang, cavitation theory 
can explain traumatic damage to the cortical and subcortical areas, but it does not 
explain lesions to the deep brain structures where there is zero pressure. 
In angular acceleration, the resultant vector of a force does not pass 
through the centre of gravity. Consequently, the body will rotate around its own 
centre of gravity. Because the head is attached to the cervical spine, some degree 
of rotation always occurs around the foramen magnum regardless of the direction 
of the impact vector. Pang (1985) cautions that both pure translation and pure 
angular acceleration are rare. What is more commonly found is a mixture of 
angular and linear acceleration. From this, the body will spin around its own centre 
of gravity whilst travelling linearly along the path of the translational vector. 
Rotation is a form of angular acceleration and it is responsible for most 
brain damage after trauma. Pang proposed that the mechanisms of injury are as 
follows: When a blow inducing rotation is applied to the head, the skull rotates, 
whilst the brain initially remains stqtionary. In time the brain is also made to rotate 
by the frictional forces of the bony prominences, namely the falx and the sphenoid 
ridges, which produce shearing strain on the cingulate gyrus, the temporal poles, 
and the frontal poles. The bony prominences create shear strain by distorting the 
shape of the brain. Because the brain has a feeble rigidity, the shear strains lead 
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to the tearing of neural tissues in the deep portions of the brain. Although the 
shearing forces cause damage diffusely, they are more likely in certain areas, 
notably along the interfaces between substances of different densities such as 
between grey matter and white matter, the brain and blood vessels, and the brain 
and cerebrospinal fluid. 
Non-acceleration dependent factors. Pang considered these factors to be 
rare and therefore to be of theoretical interest only. He divided the non-
ac~leration dependent factors into deforming and non-deforming mechanisms. 
The deforming mechanisms include impression trauma, ellipsoidal deformation, 
and skull vibration. Impression trauma results when the impacting surface is small. 
Initially the impacting object causes the skull to bend inwards. Next, the skull 
reverses, but instead of resuming its original configuration, it overshoots as a 
result of the inertia of the skull. By so doing, negative pressure is created at the 
point below the initial impact. This will have the effect of sucking up neural tissues 
and blood vessels, causing damage in the process. The mechanism involved in 
impression trauma is cavitation. 
Ellipsoidal deformation occurs when there is a fronto-occipital blow to the 
supported head. The blow deforms the skull from its usual ellipsoidal shape to a 
spherical one. The spherically shaped skull will therefore have a larger volume. 
Because of this, destructive shearing strains will occur in and around the centre of 
the brain where a negative pressure will develop. This negative pressure develops 
because the portions of the brain at the anterior and the posterior will be forced to 
move towards the centre whilst the lateral sides of the brain will be forced to move 
towards the periphery of the sphere. The anatomical sites that are injured by this 
process are the walls of the ventricles and parts of the corpus callosum, and the 
hypothalamus. The mechanism of skull vibration is largely an extension of the 
theory of "echo" across space previously described and will therefore not be dwelt 
upon further. J 
Finally, Pang (1985) described one possible non-deforming mechanism, the 
mechanism of stress waves. The impact of the blow supposedly sets up shock 
waves which travel from the point of impact to the anti-pole. As these shock waves 
travel, they create zones of differential pressure where shearing strains may be 
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generated. Pang sees this mechanism, which is similar to the theory of transmitted 
force previously described, as being of little relevance because physical laws 
dictate that a shock wave may be expected only if the collision time is less than 
the travelling time of the acoustic wave in the head. These conditions are not met 
in blows to the head, and therefore stress waves are not generated. 
Secondary Brain Damage 
\ 
Secondary brain damage occurs for varying lengths of time after head 
trauma. Salazaar (1992) suggests that because the pathologic picture continues to 
evolve for hours and days, it is important to recognize that traumatic brain injury is 
a dynamic process. Much of the ultimate damage from head trauma appears to 
occur in a delayed or secondary fashion (Smith, Casey & Mcintosh, 1995). 
Hypoxia and ischaemia are central mechanisms of cell injury within the nervous 
system (Bennett, O'Brien, Phillips, & Farrell, 1995). The other mechanisms are 
haemorrhage, haematoma, brain oedema, brain swelling, hydrocephalus. 
Hypoxia and lschemia 
Under normal circumstances, the brain takes up about 25% of the body's 
oxygen supply (Snell, 1989). The term ischemia means an inadequate delivery of 
oxygen to the brain (Sahuquillo et al., 1993). After traumatic brain injury, 
deprivation of oxygen can result from cardio-respiratory arrest, reduced blood flow, 
and increased intracranial pressure related to the mass lesions such as 
haemorrhage and haematoma (Adams, Graham & Harriman, 1989). Hypoxic 
damage is usually seen in the arterial border zones between major cerebral 
arterial territories as well as diffusely throughout the cortex (Graham, et al., 1983). 
J 
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According to Brierley (1976) the hippocampal regions have a selective vulnerability 
to hypoxia. Hall and Braughter (1993) showed that the free radicals and excitotoxic 
neurotransmitters released during hypoxia result in damage to the neurons. 
Haemorrhage and Haematomas 
By haemorrhage is meant intracranial bleeding. This occurs as a result of 
the rupture of blood vessels in different locations in the cranium. The three main 
' locations affected during trauma are the space between the dura and the skull, 
that between the dura and the arachnoid matter, and within the brain substance 
itself (Snell, 1989). Haematomas are the blood clots resulting from haemorrhage. 
Like haemorrhages, haematomas are divided into extradural, subdural, and 
intra cerebral. 
Extradural. In extradural haemorrhage, the meningeal arteries and veins, 
particularly the anterior division of the meningeal are injured. According to Snell 
(1989), bleeding occurs under high pressure and tears up the meningeal layer of 
the dura from the internal surface of the skull. The haemorrhage frequently results 
from a fracture of the parietal bone. Walsh (1987) pointed out that the extradural 
haematoma has little relevance to neuropsychology because it is a neurosurgical 
emergency. 
Subdural. Subdural haemorrhage results from the tearing of the superior 
cerebral veins where they enter the superior sagittal sinus (Snell, 1989). This 
happens when a blow to the head causes excessive anteroposterior displacement 
of the brain within the skull. Bleeding takes place under high pressure but the 
pressure is less than is the case with extradural haemorrhage. The blood 
accumulates in the potential space between the dura and the arachnoid. Subdural 
haemorrhage, unlike extradural haemorrhage spreads diffusely over the affected 
hemisphere. According to Jennett {A 994) acute intracranial haematoma is the 
most common vascular complication after traumatic brain injury. Tsuchida, Harms, 
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Woodward, & Bullock (1996) described the importance of subdural hematoma as 
follows: 
\ 
Acute subdural hematoma kills or disables more severely head injured 
patients than any other complication of intracranial trauma. The main 
pathological factor involved is ischemic neuronal damage, which is caused 
by raised intracranial pressure and local effect. (p. 104 ). 
Haematomas lead to brain damage because they are mass lesions (Grubb 
& Coxe, 1978; Pang, 1985). They take up space in the cranium and thus lead to 
increased intracranial pressure. Adams, Graham and Harriman (1989) state that 
as a result of this pressure, extradural haematomas lead to a shift of the mid line 
structures such as the ventricles, and compression of the midbrain. Subdural 
haematomas on the other hand lead to flattening of the convolutions of the brain 
and a narrowing of the sulci. 
lntracerebral. According to Snell (1989) intracerebral hemorrhages occur as 
a result of the rupture of the thin-walled lenticulostriate artery, a branch of the 
middle cerebral artery. The haemorrhage occurs into the substance of the brain. It 
is found in more severe injuries. Like subdural hematomas, intracerebral 
hematomas can lead to increased intracranial pressure (Robertson, Gopinath, & 
Chance, 1995). 
Oedema 
Cerebral oedema refers to an increase in the volume of the water content of the 
brain. It is one of the normal physiological responses to tissue damage (Lezak, 
1995). Adams and Victor (1989) distinguished between cellular and vasogenic 
oedema. Cellular oedema results fFQm hypoxic injury which causes the cellular 
elements, viz the neurons, glia, and endothelial cells to imbibe fluid. Vasogenic 
oedema on the other hand results from the alteration of the blood-brain barrier 
caused by the trauma-induced physical disruption of the nerve tissue by the 
trauma. Cerebral oedema leads to brain damage by contributing to brain swelling. 
Oedema, lik~haematoma, also causes brain damage by increasing the 
intracranial pressure (Lezak, 1995). 
Brain .Swelling 
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Brain swelling refers to the increase in the total volume of the brain. As was 
indicated in the previous section, such swelling can occur in some cases as a 
res~lt of oedema. Diffuse brain swelling can also occur in areas adjacent to 
haemorrhages, haematomas, and contusions (Kaye, 1991 ). Kaye suggests that 
cerebral swelling involves a disturbance of the vasomotor tone. Bullock et al. 
(1992) state that there is evidence of reduced cerebral blood flow in the brain 
areas surrounding the swelling, which explains why there is always a surrounding 
zone of ischemic tissue and pyknotic dead neurones. The term pyknotic refers to 
a degenerative process in the cell, which involves the condensation and shrinkage 
of the cell nucleus. This is occurs because reduced cerebral flow is associated 
with vasospasm (Kordestani, Martin, McBride, 1995). In addition to reducing blood 
flow, brain swelling also leads to raised intracranial pressure which, as previously 
pointed out, results in brain shift. It has also been suggested that axonal injury 
causes localized transport failures in the axon, which leads to swelling, as well as 
lysis of the axon, and Wallerian degeneration (Crooks, 1991; Povlishock, 1993). 
Hydrocephalus 
Hydrocephalus is an abnormal increase in the volume of the cerebrospinal fluid 
(CSF) within the skull (Snell, 1989). After traumatic brain injury, hydrocephalus 
results from atrophy in other parts of the brain. Bigler, Kurth, Blatter, and Abildskov 
(1992) found that because of the disintegration of severely damage neuronal 
tissue, the brain shrinks. This alloVJS the ventricles to increase their volume of 
CSF, leading to an increase in the ventricle-to-brain ratio. An increase in ventricle-
to-brain ratio has been observed in association with diffuse axonal injury on the 
cortex (Macnamara et al., 1992), and atrophy of the fornix and corpus callosum 
(Gale, Johnson, Bigler, & Blatter, 1995). 
Neuropathology and Pathophysiology of Traumatic Brain Injury 
\ 
Abnormalities In Brain Structure 
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Investigations of the abnormal brain structures after brain injury rely mostly 
on radiological techniques. The two most commonly used radiological techniques 
are the computerized tomography (CT) scans and magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI). Both of these techniques produce three dimensional images of the brain. 
The CT scan and the MRI are equally sensitive in the detection of superficial soft-
tissue injury (Orrison et al., 1994). There are however some differences between 
the two techniques. For example, Kurth, Bigler, and Blatter (1994) noted the 
following advantages that the CT scan has over MRI: "It requires less time to 
acquire the images, is superior to MR for visualizing bone, is less sensitive to 
motion effects (a common problem with patients, who are frequently agitated), is 
less expensive, and generally sufficient to make early diagnostic and treatment 
decisions" (p. 489). Focal and multifocal contusions as revealed by CT scans, are 
associated with an increase in the frequency in abnormalities of memory, 
concentration, speech, weaknesses of limbs, and consciousness (Eide & Tysnes, 
1992). The CT scan is also more useful than MRI in identifying acute brain 
damage (Matheson, 1994 ). 
Despite these advantages, the CT scan fails to identify many cases of brain 
injury. Astrup (1989) suggested that the CT may fail to identify lesions because it 
is only sensitive to focal injuries. It y;ill therefore fail to identify a significant number 
of cases because, as was stated before, most closed head injuries lead to diffuse 
brain damage. According to Astrup, the CT scan fails to identify damage because 
diffuse injury occurs mainly at the cellular level, leaving gross anatomy 
unchanged. As a result, the brain looks surprisingly normal on CT scan, 
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considering the often serious clinical condition of coma. 
The MRI has been found to be more sensitive than CT scan in identifying 
subtle neurological damage, such as that found in minor head injury (Eisenberg & 
Levin, 1989; Gandy, Snow, Zimmerman, & Deck, 1984; Jenkins, Teasdale, 
Hadley, McPherson, & Rowan, 1986; Levin, Williams, Eisenberg, High, & Guinto, 
1992). Jacobs (1995) reports that within 1 week of head injury, MRI scans identify 
twice as many lesions as CT scans. Furthermore, the MRI has been shown to be 
SUP.erior to the CT in identifying cerebral contusions, shearing injury, subdural and 
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epidural hematoma, and sinus involvement (Orrison et al., 1994). Both CT scans 
and MRI have been used to identify abnormalities arising from secondary brain 
damage. These abnormalities have already been described in detail. They include 
haematoma, oedema, brain swelling, and hydrocephalus. The other abnormalities 
that these imaging techniques can detect are contusions and diffuse axonal injury 
(DAI) which will be described below. 
Contusions 
Contusions are traumatic bruises on the surface of the brain, with resultant 
escape of the blood contents into the tissues of the brain (Matheson, 1994 ). 
Auerbach (1986) states that contusions have long been considered as the 
hallmark of traumatic brain injury and that they are usually correlated to some 
extent with the presence of skull fractures. Clifton, Grossman, Makala, Handel, & 
Sadhu (1980) observed that contusions are commonly bilateral, but asymmetrical. 
Contusions are focal injuries, found most frequently at the tips of the frontal and 
temporal lobes (Holbourn, 1943; Adams, Graham, Scott, Parker, & Doyle, 1980). 
The predilection for contusions on these two anatomical sites has been confirmed 
by both CT scans and MRI (Levin, Amparo, et al., 1987). The MRI reveals lesions 
in more detail than the CT scan (A,9iams, Graham, Murray, & Scott, 1982; Snow, 
Zimmerman, Gandy, Heir, & Deck, 1986). In minor head injury, small contusions 
are visible on MRI but not on CT scan (Auerbach, 1986; Jacobs, 1995). 
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Diffuse Axonal Injury 
Strich (1956, 1970) was the first to describe diffuse axonal injury (DAI) after 
postmortems on people who had died after severe head injury. Although the 
axonal injury was diffuse, it was particularly evident in the white matter of the 
cerebral hemispheres, notably the corpus callosum and the brainstem. These 
initial findings were confirmed by subsequent studies (Adams, Graham, Murray, & 
Sc~t, 1982; Blumbergs, Jones, & North, 1989). Strich proposed that the DAI was 
caused by mechanical shearing forces at the moment of impact. Oppenheimer 
(1968) reported DAI in five patients who had sustained minor head injuries but had 
died of other causes. The pathology in minor head injury that Oppenheimer found 
differed from that of severe injury only in extent. Some recent studies have shown 
that DAI in the brainstem is much more widespread than had previously been 
thought (Hashimoto, Nakamura, Richard, & Frowein, 1993 ). Hilton (1995) 
explains that disruption of the white matter "in essence disconnects the cerebral 
hemispheres from any form of communication with other brain centres, in 
particular the reticular activating system" (p. 8). 
Gennarelli et al. (1982) found that the shear strains and tensile forces that 
are associated with closed head injury lead to the formation of retraction balls. 
These retraction balls are, in essence, reactive swelling (Hilton, 1995). As the 
neurons are torn during impact, they retract and expel a ball of axoplasm. 
Furthermore, Gennarelli et al. found that in animal studies, the mechanism of mild 
head injury is the same as that for severe head injury. The only difference was that 
there was more damage in the later. Pilz (1983) showed that the frank separation 
from the cell soma occurs over a period of hours and that the large caliber, long-
tract decussating axons are preferentially vulnerable to injury. Similarly, Lyeth, 
Jenkins, Hamm, & Dixon (1990) observed that cellular disruption may induce 
persistent metabolic/physiologic agnormalities but not cellular death or 
degeneration. In mild brain injury, the axons are not torn at impact. Instead, there 
is a focal compression or stretching of axons rather than a frank separation 
(Povlishock & Coburn 1989, Gennarelli, 1993). 
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Diffuse axonal injury is the most consistent pathology after moderate to 
severe head injury (Povlishok, Becker, & Cheng, 1986). This has been confirmed 
by more recent studies. For example, an increase in ventricle-to-brain ratio after 
traumatic brain injury is an indication of degenerative changes in the brain (Bigler, 
Kurth, Blatter, & Abildskov, 1992). Macnamara et al. (1992) reported a case, 
probably the first of its kind, of an individual who had CT scans taken 3 months 
prior to a severe traumatic brain injury, and after injury. The posttraumatic scan 
sho~ed significant dilation of the ventricles, which reflected DAI. 
Neuropsychological tests which were performed on this patient showed global 
deficits, a finding which is consistent with diffuse brain injury. More recently, Bigler 
et al. (1994) compared the day of injury CT scans of 15 adult TBI patients with 
moderate to severe injury (GCS ~ 10) with scans taken two months after injury. 
These scans were contrasted with those of 21 medical controls who had normal 
scans. In 80% of the patients, there was demonstrable ventricle-to-brain ratio 
increases. According to Elson and Ward (1994), mild head injury, like moderate 
and severe injury, can also lead to diffuse axonal injury. 
In spite of the successes reported in the use of CT and MRI scans, these 
radiological assessments still fail to identify many cases with brain damage 
(Newton et al., 1992).The reason for this is that CT and MRI procedures assess 
the structural integrity of the brain. In this way, they can identify contusions, and 
DAI but they cannot actively tap the current mental activity (Horton & Miller, 1985). 
They can identify some of the abnormalities of brain structure but cannot identify 
abnormalities of brain function (Gordon, 1994). 
Abnormalities in Brain Function 
Some radiological procedures were designed to assess brain function, 
rather than brain structure. There 9fe two broad sets of measures. The first are the 
electrical measures electroencephalography (EEG), evoked potentials, and 
magneto-encephalography (MEG). The second set are the radio-isotope 
measures which include regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF), single photon 
emission computed tomography (SPECT), and positron emission tomography 
(PET). In addition to radiological abnormalities, there are also abnormalities in 
neurotransmission and in neuropsychological function . 
. Electro-encephalography 
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Electroencephalography involves measurements of voltage changes from 
the brain. Bickford and Klass (1966) demonstrated that there is a slowing of EEG 
after minor head injury. Later, McFlynn, Montgomerry, Fenton, and Rutherford 
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(1984) reported acute theta abnormalities in individuals who had sustained minor 
head injury. Similarly, Montgomery, Fenton, Mclelland, MacFlynn,& Rutherford 
(1991) demonstrated that there is a reduction in EEG theta power after minor head 
injury. Recently, Mclelland, Fenton, and Rutherford (1994) reported that after 
head injury, there was a large amount of diffusely distributed abnormal slow wave 
activity. Furthermore, they also found that all the EEG channels showed significant 
correlations with symptom counts. A major difficulty with the use of EEGs in the 
past was that normal recordings have been reported in people with demonstrated 
brain damage (Horton & Miller, 1985). Nevertheless, Gevins et al. (1995) have 
shown that the more recent high-resolution EEGs can be quite sensitive and are 
likely to be put to greater use in future. 
Evoked Potentials 
The evoked potential is a change in the EEG record elicited by the 
momentary presentation of a sensory stimulus. These potentials can be classified 
by modality into auditory, visual and somatosensory. In terms of polarity, the 
waves can be either positive, designated by the letter P, or negative, designated 
by the letter, N. The waves are further labeled according to the number of 
milliseconds that elapse between tpie presentation of a stimulus and the 
appearance of the wave. So, the wave which occurs 100 milliseconds after a 
stimulus will be P100 or N100 depending on whether it is positive or negative. 
Finally, the evoked potential waves can be labeled in terms of their latency into 
early, middle, and late potentials. The term event-related potentials (ERP) is 
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nowadays preferred to the term evoked potentials, because it has now been 
realized that the electrical recordings do not just reflect the response evoked by a 
stimulus, but also a variety of situations invoked by the psychological demands of 
the situation (Donchin, Ritter, & McCallum, 1978). Coles and Rugg (1995) 
reviewed the ways in which ERPs are traditionally classified. Their description will 
be paraphrased below. Most reviews of ERPs classify the components into those 
that precede and those that follow events. 
\. 
Event-preceding components. Two components have been identified. 
These are the readiness potential, and the contingent negative variation (CNV). 
The readiness potential was first identified by Kornhuber and Deeke 1965 (cited in 
Coles & Rugg, 1995). This is a slow, ramp-like negative shift that precedes the 
actual production of a voluntary hand movement by as much as 1000 ms. It is 
maximal at precentral sites. As the time of the impeding hand movement 
approaches, the negativity becomes larger over the right scalp site, contra lateral to 
the left hand movement. This has been referred to as the Lateralized Readiness 
Potential. 
Walter, Cooper, Aldridge, McCallum and Winier (1964) showed that when a 
person is given a warning signal and is instructed to respond to or to anticipate a 
second stimulus, his or her EEG will show negative shifts in widespread cortical 
regions. Walter et al. described this phenomenon as contingent negative variation 
(CNV) or expectancy wave. This wave was maximal over the fronto-central regions 
of the brain. Loveless and Sanford (197 4) showed that the CNV was actually 
composed of two components. The two components only become apparent when 
the interval between the two stimuli extended beyond the 1 sec originally used by 
Walter et al. At intervals of 6 sec and 15 secs, there are 2 negative waves, one 
following the first stimulus, and the other preceding the second stimulus. Loveless 
and Sanford labeled the first wave as "O" because they believed it reflected 
orientation to the stimulus. The seq_t>nd was the "E" wave, which they believed 
reflected expectancy. The researchers believed that perhaps the E wave was 
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actually the readiness potential. 
Event-following Components. Event-following components have been 
broadly classified into exogenous and endogenous waves. 
\. 
The exogenous are a set of components whose characteristics (amplitude, 
latency, and distribution) seem to depend on the physical properties of 
sensory stimuli, such as their modality and intensity ... It has been claimed 
that their characteristics are immune to variations in the subject's state and 
to the nature of the interaction between the subject and the stimulus - that 
is, that they are not influenced by 'cognitive' manipulations (p. 15). 
The endogenous components, on the other hand, depend on the nature of the 
interactions between the subject and the stimuli. They vary as a function of factors 
such as attention, task relevance, and so on. Coles and Rugg (1995) suggest that 
this dichotomy is a simplification of the real state of affairs. They point out that 
almost all of the sensory components have been shown to be affected by cognitive 
manipulations such as attention. According to these authors, one should speak of 
the exogenous-endogenous dimension that is roughly coextensive with time. "Thus 
, those ERP components that occur within the first 1 OOms of stimulus presentation 
tend to be exogenous, while those occurring later tend to be more endogenous" 
(Coles & Rugg, p. 16). The exogenous components include sensory components, 
the Nd (negative difference), which is also known as processing negativity, and the 
mismatch negativity (MMN). 
The sensory components are the ERP deflections related to transmission of 
sensory information from the peripheral sensory system to the cortex and/ or the 
arrival of that information to the cortex. One of the most commonly researched 
sensory components is the brainstem auditory evoked potential (BAEP). The 
BAEP is related to auditory stimuli,.JSnd is evident in the auditory nerve as early as 
10 ms. It can be detected in the cortex after 100 ms (Hillyard, 1993). A number of 
studies in the early 1980s reported that these waves were slowed in up to 27% of 
the victims of chronic head injury (Montgomery, Fenton, & Mclelland, 1984; 
Narayan, Greenberg & Miller, 1981; Noseworthy, Miller, Murray, & Regan, 1981 ). 
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Rowe and Carlsson (1980) noted that these abnormalities are particularly 
associated with dizziness. After these initial publications, it was felt by many that 
brainstem auditory evoked potentials would be useful in the assessment of minor 
head injury. More recent investigations have, however, failed to confirm these 
initial optimistic reports (Schoenhuber, Gentilini, & Orlando, 1988; Rappaport, 
Hammele, & Rappaport, 1991). Campbell, Suffield, & Deacon (1990) suggested 
that this is because exogenous components such as the BAEP cannot detect 
st"{ctural damage of the higher centres or the functional nature of cognitive 
deficits. Although the brainstem auditory evoked potentials are frequently present 
long after injury, they correlate poorly with other measures of severity (Alexander, 
1995). For the somatosensory processes, early evoked potentials have also been 
observed (Naatanen, 1992). In the visual sense however, only the later deflections 
seem to be evident. In other words, the deflections only become evident at the 
early cortical levels. 
The negative difference (Nd) (Hillyard & Hansen, 1986) and the processing 
negativity (Naatanen, Gaillard, & Mantysalo, 1978) are descriptors of the same 
component. However, claims about the functional significance of each component 
are somewhat different. The Nd emphasizes the polarity and the operation used to 
identify the component. It is isolated by taking the difference between two ERP 
waveforms that are elicited in response to the same physical stimulus. "The critical 
comparison is between ERPs for the same stimulus when it is being attended 
versus when it is unattended. 'Processing negativity' emphasizes the fact that the 
component is related to some form of extra processing accorded to attended 
events on the basis of a preceding selection process" (Coles & Rugg, 1995, p. 17). 
Hillyard and Hansen (1986) showed that the attended stimulus was 
associated with more negative deflections than the unattended, and the difference 
was maximal (auditory task) at 100 ms after the presentation of the stimulus. They 
concluded that the effect of attention was to modulate the amplitude of the N1 
component. On the other hand, Naatanen, Gaillard, and Mantysalo (1978) argued 
that the effect of attention was to add a negative shift to the unattended ERP, a 
shift that i~ not specifically time-locked to the N1 component. They claimed the 
negative shift was associated with the processing of the target stimulus dimension. 
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The mismatch negativity (MMN) is a negative wave that was first described 
in relation to the physiological basis of the orienting response. Sokolov ( 1963) 
suggested that the following mechanisms might explain how the orientation 
reaction comes about: Repeated presentations of a stimulus results in an internal 
representation of the stimulus, a neuronal model. All incoming information is 
compared against such neuronal models. If the incoming stimulus is identical to 
the neuronal model of that stimulus there will be no reaction. In other words there 
wil!fe habituation. If, on the other hand, the incoming stimulus is different from the 
internal representation, an orienting reaction will follow. The orientation reaction 
occurs because of the mismatch between the incoming stimulus and the neuronal 
model of that stimulus. The negative wave that is generated when there is such a 
mismatch is the mismatch negativity wave (MMN). It is an N200 wave. 
Naatanen, Gaillard, and Mantysalo (1978) found that the MMN occurs even 
when the stimuli are unattended. They suggested that this wave reflected the 
automatic detection of physical deviance. Woldorff, Hackley, and Hillyard (1991) 
argued that this deviation does not reflect a purely automatic process, because its 
amplitude may be influenced by attention. NB: The mismatch negativity is N200a; 
N200's presence depends on the events being task relevant. In many instances, 
this later component co-varies with P300. 
The most widely researched endogencus wave is the P300 (abbreviated as 
P3). This wave was first described by Sutton, Braren, Zubin, and John (1965). It is 
characterized by a parietally maximal scalp distribution and has a latency between 
300-800 ms. Coles et al. suggest that the P3 is most widely researched because 
of its size (5-20 mv), and the ease with which it is elicited. The P3 has been 
separated into two components, P3a and P3b (Squires, Squires, & Hillyard, 1975). 
The P3a is frontal in origin whilst the P3b is parietal in origin. Several studies have 
shown that the P300 component is slowed after TBI (Levin, Gary, et al., 1987; 
Papanicolaou et al., 1984). J 
The latency of the P300 is a measure of the speed of cognition and has 
thus been used as an electrophysiological marker for the disorders of cognition 
(Pratap-Chand, Sinniah, & Salem, 1988). "The latency of the P300 component 
(measured in milliseconds) reflects the time taken by the individual to conclude 
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that a task-relevant stimulus has been presented" (Shores et al., 1990). This wave 
thus reflects, amongst other things, decision making. Recently, it has been 
demonstrated that the P300 latency decreases with patient improvement as 
assessed by neuropsychological tests (Onofr et al., 1991) . 
. Cerebral Blood Flow 
\ Taylor and Bell (1966) were probably the first to report that there is a 
significant slowing of cerebral circulation after traumatic brain injury. Reduced 
blood flow is detected using positron emission tomography (PET) scans and single 
photon emission computerized tomography (SPECT) (Gordon, 1994). The 
reduced blood flow renders the brain at risk for secondary ischaemia (Bouma & 
Muizelaar, 1992). Pogacnik (1989) reported on the differences in blood flow 
between regions of the brain after traumatic brain injury as follows: 
Because of increased metabolism in the frontal regions, blood flow in the 
anterior temporal and central regions decreases (steal syndrome?). The 
interhemispheric differences can perhaps be accounted for by increased 
blood supply to the dominant hemisphere in the "deranged state" 
(interhemispheric steal?). Impaired adaptability of rCBF to metabolic needs 
is thus one of the demonstrable functional disorders in patients with the 
postconcussion syndrome (p. 314). 
After traumatic brain injury, patients become hypermetabolic, 
hypercatabolic, and hyperglycemic (Roberts, 1995). This general increase in 
metabolism leads to a greater need for a supply in oxygen, which is carried by the 
blood. Injury to the brain is associated with reduced blood flow around cerebral 
contusions and intracerebral haematoma (Bullock et al., 1992). The cerebral blood 
flow is decreased by intracranial hypertension; cerebral vasospasm; occlusion, 
compression, or injury of intracranial nerves, hypocapnia, and hypotension 
(Robertson, Contant, Gokaslan, Narayan, & Grossman, 1992). Cerebral blood flow 
measures can identify more abnormalities than structural measures. For example, 
38 
Newton et al. ( 1992) recently assessed 19 patients, comparing the structural 
measures of CT scan and MRI with the functional measure SPECT. They found 
that SPECT identified 43 abnormalities, MRI identified 19, and CT scan identified 
only 13. Reduced cerebral blood flow has been shown to have significant 
correlations with neuropsychological deficits, notably problems of attention and 
memory (Ruff et al., 1994 ). 
Neurotransmitter Abnormalities 
Carlsson (1987) showed that after traumatic brain injury, there are 
alterations in arousal, attention and information processing, which are mediated in 
part by dopaminergic and noradrenergic neurons. Similarly, Meltzer and Lowy 
(1987) suggested that post-traumatic symptoms such as memory, anxiety, and 
aggression are mediated by abnormalities in serotonergic neurons. Hayes, Lyeth 
and Jenkins (1989) and Lyeth and Hayes (1992) reviewed the literature on 
neurotransmission abnormalities and noted that mechanical brain injury seems to 
lead to a large nonspecific release of both excitatory and inhibitory 
neurotransmitters. 
The acute, net effect of TB I-induced agonist receptor interactions is 
excessive neuronal excitation. The resulting excitotoxicity 
significantly contributes to the pathophysiology of TBI. The excitation 
at the time of injury can result in functional deficits persisting long 
after the initial insult (Lyeth & Hayes, 1992, p. 5469). 
Many studies have noted an increase in the neurotransmitters glutamate 
and acetylcholine (Myseros & Bullock, 1995). The activation of the muscarinic 
cholinergic system located in the r95tral pons contributes to components of 
behavioural suppression accompanying transient unconsciousness. A recent 
review by Hovda et al. (1995} found that the release of neurotransmitters results in 
a massive ionic flux, which, consequently, produces an increase in glycolysis. 
"This increase in glycolysis is followed by a metabolic diaschisis, which is related 
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to the degree and extent of behavioural deficits." (p. 903). Gualtieri (1995) 
suggests that these neurotransmitter abnormalities suggest a link with 
postconcussion symptoms: 
' 
The pathologic anatomy of CHI is reflected by the derangements in 
neurotransmission that come one step closer to elucidating the origin of the 
symptoms of PCS (postconcussion syndrome). The axonal tracts that are 
most likely to be disrupted in CHI are monoaminergic projections from the 
brainstem to cortical and subcortical structures. The majority of the 
monoaminergic neurons are located in the lower brainstem and from there 
project to all parts of the central nervous system (CNS). They make up a 
very expansive chemical network, part of the reticular formation, organized 
in tightly clustered groups with extensive homotypic interconnections and 
long projections to interacting target areas (Gualtieri, 1995, p. 130). 
The neurochemical disturbances resulting from abnormal excitation may not 
be associated with structural alternations detectable at the light microscopic level. 
Bigler and Snyder (1995) propose that in some cases, there may be structural 
damage in mild traumatic brain injury that is below the threshold for detection by 
current anatomic imaging techniques. This is further reason for using assessment 
techniques that measure abnormalities in brain function, in addition to 
assessments of the structural integrity of the brain. 
Neuropsychological Abnormalities 
Neuropsychological assessments aim to identify abnormalities in a wide 
variety of psychological processes associated with brain injury. All psychological 
processes is potential targets for tt}ese assessments. The psychological 
processes include consciousness, sensation, perception, attention, memory, 
intellectual functions, emotional & motivational behaviour, and personality change. 
Numerous tests are currently in use to assess neuropsychological deficits after 
TBI. These are well reviewed in neuropsychological texts such as Lezak (1995). 
Research using such tests has demonstrated neuropsychological deficits in 
patients. For example, Arcia and Gualtieri ( 1993) demonstrated an association 
between the presence of postconcussion symptoms and deficits on 
neuropsychological tests. The tests included finger tapping, continuous 
performance test, switching attention test, pattern comparison test, symbol digit 
substitution, and pattern memory test. Memory problems were most consistently 
associated with the neuropsychological deficits. The assessment of 
neuropsychological deficits can also be carried out using the information 
' 
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processing paradigms, the aims and rationale of which were described in Chapter 
1. This is the approach to be used in the present study. 
Summary 
This chapter focussed on four aspects of traumatic brain injury, namely 
assessments of severity, epidemiology, mechanisms of injury, and pathology. The 
conventional indices of severity of injury are the duration of coma, the depth of 
coma, and the duration of post-traumatic amnesia. None of these measures is 
completely satisfactory as a measure of severity, when used on its own. Alexander 
(1995) points out however, that despite the inherent difficulties of these measures, 
they are still the best available. The utility of these measures is strengthened when 
they are used in combination, rather than singly. Wilson, Teasdale, Hadley, 
Wiedmann, and Lang (1994) recommend this use of multiple indices of severity, 
because these indices are sensitive to different forms of brain injury. 
The epidemiological studies that were reviewed showed that South Africa 
has one of the highest accident rates in the world. As is the case in Western 
countries, the majority of victims of traumatic are young males and concussion is 
the most frequent diagnosis. The rpechanisms of traumatic brain injury were 
divided into primary and secondary brain injuries. lschaemia has been argued by 
many to be one of the most critical processes in secondary brain damage 
(Bennett, O'Brien, Phillips, & Farrell, 1995). Other secondary brain injury 
processes include hypoxia, haemorrhage, haematoma, oedema, brain swelling, 
and hydrocephalus. Many of these processes are associated with raised 
intracranial pressure. 
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Traumatic brain injury is associated with several neuropathological and 
neurophysiological features. These were classified into abnormalities of brain 
structure and abnormalities of brain function. The abnormalities of brain structure 
include contusions and diffuse axonal injuries. Identification of these structural 
abnormalities has relied mostly on CT and MRI scans. These technologies have 
been very useful, but they have the short-coming that in some cases, the brain 
' may look structurally normal, and yet be functioning abnormally. The abnormalities 
of brain function include slowing in aspects of the brain's electrical activities, 
slowing of cerebral blood flow, abnormalities of neurotransmission, and disturbed 
neuropsychological processes. All these abnormalities can contribute to the 
postconcussion syndrome, which is the subject of the following chapter. 
J 
\ 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE POSTCONCUSSION SYNDROME: SYMPTOM CLUSTERS 
AND AETIOLOGY 
Symptom Correlations and Symptom Clusters 
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In the past, there was some controversy as to whether or not the various 
postconcussion symptoms could be said to constitute a syndrome. Several writers 
argued that these symptoms did not form clear-cut clusters, therefore they did not 
really constitute a syndrome (Lidvall, Linderoth, & Norlin, 197 4; Rutherford, Merritt, 
& McDonald, 1977). Contrary to these assertions, later researchers have since 
demonstrated strong correlations between pairs of postconcussion symptoms. For 
example, Mureriwa (1990) reported strong correlations between headache and 
dizziness, and between poor concentration and memory. 
In addition to associations between pairs of symptoms, factor analytic 
studies have demonstrated symptom clusters within the postconcussion 
syndrome. Van Zomeren and Van Den Burg (1985) used principal components 
analysis of interview findings on patients who had sustained severe head injuries 
two years previously. From these interviews, they identified two clusters of 
complaints. The first group of complaints, which they labelled as impairment 
complaints, consisted of forgetfulness, slowness, poor concentration, and inability 
to divide attention between two simultaneous activities. These complaints were 
found to be positively related to severity of injury as measured by post-traumatic 
amnesia. The second cluster of co_glplaints, which consisted of all other 
postconcussion symptoms such as headache and anxiety, were labelled as 
intolerances because they were not related to the severity of injury. 
Levin, Gary, et at., (1987) used factor analysis on the symptoms reported 
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by 155 patients one week after injury. This analysis revealed five clusters of 
symptoms: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Cognitive/depression: thinking difficulties, poor concentration, recent 
memory problems, remote memory problems, and depression. 
Somatic: dizziness, headache, vertigo, blurred vision, diplopia, and hearing 
difficulties. 
Sensory/sleep: noise sensitivity, poor sleep, and hallucinations. 
\ 
Gustatory/olfactory: loss of sense of taste, smell, and appetite. 
Irritability/anxiety: anxiety, impatience, and temper. 
Bohnen, Twijnstra, and Jolles (1992) identified two subgroups of patients 
with mild head injury. They found these two subgroups after administering a 26 
item questionnaire which included postconcussion symptoms, cognitive-energetic 
complaints, and a series of emotional and vegetative complaints. Principal 
components analyses with varimax rotation were carried out on the responses of 
71 patients ten days after trauma. The results of the analysis showed that the 
symptoms of headache, dizziness, and intolerance to environmental stimuli loaded 
together with items of decreased cognitive and work performance. Bohnen et al. 
referred to this group of symptoms as the post-concussive/cognitive complaints. 
The second subgroup was labelled as emotional/vegetative. It consisted of the 
items of emotional !ability and depression, as well as some aspecific vegetative 
symptoms such as heart palpitations, wet hands, dyspnoea, and others. Jacobson 
(1995) recently classified the symptoms into somatic, and psychological 
symptoms. The somatic symptoms include headache, dizziness, and fatiguability. 
The psychological symptoms are subclassified into cognitive (poor memory and 
concentration), and affective (irritability, emotional !ability, depression and anxiety). 
Because of the variation in the con,_eussional symptoms across patients, it has 
been suggested that the postconcussion syndrome is a group of illnesses rather 
than one illness (Szymanski & Linn, 1992). 
44 
Aetiology of the Postconcussion Syndrome 
For over 100 years, there has been major controversy about the aetiology 
of the postconcussion syndrome (Evans, 1994; Gualtieri, 1995). The two major 
points of view in the past were the view that the syndrome is the result of 
psychological factors, and the view that the syndrome has an organic basis. 
According to Trimble (1981 ), the idea that postconcussion symptoms might have a 
\. 
psychological basis was first suggested by Rigler in 1879. Rigler had observed 
that after a system of compensation for injuries sustained on the Prussian railways 
was instituted in 1871, there was an increased incidence of post-traumatic 
invalidism. From this, Rigler concluded that the patients' complaints were largely 
neurotic, arising from a desire for compensation. Erichsen ( 1882) held a contrary 
view to that of Rigler. According to Erichsen, even minor injuries could have 
resulted in genuine pathology of the spinal cord. Recently, Bohnen and Jolles 
(1992) suggested that the controversy about the aetiology of the postconcussion 
syndrome is fuelled by inconsistencies in the definition of minor head injury, the 
difficulty of objectively assessing postconcussion symptoms, and issues related to 
the methodology and design of studies on the outcome of mild head injury. The 
arguments for and against the two opposing views are discussed next. 
Psychological Factors 
In the past, the major psychological explanation for the postconcussion 
syndrome was that such patients had a compensation neurosis. Hyler, Williams, 
and Spitzer (1988) observed that although compensation neurosis is not listed in 
any official nomenclature, it is commonly used in forensic psychiatry in cases that 
involve litigation: "Traditionally: cq_mpensation neuroses involve the presence of 
physical or psychological symptoms following an injury, that seem out of 
proportion to the injury and are reinforced by claims of disability or the possibility of 
financial compensation" (p. 4). 
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Arguments in Favour of the Psychogenic Perspective 
Perhaps the most well-known proponent of the compensation neurosis 
viewpoint of the postconcussion syndrome in the past was Henry Miller (Miller, 
1961, 1966; Miller & Stern 1965). Miller (1961) based his thesis on an analysis of 
200 cases of head injury referred for medico-legal evaluations and a follow-up 
study of 50 of those patients. The patients that Miller followed up had been found 
to have gross neurotic symptoms after an accident more than three years 
' previously. From this study, Miller reported the following: 
1. There was significant negative correlation between accident neurosis and 
the severity of injury as measured by the duration of unconsciousness or 
post-traumatic amnesia. Miller and Stern (1965) reported that the 
postconcussion syndrome was conspicuously absent in severe injury. 
2. The neurosis was more common in people of lower socio-economic status 
than in the professional or managerial patients. 
3. The most consistent clinical feature was the subject's conviction of unfitness 
for work. 
4. The symptoms disappeared after the issue of compensation was settled, 
whether or not they won the application. 
Further support for the psychogenic perspective comes from the following 
factors. 
Support for the compensation hypothesis. Support for the compensation 
hypothesis has been suggested by studies on reattribution of symptoms, and 
studies on patients' desires for compensation. With respect to reattribution, 
Mittenberg, DiGiulio, Perrin, and Bass (1992) showed that patients are more likely 
than normal contra-ls to underestirl!Bte the occurrence of symptoms identical to the 
postconcussion symptoms before trauma. Mittenberg et al. conclude from this that 
patients may reattribute benign emotional, physiological, and memory symptoms 
to their head injury. The reattribution comes about because of expectations of the 
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occurrence of postconcussion symptoms. Mittenberg, DiGiulio, and Bass pointed 
out that the generalizability of their study is limited by several methodological 
considerations. One of these considerations is that their head injury group was 
drawn from consecutive outpatient referrals for neuropsychological examination 
rather than from consecutive hospital admissions for mild head injury. 
A recent study by Youngjohn, Burrows and Erdal (1995) used the Portland 
Digit Recognition Test with which they found that as much as 15% of patients 
undergoing neuropsychological evaluations for medico-legal purposes may be 
' unconsciously or consciously motivated to do poorly. They suggested that this was 
because "Patients involved in workers' compensation or personal injury cases 
have a very unfavourable motivational context for neuropsychological assessment, 
in that they are rewarded with financial compensation for poor performance." 
(p.113). Finally, Binder, Martin and Rohling (1996) carried out a meta-analytic 
study of the literature on the issue of compensation. This study was based on 17 
reports, covering 18 study groups, and a total of 2, 353 subjects. They found that 
there was more abnormality and disability in patients with financial incentives 
despite having less severe injuries. The authors suggest that in assessing brain 
injured patients, the issue of secondary gain must always be considered. 
Nonspecificity of symptoms to the postconcussion syndrome. Symptoms 
similar to those of concussion have been recorded in individuals who have not 
sustained a head injury. For example, as was mentioned earlier, these symptoms 
are prevalent in the general population (Wong, Regennitter, & Barrios, 1994), in 
non-head injured medical patients (Gouvier, Uddo-Crane, & Brown, 1988), and 
non head-injured psychiatric patients (Fox, Lees-Haley, Earnest, & Dozel-Wood, 
1995). 
One possible reason for the similarity of postconcussion symptoms to 
symptoms in other psychological disorders and controls is that stress may be 
implicated for all these groups (Mi~nberg, Zielinski, & Fichera (1993). For 
individuals without brain injury, stress has been implicated in the following 
symptoms: headache (Ficek & Wittrock, 1995), dizziness (Schneider, Friedman, & 
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Fisher, 1995), memory problems (Diamond, Fleshner, Ingersoll, & Rose, 1996), 
fatigue (Libbus, Baker, Osgood, Phillips, & Valentine, 1995), irritability (Baldoni, 
Ercolani, Baldaro, & Trombini, 1995), poor concentration (Spurgeon, Gompertz, & 
Harrington, 1996), and anxiety and depression ·(Leonard & Song, 1996). 
For the brain-injured individuals, the emergence and persistence of 
postconcussion symptoms is associated with social adversity before the accident 
(Fenton, McClelland, Montgomery, MacFlynn & Rutherford, 1993; Mclelland, 
Fenton and Rutherford, 1994). It has been established that TBI victims have 
\ 
decreased social contact, decreased leisure activity, unemployment, marital and 
family disruptions, and problems with independent living (Morton & Wehman, 
1995). These difficulties are compounded by the fact that most victims are young 
people in the early stages of establishing their independence. Finally, a brain-
injured patient may have survived an accident in which other people died, and thus 
becomes liable to the experience of bereavement. Haynes (1994) recently showed 
that such bereaved patients had significantly greater decreased memory and 
attention abilities. 
If the postconcussion symptoms persist, individuals may decide, or may be 
advised to litigate. Lees-Haley ( 1988, 1992) drew attention to the litigation 
response syndrome, whose symptoms are qualitatively similar to the 
postconcussion syndrome. Lees-Haley (1988) stated that the litigation response 
syndrome arises because for many people, litigation is a deeply frustrating and 
disturbing experience. The symptoms of the litigation response syndrome 
disappear after the settlement of compensation claims. Recently, Lees-Haley and 
Brown (1993) surveyed the complaints of personal injury claimants and confirmed . 
the presence of many concussion-like symptoms. In similar vein, postconcussion 
symptoms can also be exacerbated by the issue of blameworthiness for the injury 
(Rutherford, 1989, Jacobson, 1995). An individual who can, and does blame 
someone else for the accident fac~ a different kind of emotional stress from an 
individual who blames himself or herself. 
Another condition that may produce symptoms similar to the 
48 
postconcussion syndrome is post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In the fourth 
edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM-V) 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994), PTSD is classified as an anxiety 
disorder. The anxiety comes about because of the circumstances of the accident: 
\ 
Closed head injury often occurs in terrifying circumstances-car accidents, 
attacks, industrial accidents-and-, if the injury is recalled, the experience of 
injury (something that the severe TBI patient never has) could be a potent 
generator of anxiety or even post-traumatic stress disorder or panic 
disorder. Anxiety in its own right, powerfully disrupts concentration and 
complex mental operations (Binder, 1986; Krapnick & Horowitz, 
1981 )(Alexander, 1995, p. 1257). 
Criticisms of the Psychogenic Perspective 
The weaknesses of the psychogenic view of the postconcussion syndrome 
have been highlighted by several authors. Judd and Burrows (1986) pointed out 
several methodological flaws in Miller's (1961) study. Firstly, the 50 patients that 
Miller followed up already had a predisposition to neurosis. Secondly, the injuries 
studied were heterogeneous, and the patients were not reassessed until two years 
after the finalization of claims. Furthermore, Miller inferred that patients were free 
from symptoms because they returned to work, rather than from a clinical 
examination. The study by Mittenberg et al. (1992) requires replication before its 
findings can be accepted. The authors themselves point out that their findings are 
weakened by the fact that they did not include a control group of patients with 
symptoms who were not litigating. 
Methodological problems apart, a number of direct tests of Miller's (1961) 
claims have produced negative res_JJlts. Several studies have shown that 
postconcussion symptoms persist even after settlement of compensation (Gfeller, 
Chibnall, & Duckro, 1994; Merskey and Woodforde, 1972; Tarsh & Royston, 1985; 
Weigh ill, 1983). Balla and Moraitis ( 1970) reported that the patients who do return 
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to work do so before the settlement of compensation claims. It has also been 
shown that large numbers of patients do not return to work even after the 
finalization of the litigation (Mendelson, 1995). Other studies have shown that 
there is no correlation between the postconcussion syndrome and compensation 
in either minor injuries (Rimel, Giordani, Barth, Boll, & Jane, 1981) or severe head 
injury (McKinlay, Brooks, & Bond, 1983). 
Miller (1961) had claimed that postconcussion symptoms were confined to 
minor injuries. Kelly (1975) disconfirmed this as he found a high proportion of 
\ 
postconcussion symptoms in severely head injured patients. More important still, 
Kelly found postconcussion symptoms in severely head-injured people who were 
not claiming compensation. McKinlay, Brooks and Bond (1983) warn that failure to 
volunteer symptoms by the severely head injured does not necessarily imply the 
absence of symptoms. From their own study, McKinlay, Brooks and Bond 
observed that symptoms other than postconcussion symptoms were mentioned by 
patients because they were more dramatic. However, direct questioning 
uncovered postconcussion symptoms. 
Perhaps the strongest argument against the psychogenic perspective are 
the findings of neurological abnormalities in association with symptoms, especially 
in mild head injury. Traditionally, concussion was equated with mild brain injury, 
and either an absence of, or minimal brain damage (Adams & Victor, 1989). There 
have been some dissenting views to this generally accepted definition of 
concussion. Symonds (1962) for example, argued that concussion was 
characterized neither by brief loss of consciousness nor by absence of damage to 
the nervous system. He pointed out that differences in duration of loss of 
consciousness were only quantitative, not qualitative. Irrespective of the duration 
of loss consciousness, concussed patients all pass through the stages of stupor 
and confusion on the way to recovery of clear consciousness. This view has been 
echoed by contemporary writers, S.JiCh as Sweeny ( 1992), Parker ( 1994 ), and 
Esselman & Uomoto, (1995) who point out that brain injury can occur, not only in 
the absence of impact to the head, but also in the absence of loss of 
consciousness. In the present study, in line with these contemporary views, 
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cerebral concussion will be defined as a traumatic paralysis of the nervous system 
which is associated with impaired consciousness and/or amnesia, of whatever 
duration. 
Organic Factors 
Arguments in Favour of the Organic Perspective 
\ 
A frequently cited reason for expecting postconcussion symptoms to have 
an organic basis is the high frequency and universality of the syndrome 
(McMordie, 1988). Pogacnik (1989) argued for this viewpoint as follows. 
The occurrence of the symptoms in exactly the same form in patients of 
different ages, occupations, educational backgrounds and social levels, 
along with the fact that it is encountered only after craniocerebral trauma 
and not after other injuries (eg to the extremities, abdomen or chest), 
strongly suggests an organic cerebral basis for this syndrome (Karlin, 1976) 
(p. 313). 
In similar vein, Brown, Fann, and Grant (1994) pointed out that these 
symptoms have increasingly been shown to have a predictable configuration. If the 
symptoms were the result of a desire for compensation, one would expect that the 
symptoms reported would vary widely between patients. This should be even more 
so for patients with less education, who are unlikely to be aware of the 
constellation of symptoms making up this syndrome (Aubrey, Dobbs, & Rule, 
1989). The organic perspective is also supported by the presence of abnormal 
brain structure and abnormal brain function after traumatic brain injury. These 
include radiological abnormalities, eerebral blood flow abnormalities, and 
neuropsychological deficits, which were considered at some length in the previous 
chapter. The organic abnormalities associated with individual postconcussion 
symptoms have also been identified in some cases. These individual symptoms 
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are discussed below . 
. Headaches. McKenzie and Williams (1971) and Jackson (1977) suggested 
that concussion headaches are the result of vascular changes; muscle trauma, or 
radiculitis. The vascular changes in migraine headache are thought to take the 
form of alternating vasospasm and dilatation of blood vessels (Altchek & Vitori, 
1990; Greenblatt, 1973). Allen (1986) pointed out that in almost all head injuries, 
there is an element of whiplash injury to the cervical spine, which is probably 
reseonsible for the headaches. 
Evans (1992) also described different post-traumatic headache types. 
These include muscle contraction headaches, occipital neuralgia, supraorbital and 
infraorbital neuralgia, muscle contraction headaches, migraine, and cluster 
headaches. Packard and Ham ( 1994) recently suggested that nerve fibre damage, 
abnormal cerebral circulation, and neurochemical abnormalities may also be 
involved. Headache, is thus like the other postconcussion symptoms, notably 
memory and attention deficits, in that it has several types. Duckro, Chibnall, & 
Greenberg (1995) found that myofascial tenderness was positively related to 
measures of headache, anger, depression, and perceived disability and suggested 
that attention to muscle irritation is an important aspect of the workup of chronic 
posttraumatic headache patients. 
Dizziness. The aetiology of dizziness, like that of many other 
postconcussion symptoms is not yet fully understood. Healy (1982) pointed out 
that minor head injury is often not an isolated injury. The minor head injury 
frequently occurs with further injury to the head, skull and neck. The result of this 
might be vestibular concussion which in turn causes post-traumatic vertigo and 
persistent dizziness, as well as tinnitus or hearing loss. Researchers have 
generally supported the view that dizziness is associated with brainstem . 
dysfunction. Evidence for this comes from studies which show that brainstem 
conduction delay has been associ~ed with persistence of symptoms 
(Montgomery, Fenton, McClelland, MacFlynn, & Rutherford, 1991 ). 
According to Keane and Baloh (1992), the mechanism of post-traumatic 
positional vertigo is probably the dislodgement of calcium carbonate crystals from 
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the macula of the utricle. The dislodgement causes the crystals to become 
attached to the capula of the posterior semicircular canals. The ear's semi-circular 
canals are important in the sense of balance. Abnormalities such as the ones just 
described may thus result in the experience of dizziness and vertigo. Recently, 
Rubin, Woolley, Dailey, & Goebel (1995) demonstrated experimentally that 
individuals who had sustained minor head injury or whiplash had significantly more 
balance and postural problems than uninjured controls. Another recent finding is 
that persistent dizziness may be the result of unsuspected perilymphatic fistulas 
' (Fitzgerald, 1995). These are ruptures that allow perilymph to leak from the inner 
ear to the midear space. 
Anderson, Yolton, Reinke, Kohl, & Lundy-Ekman (1995) observed that 
dizziness unfortunately does not have a precise medical definition. "When 
dizziness is a presenting complaint, distinctions must be made between vertigo (a 
sense of false movement), near-syncope (a feeling of impending faint), 
disequilibrium (loss of balance), and ill-defined lightheadedness (an inability to 
concentrate or focus the mind)." (p. 545). These authors summarize the possible 
causes of dizziness as including conflicts between visual and vestibular 
information, vascular problems, adverse reactions to medication, psychological 
difficulties, systemic disease, and the effects of aging. 
Fatigue. Fatigue may be the effect of damage to what Luria (1973) called 
the first functional unit of the brain. This unit, which is responsible for arousal, is 
made up of the reticular activating system and the medial aspects of the forebrain. 
Luria (1973) stated that when this unit is damaged one of the symptoms is that 
patients fatigue more easily. Gronwall and Wrightson ( 197 4) suggested that 
fatigue after traumatic brain injury results from the patient's increased effort to 
perform as well as he or she used to do before the injury. This is the coping 
hypothesis explanation of the postconcussion syndrome. 
Depression. anxiety. and irritability. Depression, anxiety, and irritability are 
due to damage to parts of the limbic system such as the septa! region and the 
anteromedial thalamus (McClelland, 1988). It has been proposed that depression 
after trauma may also be due to the physical stresses which are applied to the 
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hypothalamus area of the brainstem during hyperflexion of the neck (Jackson, 
1977; Martin, 1970; McKenzie & William, 1971 ). Depression is known to disrupt 
cognitive operations, particularly concentration, memory, and executive functions 
(Weingartner, Cohen, Martello, & Murphy, 1981 ). Such patients show PET 
abnormalities, with frontal hypometabolism (Dolan, Bench, & Brown, 1992). 
Gainotti (1993) found that emotional disorders result from the disruption of neural 
mechanisms subserving the modulation and control of emotional and social 
behaviour. With specific reference to depression, Jorge, Robinson, Arndt, 
\ 
Starkstein, Forrester, & Geisler ( 1993) found that the location of the brain lesion 
was associated with the development of major depression only in the acute stage. 
Transient depressive syndromes were associated with left dorsolateral frontal 
and/or left basal ganglia lesions. Persons with both anxiety and depression on the 
other hand had right hemisphere lesions. Jorge, Robinson, Arndt, & Forrester, 
1993) further found that whereas acute onset depression occurring soon after 
injury is related to the brain injuries, late onset depression was mediated by 
psychosocial factors. 
Memory. Memory deficit is like headache and attention deficit in that it takes 
several forms after traumatic brain injury. In the past 30 years or more, several 
dissociations of memory deficits have been identified. Milner (1965) for example, 
reported the case of an adult male patient (HM), who had developed severe 
memory disorder after bilateral hippocampectomy. HM was unable to commit new 
facts to memory. However, he could remember skills he had learned such as 
mirror drawing and pursuit rotor tests. The deficits observed on HM have since 
been confirmed in other patients with hippocampal damage (Victor & Agamanolis, 
1990; Mattioli, Grassi, Perani, Cappa, Miozzo, & Fazio (1996). 
Memory deficits after traumatic brain injury, like headache and dizziness, 
present in various forms. In a recent review of the literature, Nyberg and Tulving 
(1996) concluded that there are myltiple long-term memory systems. The most 
widely researched are episodic, semantic, perceptual representation, and 
procedural memory: Episodic memory is a memory for biographical events. 
Semantic memory is memory for knowledge of the world, such as the meaning of 
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words. Perceptual representation refers to the images associated with a memory. 
Finally, procedural memory is the memory for actions, such as how to drive a car. 
Traumatic brain injury leads to impairment on some forms of memory, but not 
others. For example, it has been shown that traumatic brain injury leads to 
difficulties with episodic, but not semantic memory (Kinsbourne, 1987; Calabrese, 
Markowitsch, Harders, & Scholz, & Gehlen, 1995). 
The hippocampus is not the only brain structure associated with memory 
deficits. A significant neurological correlate of memory is temporal horn volume 
' (THV). THV is an indirect measure of hippocampal atrophy. Gale, Johnson, Bigler, 
and Blatter (1994) demonstrated that ventricular dilation, in particular THV, 
correlated with memory impairment in TBI. In addition to the increase in THV, 
Gale, Johnson, Bigler, & Blatter (1995) found that there is a significant reduction in 
most brain structures, including the fornix and the corpus callosum. The authors 
argued that the findings of an increase in THV and the reduction in brain structures 
is representative of diffuse white matter atrophy. The fornix has been shown to be 
important in the construction of episodic memories (Calabrese, Markowitsch, 
Harders, Scholz, & Gehlen, 1995). 
Axonal injury has been shown to lead to deficits in central cholinergic 
transmission (Dixon, Taft, & Hayes, 1993; Myseros & Bullock, 1995). Cholinergic 
pathways are a component of memory systems (Squire & Davis, 1981 ). The 
memory problems found after traumatic brain injury are therefore in some 
instances also due to acetylcholine deficiencies. Dixon et al. (1995) suggested that 
memory deficits may be particularly associated with hippocampal cholinergic 
circuits. Apart from the above neuroanatomic sites and systems, which are 
damaged during trauma, it has been proposed that memory deficits may result 
from changes in information processing ( eg attention problems) rather than 
damage to the neuroanatomical systems critical to memory (Reeder & Logue, 
1994). Furthermore, being involvegrin an accident is a stressful event. Bremner, 
Krystal, Southwick, and Charney (1995) suggested that traumatic stress brings 
about physiological changes in the same regions as the regions responsible for 
memory. The brain structures that are affected both by stress and head injury are 
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the limbic structures, notably the hippocampus. They propose that therefore, 
traumatic stress may contribute to the amnesia seen after traumatic brain injury. 
Poor concentration. This is one of the deficits of attention. Journals and 
books on traumatic brain injury rarely refer to poor concentration by itself. It is 
mentioned. in the context of attention deficits, of which it is a component. The 
discussion of this symptom is thus well covered in chapter 4, which deals with 
attention. 
Sensory deficits. Some of the visual and auditory impairments that arise 
' after traumatic brain injury can be attributed to cranial nerve damage. Keane & 
Baloh (1992) point out that this is evidenced by the fact that the olfactory, facial, 
and the audio-vestibular nerves are damaged most often by blunt head injury. With 
respect to vision, there are variety of difficulties that have been noted after mild 
head injury. These include binocular, oculomotor, accommodative and visual field 
loss (Hellerstein, Freed, & Maples, 1995). 
Low noise and light tolerance. Low noise and low light tolerance have been 
shown to be related to lowered thresholds in the auditory and visual senses 
(Bohnen, Twijnstra, Wijnen, & Jolles, 1991; Waddell & Gronwall, 1984 ). Cohen 
and Rein (1991) recently suggested that optometrists should routinely be involved 
in head trauma evaluations because accidents resulting in closed head trauma 
commonly affect the cranial nerves and can cause visual field defects, most 
commonly homonymous hemianopsia. 
Nausea and Vomiting. The vomiting center is believed to be the nucleus 
tractus solitarius in the brainstem (Johns, 1995). Johns observed that the 
chemoreceptor trigger zone (the area postrema) in the floor of the fourth ventricle 
is a major afferent to the nucleus tractus solitarius. This trigger zone can be 
stimulated by pressure from hydrocephalus after closed head injuries. 
J 
Criticisms of the Organic Perspective 
The factors that were enumerated earlier as supporting the psychogenic 
perspective can also be taken to be criticisms of the organic perspective. 
Additional criticisms of the perspective were recently summarized by Jacobson 
(1995, p. 686) as follows: 
1. The persistence of postconcussion symptoms after organic deficits have 
\ 
largely resolved. 
2. The variable prognosis of post-concussional symptoms after equivalent 
severity of head injury. 
3. Symptom exacerbation in those without organic deficits 
4. The impact of psychosocial factors (Fenton, McClelland, Montgomery, 
MacFlynn, & Rutherford, 1994). 
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5. The generally low correlations between organic (neuropsychological, EEG, 
BAEP, MRI scan) indices and postconcussion symptoms evident after 3 
months (Lishman, 1988). 
Youngjohn, Burrows, & Erda! (1995) pointed out that one of the most 
commonly cited evidence in favour of the organic perspective is 
neuropsychological test results. He further goes on to make the following 
important observation. "Unfortunately, neuropsychological test results may not be 
as objective as we might wish, because valid test results are dependent upon the 
best efforts for success on the part of the patient." (p. 113). Youngjohn et al., found 
that patients undergoing assessment for litigation purposes were motivated to do 
poorly, rather than well, on the tests. Another criticism regarding the use of 
neuropsychological tests was recently expressed by Alexander (1995) when he 
said, "Avoid the logical fallacy; bec.puse everyone with a TB/ from closed head 
injury has impaired concentration, it does not mean that in everyone with impaired 
concentration after closed head injury the cause is neurologic" (p. 1257). 
Alexander goes on further to say: 
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There is not yet any reliable biologic measure of 'physiologicalness' -
evoked responses, EEG, SPECT, or even statistical manipulation of 
neuropsychological tests. Studies that apply external measures to selected 
groups of the persistently symptomatic are doomed to find interesting 
correlations that shed absolutely no light on causation and thus no light on 
treatment." (p. 1258). 
The Interactive Perspective 
It is clear from the review of the psychological and organic explanations of 
the postconcussion syndrome that neither approach can fully account for the 
syndrome. There are valid points as well as valid criticisms of both sides of the 
controversy. It appears that the best approach is one which takes into account the 
interaction between the two sets of factors. Long and Novack (1986) suggested 
that there should be no place for dualistic thinking in the paradigm of minor head 
injury. According to Benton (1989), it was only by the second half of the twentieth 
century that the awareness of the multifactorial nature of the postconcussion 
syndrome came to be appreciated. Recently Bohnen and Jolles (1992) observed 
that in the view of many contemporary workers in the field, psychogenic and 
organic factors are so closely intertwined that it would be unnatural to try to 
separate them. 
A good example of the interaction between organic and psychological 
factors is the coping hypothesis for the emergence of postconcussion symptoms 
(Gronwall & Wrightson, 197 4; Hinkely & Corrigan, 1990 ; Van Zomeren, Brouwer, 
& Deelman, 1984). According to the coping hypothesis, traumatic brain injury 
leads to several cognitive abnormalities. The most important of these is a 
reduction in information processing capacity. To make up for this deficit, the 
patient exerts more effort. 
This effort is an answer to the demands made by the social environment 
and the patient's own standards. Such demands are made specifically to 
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those patients who are not visibly handicapped, and whose injuries are not 
considered to be so severe as to prevent a complete resumption of previous 
activities. When the cognitive functions are not yet completely recovered, the 
resulting stress may lead to intolerences as secondary symptoms, especially in the 
less severely injured patients (Marsh and Smith, 1993 p. 554 ). 
The intolerances which Marsh and Smith (1993) refer to include symptoms 
such as headaches and irritability. 
\. 
Summary 
In this chapter, the symptoms constituting the postconcussion syndrome 
and their aetiologies were discussed. Factor analytic studies such as those by Van 
Zomeren and Van Den Burg (1985), and Levin, Gary et al. (1987) have shown that 
these symptoms load into clear-cut clusters. For more than 100 years, there has 
been controversy in medico-legal circles about the aetiology of the postconcussion 
syndrome (Evans, 1994). Arguments have been put forward in favour of both 
psychological (Miller, 1961) and organic (McMordie, 1988) factors. Many 
contemporary writers now argue in favour of viewing this syndrome as the product 
of an interaction between psychological and organic factors (Bohnen & Jolles, 
1992). The coping hypothesis (Gronwall & Wrightson, 1974; Hinkely & Corrigan, 
1990 ; Van Zomeren, Brouwer, & Deelman, 1984 ) is a good illustration of how 
organic and psychological factors interact to bring about the postconcussion 
symptoms. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
ATTENTION: COMPONENTS, MECHANISMS, PHYSIOLOGY 
AND PATHOLOGY 
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When psychology was instituted as a scientific discipline at the turn of the 
nin~teenth century, attention was one of the key areas of psychological 
investigation. At that time, attention was studied using introspective methods by 
researchers such as James (1890), and Titchener (1908). With the rise of 
behaviourism (Watson, 1913), however, the study of attention fell into disfavour 
because the concept of attention was considered as being too mentalistic. The 
proponents of gestalt psychology such as Rubin (cited in Luria, 1973) also rejected 
the concept of attention. The gestaltists argued that the selectivity and direction of 
attention were purely the result of the structural organization of the perceived field, 
and that the laws governing attention were thus nothing more than the structural 
laws of visual perception. 
Hebb (1949) argued for the reinstatement of the study of attention in the 
mainstream of psychology. He pointed out that the existence of attention was 
undeniable, and that in fact, psychologists had all along been investigating it under 
the guise of concepts such as "attitude", "set", and "expectancy" (Gibson, 1941 ). In 
the wake of Hebb's publication, a number of experimental investigations such as 
those of Cherry (1953) were carried out in the 1950s. On the basis of 
investigations such as these, Broadbent (1957, 1958) formulated the filter theory 
of attention, which was to become very influential in the field of the experimental 
investigation of attention and set the stage for much of the work carried out in the 
past three decades. / 
By the early 1960s, attention had become fully accepted as a legitimate 
field of psychological investigation. Moray ( 1969) identified three reasons for this 
favourable change: The first was that psychologists had managed to redefine the . 
concept of attention in stimulus-response terms. This redefinition resulted in the 
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concept of attention becoming more acceptable to behaviourally oriented 
psychologists. Secondly, after the second world war, and the technological 
advances that followed, it became necessary to find solutions to critical problems 
of communication because the advanced technologies generated rapid and 
extensive information. Lastly, the availability of new techniques and apparatus 
such as tape recorders eased the problems for the experimental studies of 
attention. 
The Varieties and Components of Attention 
William James (1890), one of the earliest and most influential psychologists 
of the time, defined attention as follows: 
Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession of the 
mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several 
simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, 
concentration of consciousness, are of its essence. It implies 
withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others 
(James, 1890, pp. 403-4). 
Recently, Wells and Matthews (1994) defined attention more simply as "the 
selection or prioritization for processing of certain categories of information" (p. 
19). This is the definition that will be adopted for the rest of this chapter. As 
attention became more widely experimented upon and theorized about, from the 
1950s onwards, it soon became clear that there was no generally agreed definition 
of attention as James ( 1890) had claimed. This state of affairs was clearly 
I 
demonstrated by Moray (1969), who reviewed the literature and identified six 
broad categories of the meaning of attention. These meanings of attention still 
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guide contemporary research and theory. Because of their ongoing influence, I will 
paraphrase Moray's list below: 
1. Mental concentration: The person concentrates on some specific task, 
such as mental arithmetic, and tries to exclude all incoming stimuli which 
might interfere with the specific task. 
2. Vigilance: This is a situation where nothing much is happening, but the 
observer is paying attention in the hope of detecting some event, whenever 
' it does occur (watch keeping). 
3. Selective attention: This is exemplified by the cocktail party problem 
described by Cherry (1953). An individual receiving several messages at 
once tries to select only one of them. 
4. Search: A set of signals is presented and the observer hunts among them 
for some subset or single signal. 
5. Activation: This is the everyday version of the orientation reflex. During 
activation the individual is getting ready to deal with whatever is going to 
happen next. 
6. Set: Preparation to respond in a certain way, either cognitively or by an 
overt motor response. 
Since Moray's (1969) paper, several attempts have been made to break 
down the concept of attention into a small set of components. As Stablum, 
Leanardi, Mazzoldi, Umilta, and Morra (1994) put it, "attention is not a unitary 
aspect of cognition, but rather comprises a variety of interacting processes and 
functions" (p. 603). After reviewing the literature I identified the following to be 
some of the ways in which theorists and researchers have tried to classify the 
components of attention. 
J 
1. Posner (1975): alertness, selectivity, and processing capacity. 
2. Zubin (1975): selectivity, focus, and shift. 
3. Pribram and McGuiness (1975): arousal, activation, and effort. 
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4. Shiffrin and Schneider (1977): automatic and controlled processing. 
5. Posner, Walker, Friedrich, and Rafal (1984): disengage, move, engage. 
6. Posner and Petersen (1990): orienting to sensory events, detecting signals 
for focal (conscious) attention, and maintaining a vigilant and alert state. 
7. Mirsky, Anthony, Duncan, Ahearn, and Kellam (1991): focus-execute, 
sustain, encode, and shift. 
8. Plude, Enns & Brodeur (1994): components of selective attention: orienting, 
filtering, searching & expecting. 
\ 
Posner (1975) suggested that the various components of attention are not 
mutually exclusive. Furthermore, one can see from the above list of components 
that the schemes of the different theorists overlap a great deal. In the remaining 
part of this section, some of the above components will be described. For each of 
the components of attention, an attempt will be made to describe the 
corresponding neural bases. Because of its complexity and the large variety of 
activities with which it is associated, one can expect attention to have a complex 
neural base. Mirsky, Anthony, Duncan, Ahearn, and Kellam (1991) pointed out 
that the complexities of some of the models of attention proposed by cognitive 
psychologists are beyond our current knowledge of the correspondence between 
brain structure and brain function. In similar vein, Van Zomeren and Brouwer 
(1994) stated: "'Attention' refers to a collection of states, processes, and abilities. 
It is impossible to relate all of its various aspects to separate cerebral structures" 
(p. 39). For these reasons, it has generally been found more useful to speak in 
terms of brain systems than of individual neuroanatomical structures when 
discussing the neural basis of attention. 
Arousal 
J 
According to Duffy (1962), arousal refers to a variety of physiological states 
between the extremes of coma and excitation. Arousal is also a fragmented 
concept, taking as it does, three forms, viz cortical, autonomic and behavioural 
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(Lacey, 1967). An important component of arousal is the orientation reaction, first 
described by Sokolov (1963). Sokolov defined the orientation reaction as a 
nonspecific response to novelty. He further observed that the orientation reaction 
was accompanied by distinct physiological changes such as EEG 
desynchronization and momentary changes in heart rate and blood flow. For this 
reason, electrophysiologists often refer to the orienting reaction as activation (Van 
Zomeren & Brouwer, 1994 ). These changes are brought about by the sympathetic 
division of the autonomic nervous system. Some writers have argued that novelty 
per se is not enough for the elicitation of the orientation reaction. Additional 
concepts, such as the significance of the stimulus, were postulated as necessary 
conditions for the orientation reaction to be elicited by a change in stimulation 
(Bernstein, 1979; Maltzman, 1979). Gati and Ben-Shakhar (1990) observed that a 
mechanism that produces an orientation reaction to the slightest change in 
stimulation would not be functional. 
The theory of neuronal models in the elicitation of the orienting response 
was discussed in chapter 3 (mismatch negativity, Sokolov, 1963). Pribram and 
McGuiness (1975) suggested that the hippocampus, which plays an important part 
in memory, compares incoming information with old information. If the incoming 
information is similar to the information in memory, the hippocampus inhibits 
arousal by the ascending reticular formation. On the other hand, if the information 
is novel, the hippocampus releases the reticular formation, thus allowing arousal to 
take place. 
Montcastle (1978), Wurtz, Goldberg, and Robinson (1980), and Petersen, 
Robinson, and Morris, (1987), suggested that orienting to visual stimuli is 
controlled by the posterior attention system. This system is made up of the 
posterior parietal lobe, the lateral pulvinar nucleus of the posterolateral thalamus 
and the superior colliculus. Posner and Petersen ( 1990) showed that these three 
anatomical areas perform different ~nctions in visual orienting: The parietal lobe 
first disengages attention from its present focus. The superior colliculus acts to 
move attention to the areas of the target. Finally, the pulvinar, which is involved in 
the filtering of sensory inputs, reads out data from the indexed locations. 
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Sharpless and Jasper (1956) distinguished between a phasic arousal 
pattern which is of short latency, brief duration, and is resistant to habituation; and 
tonic arousal, which is of longer latency, greater persistence, and is susceptible to 
habituation. The tonic arousal is mediated by the ascending reticular activating 
system (ARAS) below the mesencephalon, and phasic arousal is mediated by the 
ARAS above the mesencephalon. Moruzzi and Magoun (1949) demonstrated that 
arousal arises from the activities of the reticular activating system. Posner and 
Petersen (1990) expanded on this notion suggesting that one of the subsystems of 
attention is the reticular component which consists of the intralaminar thalamus, 
the midbrain raphe nucleus, and the locus coeruleus. The reticular activating 
system and related structures arouse the rest of the brain, probably because of the 
action of the noradrenergic, dopaminergic, and serotonergic fibers which they 
contain (Robins, 1986). Kinomura, Larsson, Gulyas & Roland (1996) found that 
when subjects shifted from a relaxed awake state to do an attention demanding 
reaction time task, PET recordings showed significant activation of the midbrain 
reticular formation and of the thalamic intralaminar nuclei. Trexler and Zappala 
(1988) following closely on the previous work of Magoun and Morruzzi (1949) and 
Luria (1966) proposed that there are three hierarchically integrated and 
interdependent anatomical systems which functionally regulate attentional 
processes. These are the brainstem, the diffuse thalamic system, and the 
thalamofrontal gating system. According to Trexler and Zappala, the brainstem is 
responsible for the tonic arousal of the telencephalon. The thalamic projection 
system is responsible for the phasic activation of the cerebral cortex, especially 
the associative cortex. The third system, the thalamofrontal gating system, which 
is physiologically and functionally connected with certain limbic structures (Nauta, 
1971 ), is responsible for controlled or selective attentional processes. Some 
studies have suggested that although the cortex is aroused diffusely by the 
reticular activating system, the assJciation areas are more densely innervated 
than the primary sensory areas (Clark, Geffen, & Geffen, 1989; Robins, 1986). 
The right hemisphere has also been thought to be more closely associated with 
arousal, particularly tonic arousal, than the left hemisphere (Jutai, 1984; Posner, 
lnhoff, Friedrich, & Cohen, 1987). 
Recently, Robins and Everitt (1995) reviewed studies on arousal, and 
concluded that the cortex is aroused from the brainstem by a number of distinct 
neurotransmitter systems. These systems perform different functions in arousal: 
The ceruleocortical NA system seems to have a protective function of 
maintaining discriminability in stressful or arousing circumstances; the 
mesolimbic and mesostriatal DA systems play a role in the activation of 
output, whether cognitive or motor in nature; the cholinergic systems 
appear to enhance stimulus processing at the cortical level; and the 5-HT 
systems may serve to dampen the actions of the others-for example, by 
promoting behavioural inhibition and cortical de-arousal. (p. 715). 
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According to the schema proposed by Robins and Everitt (1995), the 
prefrontal cortex regulates its own inputs by sending feedback to the origins of the 
ascending arousal systems. The salience of the sensory inputs to the ascending 
systems is determined by descending inputs including novelty and conditioning. 
Alertness 
One can define alertness as a state of arousal characterized by an 
increased selective awareness of an aspect of the environment and a readiness to 
detect and respond to specified stimuli (Posner, 1975). As it stands, this definition 
incorporates some of the meanings of attention identified by Moray (1969). These 
are mental concentration, vigilance, selectivity, and activation. As previously 
stated , arousal can be divided into two forms, tonic and phasic. In like manner, 
alertness has been divided into tonic and phasic forms. Van Zomeren, Brouwer, 
and Deel man ( 1984) described the difference between tonic and phasic arousal as 
.! 
follows: Tonic alertness is continuing responsiveness to stimulation covering 
minutes or hours. The changes in tonic alertness occur slowly and involuntarily. 
They are mostly explained as resulting from physiological changes in the 
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organism, such as diurnal rhythms. Phasic alertness, on the other hand, occurs in 
anticipation of an event. The changes in phasic alertness occur rapidly and 
depend on the subject's interests and intentions. 
In reaction time tasks, the contingent negative variation (CNV) has been 
taken to reflect vigilance or sustained attention during the 1.0 to 1.5 second period 
that typically separates .the warning signal from the second, or target stimulus 
(Papanicolaou, 1987). Segalowitz, Unsal & Dywan (1992) showed that the CNV is 
more closely associated with frontal lobe activity than with activities in the posterior 
regions of the brain. The frontal lobe is the origin of the N200 which is associated 
with orientation, a precursor of alertness (Squires, Squires, & Hillyard, 1975). 
Drake ( 1990) suggested that the N200 reflects stimulus classification. Recent 
studies by Naatanen and Alho (1995) suggest that the MMN is generated in at 
' least three brain areas including the frontal lobe: The main contribution to the 
MMN is the auditory complex, in the supra temporal plane. The other sources are 
the right lateral temporal cortex and the right frontal cortex. Naatanen and Alho 
suggest that the temporal sites reflect a preperceptual detection of a mismatch. 
The frontal sites, on the other hand "might be associated with conscious 
perception of, or attention switch to, stimulus change." (p. 315). 
In addition to the N200, alertness is also associated with the P300. Karlin 
( 1970) suggested that the P300 reflected a cessation of a state of alertness, a 
change of state from high to low arousal. Hillyard and Kutas (1983) proposed that 
this wave is elicited by task relevant stimuli that occur unexpectedly and require a 
motor response or a cognitive decision. Like the N200, the P300 is believed to be, 
at least partially, the result of a mismatch between the mnemonic templates of the 
frequently occurring stimuli and the rare stimulus (Halgren et al., 1980). The P300 
is elicited by unattended events that produce orienting (Pritchard, 1981 ). A related 
idea is that the P300 reflects the resolution of uncertainty or a cessation of 
vigilance once the sought-after rare stimulus occurs (Papanicolaou, Loring, & 
I 
Eisenberg, 1985). f 
The P3a, which predominates in the frontal areas, is related to alertness. It 
is linked to processes involved in the involuntary capture of attention by salient 
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events (Knight, 1991 ). Posner and Petersen ( 1990) proposed that there are three 
interrelated subsystems for visual attention. These are, orienting, target detection, 
and alerting. The ability to sustain the alert state depends heavily on the integrity 
of the posterior aspects of the right hemisphere (Heilman, Watson, & Valenstein, 
1983). Posner and Petersen further found that the alerting system requires 
norepinephrine pathways which are lateralized more to the right hemisphere. 
During tasks that demand sustained vigilance, normal subjects show right frontal 
and parietal activation as measured by cerebral blood flow studies (Pardo, Pardo, 
& Raichle, 1990). This finding was confirmed by Pardo, Fox, & Raichle (1991 ): 
These data identify and localize in healthy humans an anatomically distinct 
and asymmetric neural system mediating sustained attention to sensory 
stimuli. Vigilance then, is one cognitive component of human attention that 
is right-lateralized. The vigilance system encompasses both right prefrontal 
and right superior parietal cortices (p. 63). 
Recently, Arguin, Cavanagh, and Joanette (1993) demonstrated that 
damage to the left hemisphere leads to a delay in the alerting effect of a warning 
signal for the processing of contralesional targets. An analysis of the lesions did 
not establish a clear correlation between attention deficit and a specific brain area. 
However, analyses of the volumes of the lesions suggested that "a mass effect, 
rather than lesion localization may be the most plausible anatomical account for 
the alerting deficit observed" (p. 320). 
Selectivity 
As Moray (1969) indicated, many early writers ~~~~d sele~tivity as bei11g 
~ttention e~r ~~C..lf!!!~~~'!· For examyle, James's (1890) definition of attention 
emphasized its selective aspects. Hebb (1949) defined attention as the selectivity 
of response. Later, Treisman (1969) defined attention as the selective aspects of 
perception and response. Thes_~_definitions o~ attention Jt:!!e.lyJ!!~_!l_l:lm?ns 
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perceive and respond to only a limited portion of the sensory inputs from the 
-·--·- ,. ·--- ··- -"-·~-~--- -- ... ,_,,._,_~_.,. ·-··-· " -.. .. .. ' ' - _____ ,,__ - ... 
enyironm~Jlt. Cherry (1953) suggested that such selectivity is necessary because 
h~man~ have a limited processing capacit~. To demonstrate this, Cherry used an 
experimental procedure called dichotic listening. She had subjects listen to two 
separate tape-recorded messages simultaneously delivered to the two ears. The 
subjects were instructed to shadow one ear, that is, to repeat the message as it 
arrived. The results of the experiments showed that the subjects could tell very 
little about the message delivered to the non-shadowed ear. 
On the basis of selectivity, three types of attention can be distinguished. 
These are focused attention, divided attention, and sustained attention. Focused 
attention, as James (1890) stated, implies the withdrawal from some things in 
--·· ·-·--·~-.. -·-~----·~----~--··•&~~-------~, . -~- - . -- , 
order to deal more effectively with others. As such, focused attention requires the 
·-"----·~ ,._...,_M __ ... - ,_.... __ "~- ----·-----••••••••••••-'• '"' ··--·~~- --
ability to ignore distraction. The second type of selective attention, divided 
--~--~--- - ---
attention, refers to the ability to do two or more things simultaneously. The third 
type of selective attention is yi9ilance, als_o ~nown_~~-~~!!~ined -~ttention. 
Vigilance is studied when interest is in long-term performance decrement, mainly 
in detecting infrequent and unpredictable weak signals, as a function of the time 
on task (Naatanen, 1992). 
The selection of a channel for further processing in terms of the filter theory 
(Broadbent, 1958) is reflected by the emergence of the N1 component of the 
evoked potential (Hillyard, Hink, Schwent, Picton, 1973). Naatanen, Gaillard, and 
Mantysalo (1978) found that the P300 is related to more complex stimulus 
evaluations, such as selectivity. According to a review of the literature by Coles, 
Smid, Scheffers, and Otten (1995), the critical variables affecting the amplitude of 
the P300 are the subjective probability of the eliciting event, "and the relevance or 
utility of the event in the context of the task as appraised by the subject" (p. 95). 
The latency on the other hand is affected by events occurring before the elicitation 
of the P300. These have been found to be stimulus evaluation and categorization. 
I 
Clark, Geffen, and Geffen (1987) and Carlsson (1988) carried out some 
studies which showed that the thalamus acts as the filter for sensory inputs. They 
suggested that the filter is controlled by feedback systems modulated by 
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dopaminergic mesencephalo-striatal pathways. Trexler and Zappala (1988), 
whose model was discussed above, suggested that the thalamofrontal gating 
system was responsible for selectivity in humans. A review of the literature by 
Robinson and Petersen (1992) suggested that in animal models at least, the 
pulvinar of the thalamus is involved in the act of choosing relevant from irrelevant 
visual information. 
For auditory and somatic information, the lateral and the medial pulvinar of 
the thalamus are involved. Cohen et al. (1988) investigated sustained attention in 
subjects carrying out an auditory discrimination task. The control tasks in this 
experiment were somatosensory stimulation and resting. Brain activity during the 
tasks was monitored through positron emission tomography. The investigators 
established that higher glucose metabolic rates in the mid-prefrontal cortex and 
lower metabolic rates in the anterior and the superior posterior cortices were 
associated with the processing of stimuli that are important to the organism in 
determining goal-directed behaviour. On the other hand, lower metabolism in the 
midprefrontal and hipppocampal cortices with possible metabolism in the 
orbitofrontal and temporal cortices were observed in subjects receiving, and 
possibly processing stimuli that do not contain information important for behaviour. 
Cohen et al. suggested that some of these regional metabolic rates were linked 
with the processes of response extinction, habituation, or inhibition. 
The role of the thalamus, particularly the pulvinar in selective attention has 
been confirmed in a recent reviews (Kinomura, Larsson, Gulyas, & Roland, 1996; 
Newman, 1995). Laberge (1995b) for example stated, "The pulvinar mechanism 
apparently is directly controlled by axon fibres from the posterior parietal cortex, 
whose cells are driven , in turn, both by bottom-up inputs originating in the eye and 
top-down inputs arising from the prefrontal cortex" (p. 649). 
F9Cus. sustain, encode. and shift 
These four elements of attention were proposed by Mirsky, Anthony, 
Duncan, Ahearn, and Kellam ( 1991 ). Mirsky et al. based their classification of the 
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components of attention in part on Zubin's (1975) list. Their intention was to 
identify components that can be correlated with brain functional systems. 
According to Mirsky et al. ( 1991) the focus element represents the ability to select 
target information from an array for ~nhanced processing. The sustain element 
~-~a.ns vigitc:ince _in the sense of the ability to maintain focus and alertr::i~J>.!.QV~r 
time. Shift is the " ability to change attentive focus in a flexible and adaptive 
-~·- , --· ,.--.-·~' '"""'<" -- • --.·~,.--
manner'' (p. 112). Mirsky et al. ( 1991) attempted to provide evidence for the 
validity of this scheme by carrying out factor analyses of the performance of 203 
adult neuropsychiatric patients and normals as well as an epidemiologically-based 
sample of 435 elementary school children on a wide range of neuropsychological 
tests. 
Mirsky et al. found that the ability to focus depends on the activities of the 
superior temporal and inferior parietal cortices as well as the structures of the 
corpus callosum. These researchers adopted Mesulam's (1985) suggestion that 
the execution of responses relies on the integrity of the inferior parietal and the 
corpus striatal regions. With respect to the sustain element, Mirsky et al. stated: " 
Sustaining a focus on some aspect of the environment is the major responsibility 
of rostral brain structures, including the mesopontine reticular formation and 
midline and reticular thalamic nuclei"(p. 133). Finally, Mirsky et al. suggested that 
the encoding of stimuli depends upon the hippocampus and amygdala, whilst the 
capacity to shift from one salient aspect of the environment to another is supported 
by the prefrontal cortex. A recent review by Rafal and Robertson (1995) confirmed 
the findings that the parietal lobe, particularly the temporo-parietal junction, is 
involved in the disengagement of visual attention. Rafal and Robertson further 
found that the right parietal lobe may be critical for shifting attention between 
locations, whilst the left parietal lobe is critical for shifting attention between 
objects. In monkeys, the specific area responsible for the shift component of 
attention is believed to be o/Odmann's area 7. Steinmetz and Constantinidis 
( 1995) found that cells in this area respond to covert shifts of attention away from 
the point of fixation. This same area was found by Corbetta, Shulman, Miezin, and 
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Petersen (1995) to be activated by detection of conjunction features. In this study, 
subjects were required to search for signals whose position was indicated by 
colour, motion, or a conjunction of colour and motion. 
Automatic and Controlled Processing 
Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) and Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) 
distinguished between automatic and controlled information processing. As the 
term automatic implies, this form of processing does not require attention. Shiffrin 
and Schneider proposed that automatic processing does not require attention 
because it is well-learned in long-term memory. When inputs are being processed 
automatically they will be processed in parallel rather than serially. For this reason, 
such tasks do not interfere with each other. Controlled processing on the other 
hand involves search, rehearsal, and other processes which are demanding of 
attention. In controlled processing therefore, the division of attention is more 
difficult. With practice, tasks that previously required controlled processing can 
also become automatic (Anderson, 1987). According to Wells and Matthews 
(1994), "The key criteria for automaticity are thus independence from resources, 
and its insensitivity to voluntary control' (p. 28). 
Effort and the Strategic Control of Attention 
Kahneman (1973) wrote a very influential essay on effort as a component of 
attention. He viewed attention as having two major dimensions, the selective and 
the intensive. The selective aspect of attention has already been discussed in 
previous sections. By the intensive aspects of attention, Kahnemann meant that 
attention varies in amount. Increased attention is the result of increased effort and 
is correlated with physiological arousal. Pribram and McGuiness (1975) viewed 
I 
effort as the activity which controls fattention by coordinating arousal and 
activation. The manner in which this control takes place is as follows: Two 
reciprocal neural systems converge on the amygdala, which probably controls the 
emotional tone of arousal. The first system arises from the dorsolateral aspect of 
72 
the frontal lobe. Pribram and McGuiness propose that this input facilitates arousal. 
The other input arises from the orbitofrontal cortex and is supposed to have an 
inhibitory effect on arousal. Commenting on Pribram and McGuiness's model, Van 
Zomeren and Brouwer ( 1994) said that "The frontoamygdala influence may be 
conceived as a finely tuned determinant, controlling visceroautonomic arousal 
initiated by the hypothalamic mechanism during orienting" (p. 43). 
An important aspect of the Pribram and McGuiness (1975) formulation is 
that it makes reference to control. The idea that attention exercises a controlling 
function over other psychological processes has been suggested by several 
writers. Eysenck (1982) for example, suggested that effort is a nonspecific 
resource of limited capacity which is importantly involved in the performance of an 
enormous variety of tasks. Similarly, Posner (1975) suggested that effort is an 
overseer which is tied to concentration and the ability to respond to information 
rapidly. Shallice (1982) proposed that there is a supervisory attentional control 
system during information processing. The following description of the strategic 
control of attention given by Whyte (1992a) provides a clear picture of the nature 
of this supervisory function: 
Effective performance involves a delicate balance between two 
opposing needs: The need to allocate attention in a goal directed 
fashion related to current performance priorities, and the need to 
attend to important unexpected environmental events that are not 
part of the current task. An excess of the former tendency results in 
lack of awareness of critical, but unforseen information. An excess of 
the latter results in distractibility (p. 946). 
According to Van Zomeren and Brouwer (1987), the term control refers to 
what Luria (1966) referred to as the executive functions of the brain. These 
~ 
functions comprise planning, programming, regulation, and verification of goal-
directed behaviours. Because of the controlling function of effort, one can 
justifiably regard it as a higher order component of attention than the other 
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components such as alertness and selectivity. Auerbach (1986) suggested that in 
terms of the neurological substrates of attention, one can identify a group of 
components which he labeled as the attentional control matrix. This matrix 
includes arousal and alertness, vigilance, ability to initiate set shifting, ability to 
inhibit inappropriate set shifting, and speed of processing. The mental control 
components are believed to arise from the activities of the frontal lobes. This is 
consistent with Luria's ( 1966) proposal that the frontal lobes act as a kind of 
superstructure over the other two functional units of the brain. 
Brain Systems and Attention 
For all the components of attention discussed above, attempts were made 
to identify the neural basis of the components. It is clear from the various 
descriptions that multiple brain areas are involved in attention. This is consistent 
with the influential theory put forward by Luria ( 1966, 1973) regarding the role of 
the brain in psychological processes, including attention. It is therefore appropriate 
to discus Luria's proposals about attention. This description will be followed by a 
more recent model of neural networks in attention. 
Luria's Model of the Neural Basis of Attention 
Luria (1966, 1973) cautioned that higher mental processes, including 
attention, cannot be strictly localized to specific brain structures. He proposed that 
the brain can be divided into three functional units which act concertedly to bring 
about higher mental processes. The first functional unit is made up of the 
ascending and descending reticular formation, some limbic structures such as the 
hippocampus, and the medial aspects of the forebrain. This unit, according to 
Luria, is responsible for regulating cortical tone, and for waking. The reticular 
J 
activating system of the first functional unit sends projections to widespread areas 
of the brain to arouse them. Attention, like all other mental states, requires this 
background level of waking and arousal. The second functional unit of the brain is 
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located in the posterior regions of the brain. This includes the parietal, occipital, 
and temporal lobes. The unit is responsible for receiving, analyzing, and storing 
information. In discussing attention, Luria (1973) did not make specific reference to 
the role of the second functional unit. However, one may assume that he viewed 
the parietal, occipital, and temporal lobes to be involved as one pays attention to 
spatio-temporal, visual, and auditory information. 
Luria's third functional unit is situated in the frontal lobe. This unit is 
responsible for the programming, regulation, and verification of mental activity. 
The frontal _lobe is respons_~le f?!_~e ~i~~~~ ~?l_~-~~8-ry f?rn:is -~f c:i~t~~ti<?~_: In thi~, 
~~_essen~~!~~~~-~s t~ _i~~i_t.Jit responses to i!_relevant sti_muli and_!~ ere~~~-8. {;J<?al-
directed, programmed behaviour and higher forms of verification of activity 
--·~·~· .-.~··-·-» 
(Konorsky, Lawicka, & Brutowsky, cited in Luria, 1973). 
Neural Networks of Attention 
Mesulam (1981, 1990) proposed an integrated cortical network consisting 
of four components which modulate directed attention within extrapersonal space. 
The first of these is the posterior parietal cortex which is responsible for the 
sensory representation of extrapersonal space. Inputs from the association 
cortices bordering on the parietal, occipital, and temporal lobes converge in this 
area. The second component consists of the limbic structures including the 
cingulate gyrus, the substantia inominata and the basal forebrain. These 
structures play a fundamental role in assigning motivational valence to complex 
events occurring in extrapersonal space. The third component, comprising the 
frontal eye-fields (part of Brodmann's area 8) and surrounding regions, are 
responsible for motor representation. These regions provide a stage of efferent 
integration for the initiation or inhibition of motor mechanisms involved in 
exploratory or attentive behaviour. The frontal eye-fields, together with the superior 
I 
colliculus of the midbrain, modulate head and eye movements. Finally, there is the 
reticular component, which consists of the intralaminar thalamus, the midbrain 
raphe nucleus, and the locus coeruleus. The reticular structures are responsible 
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for the widespread arousal of cortical structures. 
The posterior parietal cortex, the cortex around the cingulate gyrus, and the 
frontal cortex have reciprocal relations with each other. They all receive afferents 
from the reticular structures. The input and output structures that are relevant to 
directed attention are organized as follows: The inputs from the reticular 
structures, limbic structures, and the sensory association cortices all converge 
into an area of the dorsolateral area of the inferior parietal lobule. This dorsolateral 
area then sends outputs to the frontal eye-fields and to the superior colliculus. 
These outputs are believed to coordinate the sequences necessary for fixing the 
visual stimulus on the fovea of the eye, for scanning, exploring, fixating, and 
manipulating motivationally relevant events within extrapersonal space. The neural 
networks as described by Mesulam (1981, 1990) were recently supported in a 
review by LaBerge (1995a). 
The Mechanisms of Attention 
The theories that have been put forward to explain the mechanisms of 
attention can be divided into two groups, the bottleneck theories and capacity 
models (Kellogg, 1995). These two approaches will be discussed next. 
Bottleneck Theories 
The first major bottleneck theory was put forward by Broadbent ( 1957, 
1958). Broadbent stated that the nervous system acts to some extent as a single 
communication channel. Information flows through the nervous system in stages. 
At some stage in the information flow, there is a filter which allows only a portion of 
the information to pass on for more complex processing. The selection can take 
place either in the earlier stages of in the latter stages. Bottleneck theories have 
also been referred to as structural theories, because they suggest that there is a 
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fixed location in the system for the bottleneck beyond which the capacity is limited 
(Naatanen, 1992). The limitation is evidenced in particular, by the difficulty or 
inability to carry out more than one task at a time, the problem of divided attention. 
Bottleneck theorists can be categorized into two types on the basis of whether 
they favour early or late selection. Early and late selection were recently defined 
by Mangun and Hillyard (1995) as follows: 
From the psychological standpoint, early selection is taken to mean that the 
processing of a stimulus need not be completed before the event can either 
be selected for further processing or rejected as irrelevant. This view 
implies a bottleneck in information processing in that the brain protects 
higher, limited capacity processing systems from being overloaded by 
irrelevant inputs. In contrast, late selection theorists have argued that both 
attended and irrelevant stimuli are fully analyzed before any selection 
between them takes place (p. 41 ). 
Broadbent's Early Selection Theory 
Broadbent (1958) suggested that information coming from various channels 
arrives in parallel at the sense organs. A channel in this context means sensory 
inputs that have distinctive physical properties such as location in space, intensity, 
frequency, etc. The next stage in the information flow is the short-term buffer store 
where information is stored only for a few seconds. The short-term buffer store is a 
preattentive level in the processing of information. From this store, one class of 
events is selected to pass through a filter for further perceptual analysis by a 
limited processing capacity channel. Broadbent suggested that information is not 
selected at random to pass on from the short-term sensory buffer. The probability 
of a particular class of events beinJ selected is increased by certain properties of 
the events such as physical intensity and frequency. The selection of channels is 
also influenced by certain states of the organism such as the drive states like 
hunger. Information that is not selected to pass through the filter decays in the 
short-term buffer store and is thus lost. On the other hand, the selected 
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information passes either into a long-term store where the conditional probabilities 
of past events are stored, or it is selected for response. If the information is not 
stored in long-term memory or selected for response, it goes back into the short-
term store. 
The early selection theories have received support from electrophysiological 
studies. Zani and Proverbio (1995) gave subjects a task to decide on the relative 
sizes of visual stimuli. They found early, enhanced latero-occipital P90 positivity as 
well as an occipital N115 negativity to relevant patterns. There was also a 
stronger, left-sided selectivity. A review by Hillyard, Mangun, Woldorff, & Luck 
(1995) also supported early selection theories for both auditory and visual 
attention. They found that the earliest evoked potential changes (20-50 ms for 
auditory and 70-90 ms for visual) were noticeable over the primary auditory and 
visual sensory areas respectively. They are thus modality specific, suggesting that 
"attention acts to modify processing in cortical areas that encode elementary 
stimulus features rather than fully analyzed pattern or object representations." (P. 
679). The longer latency ERPs were found in association with brain areas that 
process multiple stimulus features and feature combinations, the association 
cortices. Mangun and Hillyard (1995) found that although there is early selection 
for both auditory and visual senses, it is still unresolved whether the two modalities 
differ in the cortical level at which the earliest selection takes place: 
For visual attention, there has been no convincing evidence from ERP 
recordings (or from other neuroimaging techniques) for any stimulus 
selection at, or prior to, the level of the primary visual cortex. Rather, the 
initial effects of visual-spatial attention appear to modulate information 
transmission between the primary cortex and visual association areas of the 
occipital lobe. For auditory attention, however, the short latency of the 
earliest attention ef!pct (20-SOms) and its localization in the superior 
temporal lobe are consistent with sensory modulation in either primary or 
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secondary auditory cortex (p. 77). 
Late Selection Theories 
Late selection theories arose because a number of research reports contradicted 
some aspects of Broadbent's (1958) filter theory. For example, Moray (1959) 
demonstrated that the filter seemed to have a selective block. He showed that in 
shadowing experiments, subjects are able to perceive important information, such 
as the subject's own name, coming through the to-be-ignored channels. This 
finding was replicated by Oswald, Taylor, and Treisman (1960). Similarly, Gray 
and Wederburn (1960) showed that in dichotic listening tasks, parts of the rejected 
message may slip in when they fit well into the relevant message. Findings such 
as these necessitated changes to Broadbent's original formulation of the filter 
model. Treisman (1960, 1961, 1969) proposed that incoming sensory information 
is analyzed, prior to the filter, for physical characteristics such as pitch, intensity, 
location, and so on. The filter then selects one channel for further processing. 
However, the non-attended channels are not completely blocked. Instead, they are 
attenuated, that is, they continue to be processed but are given less priority than 
the selected channel. Further on in the sequence of information flow, the attended 
and the attenuated channels arrive at a second stage of selection. Treisman 
(1960) described this second stage as follows: 
Shadowing experiments suggest that there is a single channel 
system for analyzing meaning, presumably comprising the matching 
of signals with some kind of "dictionary" and its store of statistical 
probabilities and transition probabilities gradually learned through the 
continual use of language. If this is so, one should be able to avoid 
the "identification pyradox" pointed out by Moray (1959, p. 246). 
Treisman proposed that in the dictionary or store of known words, some 
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units or groups of words have permanently lower thresholds for activation, or are 
permanently more available than others (eg one's own name). The incoming 
attended message activates the relevant dictionary unit which in turn leads to a 
response. The attenuated channels also arrive at the second selection stage but 
they will fire only if the unit which it activates has a lowered threshold. Treisman's 
(1960) approach differs from that proposed by Broadbent (1958) not only in that 
the latter involved early selection, but also in that Treisman's theory involved two 
stages of selection, an early stage and a late stage. Both Treisman's approach 
and that of Broadbent differed from those who proposed a purely late selection 
model. 
Deutsch and Deutsch (1963) were probably the earliest proponents of late 
selection. They proposed that each central structure which is excited by the 
presentation of a specific quality or attribute of the senses is given a preset 
weighting of importance. An individual will be alerted to the stimulus depending on 
two factors, namely, the level of general arousal and the importance of the 
message. Deutsch and Deutsch likened arousal to a fluctuating standard 
interacting with the preset weighting of importance. When the individual is highly 
aroused, he or she will attend to every incoming message. On the other hand, 
when asleep, the individual will respond only to the most important messages, 
such as one's own name. According to Deutsch and Deutsch (1963) and Deutsch, 
Deutsch, and Lindsay (1967), all sensory inputs are recognized at the highest 
level, that is, they are analyzed for meaning. The filter selects the sensory 
message for response, not for further analysis. 
As a result of the contributions of the two-stage selection models and the 
late selection models, Broadbent ( 1970, 1971, 1982) modified his filter theory, so 
that it could incorporate these latter contributions. In his revisions, Broadbent 
(1970) introduced the notion of stimulus set and response set (pigeon-holing). By 
stimulus set Broadbent meant that sensory inputs which satisfy certain anticipated 
F 
physical parameters are selectively processed whilst those that do not are 
attenuated or blocked. Broadbent defined response set as the selection of certain 
classes of responses as having higher priority of occurrence even if the evidence 
for them is not especially high. To clarify this further, Mulder (1983) explained that 
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if in the selection of a channel, controlled processing is applied to early aspects of 
information processing such as pitch and colour, stimulus set is said to occur. 
Response set on the other hand is said to occur when controlled processing is 
applied to late aspects of information processing. 
In a simplified psychological model attentional mechanisms can act at either 
the input or output levels of information processing. At the input or sensory 
level they enable discriminations between relevant and irrelevant material 
and set priorities for the processing of input information, processes 
corresponding to selection or directed attention. At the output level they 
efficiently orchestrate the responses appropriate to the task, processes 
corresponding to motor intention" (Bench et al., 1993, p. 907). 
Criticisms of the Bottleneck Theories 
The first possible criticism of the bottleneck theories was already noted in 
previous sections. It is the fact that in shadowing experiments, meaningful 
information from the to-be-ignored channel often breaks through into awareness 
(Treisman, 1960). This means that, contrary to filter theory (Wells & Matthews, 
1994) this information will have been analyzed for semantic content. The second 
criticism is related to the first. As Meyer et al. (1995) put it, the bottleneck theories 
lack computational flexibility. According to the theory, information is processed on 
a first-come-first served basis. This leaves no room for the processing of high 
priority information first. If this was the nature of our processing of information, we 
would have great difficulties adapting to changing circumstances and changing 
priorities. Finally, Meyer et al. (1995) noted that the assumptions of bottleneck 
theories seem to be neurophysiologically implausible: 
Contrary to them, informatioh processing in the brain is 'massively parallel' 
and 'distributed' throughout components of many interconnected neural 
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networks (Anderson & Hilton, 1981; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). There 
are no obvious brain sites that constitute immutable response-selection 
bottlenecks of the sort to which PRP (psychological refractory period) 
effects and other multi-task performance decrements have been attributed 
(Allport, 1980, 1987; Newman, 1987). (p. 165). 
Capacity Models of Attention 
The Effort Component of Attention 
Capacity models of attention are also called resource models. In Best's 
(1986) view, the second phase in theory building with regard to the mechanisms of 
attention began with the reconceptualization of the problem which occurred with 
the publication of Kahneman's (1973) book on effort. Kahneman stated that the 
performance of any task requires some effort. Even when task demands are at 
zero, some effort, known as spare capacity, is expended in the continuous 
monitoring of the environment. This spare capacity is reduced as the individual 
pays more attention to the primary task. The reduction of capacity when an 
individual performs more than one task at a time implies a limitation of resources. 
Kahneman (1973) did not specify what these limited resources were. In Best's 
view, research suggested that the limited resources might be some basic and 
elementary processes of the nervous system. Whyte (1992a) suggested that the 
limited resource might be arousal. 
As was previously mentioned, Kahneman (1973) emphasized the fact that 
attention has both selective and intensive aspects, and that the latter was related 
to effort. Van Zomeren and Brouwer (1994) acknowledged this concept by 
suggesting that attention may be said to be qualified by selection and quantified by 
intensity. To explain the factors tha}influence the intensity of attention Kahneman 
cited the work of Berlyne (1960, 1970). Berlyne, whose work focused only on 
involuntary attention, had suggested that the intensity of attention was related to 
the level of arousal, alertness, and activation. Berlyne further suggested that the 
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level of arousal of an organism is largely controlled by the properties of the stimuli 
to which it is exposed. The properties of the stimuli include collative variables such 
as novelty, complexity, and incongruity. 
According to Kahneman (1973), the study of attention at the time dealt 
mostly with involuntary attention and thus made little reference to arousal and the 
intensive aspects of attention. He suggested that the intensive aspects of attention 
applied to voluntary attention as they did to involuntary attention. He proposed that 
voluntary control over effort is limited. The effort invested in a task is determined 
mainly by the intrinsic demands of the task. 
Multiple Resources and Resource-free Processing 
The idea that there is a single, limited processing capacity has been questioned by 
some. For example, Allport, Antonis, and Reynolds (1972) proposed that there are 
several processing mechanisms rather than just one. Because of this, dissimilar 
tasks which rely on different resources do not interfere with each other. This idea 
was echoed by Wickens (1984) who suggested that one should view simultaneous 
task performance in terms of time sharing: 
Tasks are assumed to demand resources for their performance, and these 
resources are limited in their availability. Therefore, when the joint resource 
demand of two tasks exceeds the available supply, time-sharing efficiency 
drops and will be more likely to do so as the difficulty of either component 
task increases {p. 63). 
Navan ( 1984) argued that all information processing, not just automatic 
processing, is resource free. He proposed that there is no central processing 
capacity. The deterioration rl performance in dual tasks is due to outcome conflict 
between two processes rather than to a competition for a limited resource. 
Recently, Meyer et al. (1995) proposed a new theoretical framework for 
understanding processing resources, the executive computational model. They 
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propose that there is "no immutable decision or response-selection bottleneck for 
executing task procedures at a central cognitive level" (p. 173). Instead multiple 
procedures can be executed simultaneously with distinct sets of production rules. 
For example, a person can drive and talk on the cellular phone at the same time 
because the two activities rely on different production rules, making it possible for 
them to occur in parallel. The reason why people may not be able to do more than 
two tasks at once is that there is a limitation of the peripheral sensory and motor 
mechanisms, and not limited cognitive capacity. For example it is impossible to 
keep both hands on the steering wheel and to hold the telephone at the same 
time. The executive processes may, in this instance, engage in flexible task 
scheduling (ie when approaching an intersection, the individual stops using the 
phone and uses both hands for driving. He will resume use of the phone after 
crossing the intersection). 
Attention and the Concepts of Information Processing 
Mulder (1983) maintains that the main assumption of the information 
processing approach is that there are a few symbolic, COfT1putational operation~ 
such as encoding, comparing, locating, storing, retrieving, deciding, etc, which. 
ultimately account for intelli~e~~e. As Tromp and Mulder (1991) put it, "c()gnition 
refers to the basic ability of the brain to analyze, store, retrieve, and manipulate 
information in order to solve problems" (p. 821 ). Because of the dominant position 
of the information processing approach, it is not surprising that the theories of 
attention, starting with Broadbent (1958), discus attention within the framework of 
infc:>rmation processing. For example, the bottleneck theories discussed in a 
previous section are attempts to eJ>lain how sensory information coming from 
multiple channels gets selected for further processing. The ~P~'?!~X-~~~~ies ~te 
also concernect \.\'!th the issue of information. They grapple with the question of 
whether or not the resources required for processing information are limited, or 
- - --'"~·~···~··-· -~-~ 
whether information processing requires any resources at all. Zubin (1975) 
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suggested that the attentional elements of focus, sustain and shift are important 
aspects of the regulation of information processing. Likewise, it can be argued that 
components of attention, in addition to those cited by Zubin, also play a crucial role 
in the control of information processing 
Attention~ acting as the supervisory control previously described, exerts 
some control over some of the stages of information processing. Mul~er (1983r\r 
example, suggested that stages of information processing such as serial 
comparison, binary decision, and choice all require controlled attentional 
J?rocesses. Because of its controlling function, attention can be expected to affect 
the ~~eed -~~d accuracy of information processing (Whyte, 199~). Mulder drew 
-·-····--~· ,, ,, " , , , ' 
attention to the distinction between fast process research, which relies on 
automatic information processing, and slow process research, which relies on 
controlled processing. According to Mulder, the use of response time in fast· 
process research requires the use of reaction time paradigms. Reaction time tasks 
have been found to be so important in information processing research that Va.n 
Zomeren and Brouwer (1994) said of them, "Given the proper stimuli and · 
instructions, almost any neuropsychological impairment can be expressed in a RT 
task as slow information processing" {p. 39). Because of the importance of 
reaction time studies in investigating information processing, they will be described 
at some length in the following section. 
Reaction Time 
The reaction time experiment was first introduced by Helmholtz in 1850 
{Leahy, 1980). Helmholtz carried out reaction time experiments in order to 
measure the speed of nerve conduction. His method entailed stimulating the nerve 
of a frog's leg at different points, near and far from the target muscle. The time it 
took for the animal to respond to the stimulation was labeled as the reaction time. 
Contemporary reaction time experiments are designed in a variety of ways and 
use a variety equipment. One of the most commonly used equipments is response 
box with a home button, and varying numbers of response buttons arranged in a 
. . ' 
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Figure 1: Reaction time box with four response buttons 
' 
Response buttons 
• 
Home button 
J 
semi-circle (Jensen & Munro, 1979). An example of a four-response button 
reaction time box is shown in Figure 1. 
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The home button is so called because it is the button from which the 
subject begins to make a response, and the one to which the subject must return 
after making a response. At the beginning of the reaction time experiment the 
subject sits with the index finger depressing the home button. A stimulus will then 
be given for the subject to respond to. This stimulus may be a sound, or some 
visual stimulus flashed on the computer screen (as is the case in the present 
stuqy). The subject is required to respond by lifting his or her finger as quickly as 
possible from the home button and depressing one of the response buttons 
depending on the instruction. In a simple reaction time experiment, for example, 
only one response button and the home button would be visible and accessible to 
the subject. The other three response buttons would be covered by a mask. In the 
simple reaction time experiment for example, the subject may be required to 
depress the response button as soon as he or she sees a luminous arrow flashed 
on a computer screen. In a two, three, or four choice reaction time experiment, 
there would be two, three, or four response buttons respectively. The subject will 
be required to press one of the four buttons, depending on the test stimulus given. 
For example, as is the case in the present study, the stimulus may be a luminous 
arrow on the computer screen pointing in the direction of one of the response 
buttons. The subject is required to depresses the button to which the arrow points. 
Indices of Reaction Time 
Two main measurements are taken during reaction time experiments. 
These are !~'!EtiC?n t{f7!~JRT)_ and movement time (MT) (Jensen & Munro, 1979). 
RT is the duration, in milliseconds, from the time the test stimulus is presented, to 
the time the subject lifts his or her finger from the home button. MT is the duration 
in milliseconds from the time the sdbject lifts the finger from the home button to the 
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time he or she depresses the appropriate response button. 
Some researchers have suggested that RT reflects decision time, the 
length of time required for stimulus evaluation and response programming, whilst 
MT is a measure of the time it takes to complete a response (Carroll, 1981; 
Houlihan, Campbell, & Stelmach, 1994). So, whilst RT reflects cognitive 
processes, MT is supposed to reflect the motor component of the reaction time. 
Other researchers have defined reaction time as the sum of RT and MT, which is 
then referred to as total reaction time (Dunlop, Bjorklund, Adelnoor, & Myrvang, 
199.3). Smith and Carew (1987) stressed the importance of using both RT and MT 
rather than just total reaction time. The reason for this is that different subjects 
may use different strategies when responding. For example in the detection 
strategy, the subjects may lift the finger from the home button simply after noticing 
the presence of a stimulus, rather than after evaluating the stimulus. The result 
would thus be a lengthening of movement time. Other subjects on the other hand, 
may fully evaluate the stimulus and make a decision about how to respond before 
they make any movement. This is the decision strategy. The result would be a 
longer RT and shorter MT. The experimenter is thus never sure which strategy 
each subject uses. Smith and Carew (1987) further pointed out that there may be 
a range of possibilities between the extremes of the detection strategy and the 
decision strategy. Another reason for separating reaction time from movement 
time is that correlations between reaction time and movement time are either 
nonsignificant or significant and small (Whitley & Montano, 1992). 
Task Complexity and Warning Signals 
Researchers have identified two parameters of reaction time that are 
related to traumatic brain injury. These are task complexity and the presence of a 
warning signal. Task CQmJ:21e~ity refers to the numbers of choices that the s,ubiect 
has during a re.~~tion time task. If, for example, there is only one response button 
on the reaction time box (with the other buttons masked), the subject makes all his 
or her responses by depressing this one button. The task requirement might be to 
depress the button when a certain stimulus is flashed on the computer screen. In 
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this case, the reaction time task is referred to as simple reaction time, because 
there is only one, simple choice. On the other hand, when there is a choice of two 
or more response buttons, the task is more complex, and it is called choice 
reaction time. With the choice of responding by pressing one of two response 
buttons, the task is referred to as two-choice reaction time. 
Blackburn and Benton (1955) showed that a two-choice reaction time task 
did not produce a more severe retardation of response than simple reaction time. 
This led to the belief that increasing task complexity does not lead to better 
dis~rimination between patients and controls. Contrary findings were however 
reported by Rosvold, Mirsky, Sarason, Bransome, and Beck (1956), Norman and 
Svahn (1961 ), Miller (1970), Van Zomeren and Deelman (1976, 1978), and Van 
Zomeren and Brouwer (1987). These researchers found that in order to 
demonstrate the complexity effect, one must use more than two choices. Van 
Zomeren (1981) established that there is an interaction between task complexity 
and severity of injury. The trend towards a complexity effect is clearest in the more 
severe cases. 
The other reaction time parameter that has been investigated is the 
presence or absence of a warning signal in the test. Woodraw (1914) first reported 
that the most rapid reaction times were obtained when subjects were given a 
warning signal 2 seconds before the test signal. He suggested that a 2 second 
foreperiod gave the "maximal adaptation of attention" (p 64). Blackburn & Benton 
(1955) showed that reaction time in patients with cerebral disease is longer than 
that of normals when the preparatory interval of 2 seconds is used. Costa ( 1962) 
reported that in people with brain damage, a preparatory interval of 2 seconds has 
no relation to reaction time, whereas in normals, there are more rapid responses 
over constant preparatory intervals of 0.5 seconds or 2 seconds. Costa concluded 
from this that normals controls develop an expectancy or set based on the 
characteristics of the preparatory interval. People with cerebral damage on the 
F 
other hand do not develop such an expectancy. 
Explanations for the Slowing in Reaction Time after TBI 
The central issue in t~~ .. ii:!f.~~~~tL~~~o~~-~~i~~L~PeEoa9!:!_~ith r~~pe_~! to 
traumatic brain injury is that patients are significantly slower than uninjured 
- - . 
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indiv~d.~~!~· Gronwall and Sampson {1974) and Van Zomeren and Deelman (1978) 
proposed that the prolonged reaction time indicated a state of underarousal. Van 
Zomeren {1981) concluded that the slowness was not caused by underarousal 
beoause in his series of experiments, both EEG recordings and heart rate activity 
unequivocally pointed in the direction of increased rather than decreased levels of 
arousal. 
According to Brouwer (1985), the main cause of slowness is a delay in 
access to stored knowledge. In other words, the slowness is really an aspect of 
.... ,..._,~"~__.,.,.., __ ~......,,,_-.,...--·-- '"""""'-·'-.... .._ ,. ···~-· ~,--·"'·-~--- -.,,...,....,,_,. ·---·e,·•~·""'' -
memory deficits. Tromp and Mulder {1991) suggested that mental slowness after 
traumatic brain injury is due to reduced redundancy of memory representations, 
causing a delay in the retrieval of information stored in memory."Redundancy 
implies that, in the normal brain, knowledge is stored in multiple ways, and that 
multiple access routes can be taken to reach an item of knowledge. It makes the 
system less vulnerable to damage (Powell, 1981)." (p. 822). Tromp and Mulder 
propose that declarative knowledge can have either high or low redundancy 
according to its familiarity, whilst procedural knowledge, which is formed through 
experience by solving the same type of problem in many slightly different contexts 
(Anderson, 1987), is necessarily represented in a highly redundant way. After 
traumatic brain injury, the retrieval of both declarative and procedural knowledge 
will be delayed. Procedural knowledge however, because of its greater 
redundancy, will be relatively less affected. 
The issue of redundancy has also been used to explain the differences 
betweel'.l left and right hemisphere brain damage. Goldberg and Costa (1991) 
reviewed the literature and came tdthe conclusion that the left hemisphere is 
superior in the use of well routinized, familiar codes (ie procedural knowledge), 
whereas the right hemisphere is superior in handling novel information (ie 
declarative knowledge). As was seen earlier, the hypothesis that was put forward 
by Tromp and Mulder (1991) is that declarative knowledge, which is less 
redundant than procedural knowledge, is more vulnerable to brain injury. The 
differences between the right and left hemispheres has anatomical correlates: 
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The left hemisphere contains relatively more cells than fibres, and is 
organized in a modular way. The right hemisphere, on the other hand, 
contains more fibres than cells, and has more interconnected association 
areas. Hence, shearing of axon tissue, as happens in head injury, will affect 
' the right hemisphere more than the left, and therefore have more impact on 
the processing of novel information" (Tromp & Mulder, 1991, p. 827). 
Analysis of Stages of Information Processing 
One of the most frequently debated approaches to information processing 
is the stage theory. Sternberg ( 1969) defined stage theory as follows: 
This stage theory implies that reaction-time (RT) is a sum, composed of the 
durations of the stages in the series, and suggests that if one could 
determine the component times that add together to make up the RT, one 
might then be able to answer interesting questions about mental operations 
to which they correspond. The study of RT should therefore prove helpful to 
an understanding of the structure of mental activity. (p. 421 ). 
Two main methods have been designed for identifying and measuring the 
duration of the different stages of information processing. These are the 
subtractive method, and the additive factors method (AFM). Sternberg sees these 
two methods as ways of decomposing RT. 
J 
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The Subtractive Method 
The subtractive method was introduced by Danders in 1868 (Danders, 
1969). Danders was interested in quantifying mental processes, in particular, the 
length of time required for mental processes. He assumed that information 
processing takes place in stages. In order to establish the duration of a stage, 
Danders asked his subjects to carry out two tasks. The second task required all 
the stages of the first task and an additional stage. The difference between the 
me'&ln reaction times of the two tasks over a number of trials was taken to be an 
estimate of the duration of the additional stage. In other words, the reaction time in 
simple versions of a task is subtracted from the reaction time in a more complex 
version (Mulder et al., 1995). 
After Donders's (1969) publication, a lot of experimental work was carried 
out utilizing the subtractive method. For example, In 1880, Wundt (cited in 
Sternberg, 1969) investigated the information processing stages of stimulus 
detection, identification, and response organization as follows: The reaction time 
achieved by the subject when instructed to respond after merely identifying the 
presence of a stimulus was taken to be an estimate of stimulus detection. The 
reaction time after recognizing the stimulus was taken to be an estimate of 
identification. Response time was the time between recognition of the stimulus and 
the making of a response. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the subtractive method began to 
fall into disfavour (Jastrow, 1890). According to Jastrow, there were two main 
reasons for this. Firstly, introspective data suggested that it would be difficult to 
devise experimental tasks that could add or delete one of the stages between 
stimulus and response without also altering other stages. In other words, there 
were doubts whether pure insertion was possible. Secondly, the differences in 
mean reaction times varied excessively from one subject to another, and from one 
laboratory to another. The revival o1 interest in the subtractive method came with 
the emergence of better styles of experimentation, and better tests of validity than 
the method of introspection (Sternberg, 1966). 
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The Additive Factors Method (AFM) 
Sternberg (1969) introduced the additive factors method for identifying 
stages of information processing. He proposed that the duration of each stage of 
information processing is influenced by variables that do not influence any other 
stages. These variables.are referred to as task variables. The task variables are 
stimuli that are presented in a factorial reaction time experiment, to which the 
subject is instructed to respond in a specified way. Each task variable has two 
levlils, an easier one and a more difficult one. The levels of the task variables are 
called task conditions. The presentation of different levels of the task variable is 
referred to as manipulation of the task variable. 
To illustrate these ideas, I will briefly describe an experiment by Shum, 
McFarland, Bain and Humphreys (1990), which was carried out to identify four 
stages of information processing. The four stages of information processing were 
feature extraction, identification, response selection, and motor adjustment. The 
corresponding task variables (with the task conditions in brackets) were as follows: 
signal quality (degraded vs undegraded), signal discriminability (similar vs 
dissimilar), signal-response compatibility (compatible vs incompatible), and 
foreperiod uncertainty (fixed foreperiod vs variable foreperiod). 
In the experiment, a reaction time box similar to the one illustrated in Figure 
1 was used. The stimuli consisted of luminous lines on a computer screen pointing 
in the direction of one of the four response buttons. At the beginning of the 
experiment the subject sat with his or her index finger depressing on the home 
button. An auditory warning signal in the form of a beep generated by the 
computer acted as a warning signal that the luminous arrow was about to appear 
on the screen. When the luminous arrow appeared, the subject was required to lift 
~he finger from the home button and depress one of the four response buttons, 
depending on the task condition. The task conditions are described below. 
T 
In the degraded condition, mere was a random dot pattern (pixels) which 
were superimposed on the luminous line. This made this signal more difficult to 
extract from the background than in the undegraded condition where the 
Fig 2· The experimental conditions for three task coodKions 
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luminous line appeared against a clear screen background. The luminous lines for 
the similar condition pointed at positions much closer together than in the 
dissimilar condition (See Fig. 2 for illustration. For the similar condition, it was thus 
more difficult to identify the response button to which the line pointed, than in the 
dissimilar condition. 
In the compatible condition, the subject was required to depress the button 
corresponding to the direction of the arrow. For the incompatible condition on the 
other hand, the subject was required to depress the response button opposite to 
the\direction of the arrow (See Fig. 2). The incompatible condition was more 
difficult than the compatible condition. Finally, for the motor adjustment stage, the 
duration between the warning signal and the presentation of the luminous arrow 
was either short and fixed at 1.5 ms for the fixed foreperiod, or was longer and 
variable (3.5, 4.4, or 5.5 milliseconds) for the variable foreperiod. The variable 
foreperiod condition is more difficult than the fixed foreperiod condition. The task 
conditions were presented in a factorial design. This means that the eight task 
conditions were combined two at a time. The resulting 24 factorial task conditions 
are shown in Table 1. 
Sternberg (1969) defined a stage as one of a series of successive 
processes that operates on an input to produce an output, and contributes an 
additive component to reaction time. By additivity Sternberg meant a property of 
independence for mean reaction time. The mean score at any stage is not related 
in any systematic way to the mean score for any other stage. In other words, at 
each stage of information processing, the duration of the stage is influenced only 
by the manipulation of the relevant task variable. For example, the stage of feature 
extraction is affected by signal quality alone. The duration of the stage will 
be longer for the degraded stimulus and shorter for the undegraded stimulus. If 
there is true independence of stages, the duration of feature extraction should not 
be affected by task variables from another stage. 
J 
Table 1. Factorial design task conditions 
Factorial Deg Und Comp In com Simi I Disim 
tasks8 
Deg xb x 
Und x x 
Comp .IC ./ x x 
lncom ./ ./ x x 
Simi I ./ ./ ./ ./ x x 
Disim ./ ./ ./ ./ x x 
Fixed ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
Var ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
Note 
a Deg = degraded; Und = Undegraded; Comp = compatible; 
lncom = incompatible; Sim = similar; Disim = dissimilar; 
fixed = fixed foreperiod; Var = variable foreperiod. 
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Fixed Var 
x x 
x x 
b X = Nonconditions. This is either because the task is being combined with itself, 
or, because it is combined with a task condition in the same task variable. The 
latter would result in a contradiction in terms. For example, a stimulus cannot both 
be degraded and undegraded. 
c .t A factorial task condition, for example degraded compatible. 
The general idea is that when factors influence no stages in 
common, their effects on mean reaction time will be independent and 
additive. That is, the effect of one factor will not depend on the level · 
of the others .... On the other hand, when two factors ... influence at 
least one stage in common ... there is no reason to expect their effects 
on reaction time to add; the most likely relation is some sort of 
interaction (p. 282). 
\ Sternberg (1969) further suggested that whilst this is the general rule, 
exceptions are possible. The additive factors method differs from the subtractive 
method in that the experimental factors are designed to selectively influence, 
rather than to insert, a stage. The additive factors method is based on the 
following assumptions: 
1. Information processing consists of a sequence of independent stages. 
2. Each stage receives input from a preceding stage. 
3. The transformation produced in each stage is independent of any prior 
stage, and 
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4. The total reaction time is the sum of the processing times produced in each 
stage. 
Subsequent to the introduction of the additive factors method by Sternberg 
(1969), interest in the investigation of processing stages increased amongst 
researchers (Shum, McFarland, Bain & Humphreys, 1990). The additive factors 
method has some shortcomings, however. Sternberg was aware of this and 
pointed out that exceptions are possible to his general scheme of how stages can 
be identified. He also pointed out that his method revealed the stages that existed 
but did not reveal stage order and st_age duration. He agreed with the views of 
some earlier writers, such as Jastr6w (1890), who argued that the overall duration 
of a stage is more difficult to study and is of less interest than whether such a 
stage exists, what influences it, what it accomplishes, and what its relationship to 
other stages is. Other criticisms of the additive factors method were summarized 
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by Sanders (1980): 
1. There is a problem with the basic logic of the additive factors method. 
·Sternberg (1969) had stated that if variables affect different processing 
stages, then their effects on reaction time add. This statement cannot be 
logically reversed to the statement that if two variables have additive effects 
they affect different processing stages. There is always a possibility that a 
third variable affected both stages, or that there was additivity by 
\. coincidence. 
2. The additive factors method is built on the assumption that the reaction 
process is a single serial dimension in the sense that the output of one 
stage cannot serve as input for more than one stage. It is quite feasible that 
an experimental variable may affect not only the duration of a stage, but 
also its output. 
3. When deciding that two variables have additive effects, the null hypothesis 
is accepted. Sanders (1980) points outi however, that the traditional 
prejudices against the null hypothesis have been subject to much criticism 
(Rouanet, 1978). 
4. The speed-accuracy phenomenon is a well recognized factor in reaction 
time experiments. The additive factors method does not make provision for 
this factor. 
5. The principle of seriality and independence has been shown to be non-
universal. Taylor (1976) for example, described successive stages that 
overlap in time, so that an increase in time required for one stage may have 
the effect of decreasing the time required by a subsequent stage. 
Further criticisms of the additive factors method (AFM) were recently 
summarized by Coles, Smid, Scheffers, and Otten (1995) . 
.! 
Most notable of these are the assumptions of selective influence and 
constant output. Just as a change of condition may involve more than an 
insertion of a stage, so it may also involve more than a change in the 
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duration of a particular stage. It might affect the functioning of other stages 
and it might also influence the quality of the output of the stage. In addition, 
appropriate use of the AFM is critically dependent on the presence of a 
single, all-or-none, discrete instance of information transmission between 
stages of processing. The idea of discrete transmission is also associated 
with an additional assumption that each stage of processing is active in 
series and that no two stages are active in parallel. Deviations from these 
conditions of discrete transmission and serial ordering of processing can 
' render application of the AFM invalid (p.89). 
Sanders (1980, 1990) suggested that despite these limitations of the 
additive factors method, it has proved very useful as a first step in discovering 
precessing stages. He suggested further that a moderate optimism is justified that 
at least for limited sets of problems, the method will work, and that in any case, it 
is advantageous to use this method in order to extend the data base. 
Task Variables and Physiological Changes 
Electrophysiological studies have been used in an attempt to identify the 
neural mechanisms associated with different stages of information processing. For 
example, the decision about the identity of an object is reflected in ERP latency 
changes. Smulders, Kok, Kenemans, & Bashore (1995) showed that the latency of 
the evoked potential P300 is lengthened as the stimulus is degraded. In their 
experiment, the latency of the P300 was not affected by an increase task 
complexity. Decary & Richer (1995) compared the performance of patients with 
frontal lesions with those of patients with temporal lobe lesions in an S-R 
compatibility task amongst other tasks. They found that both groups of patients 
were impaired compared to normals, but those with frontal lesions were more 
r 
greatly affected. The motor preparation stage was shown to delay the latencies of 
N200 and P300 components of event related potentials (Fiori, Ragot, & Renault, 
1992). Coull et al. (1995) recently investigated the effects of catecholamines on 
attentional processes. They found that a low tryptophan drink had differential 
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effects on stimulus-response compatibility during attentional search. 
Although stimulus-response incompatibility has been found to affect 
reaction time, it does not affect P300 latency (McCarthy & Donchin, 1981; Ragot, 
1984). Similarly, Smid, Mulder, Mulder, and Brands (1992) found that although an 
increase in response selection difficulty resulted in an increase of about 70 ms in 
reaction time, it did not influence the latency of the P300. Coles, Smid, Scheffers, 
and Otten (1995) suggest that these findings can be interpreted to mean that "the 
P300 is emitted after the completion of those processes that are needed for the 
evaluation of the stimulus, but that the timing of the P300 is independent of the 
processes associated with response selection and execution." (P. 97). 
Neurological Substrates of Attention Deficits after TBI 
Normal attention has a complex neurological substrate, as was shown in 
discussing the components of attention. Likewise, the neurological substrates of 
attention deficits after traumatic brain injury should be expected to be complex. 
From the review of the literature in chapter 2, it was pointed out that closed head 
injury tends to be associated with diffuse injuries. This means that there is a wide 
range of deficits possible because of the involvement of widespread areas of the 
brain. The review of that literature also suggested that whilst the brain is injured 
diffusely in closed head injury, the tips of the frontal and temporal lobes are 
particularly vulnerable. In the next few paragraphs, the brain lesions that are 
associated with some of the commonly reported attention deficits will be 
discussed. 
J 
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Frontal Lesions 
Luria (1973) observed that damage to the prefrontal lobe results in the loss 
~· '" 
of the ability to form an intention to pay attention. Damage to the dorsolateral 
portions of the frontal lobe leads to what Hecaen and Albert (1975) later called the 
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"pseudo-depressed" state. This state is characterized by slowness, perseveration, 
and lack of initiative. Damage to the orbito-frontal cortex leads to disinhibition 
which manifests as distractibility, impulsivity, and hyperactivity. This distinction 
betvteen dorsolateral and lateral aspects of the frontal lobe was recently illustrated 
using brain injury in monkeys. Dias, Robbins, and Roberts (1996) showed that 
damage to the lateral prefrontal cortex (Brodmann's area 9) was associated with 
loss of inhibitional control in attentional processes. On the other hand, damage to 
the orbito-frontal cortex is associated with loss of inhibitory control in affective 
processing. The frontal lobes have also been shown to be crucial in sustained 
attention (Wilkins, Shallice, & McCarthy, 1987). The right hemisphere is better 
than the left hemisphere in sustaining attention on a voluntary basis (Tartaglione, 
Oneta, Manzione & Favale, 1987). 
Fronto-limbic and Reticular Lesions 
The frontal lobes have very close connections with the limbic system and 
the reticular activating system (Nauta, 1973). Weintraub and Mesulam ( 1985), and 
Mesulam ( 1985) suggested that there is an attentional control matrix consisting of 
concentration.,_yjgilance,_perseverance, and response inhibition, which correlate 
with the functi~!l~ of the a~cending reticular pathways and th~ frontal lobes. 
Auerbach (1986) suggested that this control matrix should be expanded to include 
arousal and alertness, vigilance, ability to initiate set shifting, ability to inhibit 
inappropriate set shifting, and speed of processing. The disorders of attention 
arising from damage to this part otfhe brain include perseveration, impulsiveness, 
distractibility, impersistence, slowness in processing, and confusion. 
Trexler and Zappala (1988) suggested that there is a thalamofrontal gating 
system which is responsible for the controlled or selective attentional processes. 
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Damage to the thalamofrontal gating system leads to increased susceptibility to 
interference. It has been suggested that the thalamus acts as a filter for sensory 
inputs (Carlsson, 1988). The pulvinar of the thalamus for example, has been 
shown to be involved in the act of choosing relevant from irrelevant visual 
information in animal studies (Robinson & Petersen, 1992). 
Posterior Lesions 
' Posterior lesions, as has already been noted, are less frequently 
encountered than the anterior lesions discussed above. The posterior lesions fall 
within Luria's (1973) proposed second functional unit of the brain which is 
responsible for receiving, analyzing, and storing information. The primary zones of 
the posterior lobes are more modality specific than the secondary and the tertiary 
zones. In these primary zones, one can expect auditory, visual, and spatial 
attention deficits with damage to the temporal, occipital, and parietal lobes 
respectively. The posterior regions, especially in the right hemisphere appear to be 
involved in subconscious or automatic processing (Posner, 1975). This suggests 
that damage in this region may lead to reduced capacity for automatic processing. 
The end result of this is a regression from automatic to conscious and effortful 
processing of information (Van Zomeren, 1981 ). 
Memory deficits are very common after traumatic brain injury (Brooks, 
1975). These deficits can occur with lesions to any of the lobes, but are particularly 
associated with temporal lobe damage and damage to diencephalic structures, 
notably the hippocampus (Milner, 1965). It has been suggested that memory 
_, ,. ~ 
disorders may be, at least in part, secondary to attention deficits (Kinsbourne, · 
1987; Nissen, 1986; Russell & D'Hollosy, 1992). However, it is likely that the 
source of the underlying attention difficulty itself may lie elsewhere in the brain, 
n<?tably the frontal lobes. 
A well-known attention deficlt associated with posterior deficits is unilateral 
spatial neglect. This condition was first described by Geschwind (Heilman, 
Watson, & Valenstein, 1983). Patients with unilateral spatial neglect behave as if 
they are not aware of one side of their body and one side of extrapersonal space. 
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This is evidenced for example by failure to wash one side of the body. Whyte 
(1992a), suggests that spatial neglect is a disorder of selective spatial attention. 
This disorder is found in association with right parietal lobe lesions (Heilman, 
Watson, & Valenstein, 1983). Posner, Walker, Friedrich, and Rafal (1984) 
suggested that attention can be divided into the components of disengage, move, 
and engage. Posner, lnhoff, Friedrich, and Cohen (1987) showed that damage to 
the parietal lobe can lead to a severe deficit of the disengage component whilst 
the move and the engage components remain intact. 
\. A recent study by Mosidze, Mkheidzw & Makashvilli (1994) confirmed that 
the right parietal and occipital regions are crucial for visuo-spatial attention, whilst 
the left hemisphere is not. Similarly, Egly, Rafal, Driver, and Starrveveld (1994) 
tested the ability of neurologically injured and intact controls to detect luminance 
changes in one of four locations. They found that damage to the right hemisphere 
was associated with a spatial detection deficit, whilst left hemisphere lesions were 
associated with object deficits. 
Assessment of Attention Deficits after TBI 
".,~\ 
In a recent review of the methods used ir1 -~s~~-sS.i1'lg_~~t13riti()l'l_. __ \i'{~-~~ 
(1~~~!Jl.9!'~.E3rve~.-~hat there are nopure tests of attel'_ltion. Attention, rath_er, may 
~e seen as the sllbstrate in the performance of all consciou~ !~~~~s. Whyte ( 1992b) 
further observed that one can view the assessment of attention in terms of levels. 
Th~~~ .!~~~Is vary from the firing of individual neurons, to the gener~tion of event 
r~~~~~..E~!~n~ials.(!::RPs), to changes in accuracy and speed, and overt 
movements of the organs, through to clinical symptomatology. Whyte noted that 
there are trade offs related to these levels. The lower molecular levels are 
F 
associated with greater precision t5ut less immediate relevance to behaviour. The 
higher levels are more clearly related to behaviour but are less precise. The level 
to be chosen depends on the clinical question. 
Whyte ( 1992b) suggested that in order to assess attention, one ~as .!~~!Y 
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on ITl.e~surese>,! mo.tor.J:>erceptual, and cognitive activity. Just as with the 
theoretical study of attention itself earlier in the century, little attention has been 
given to the development of psychological tests of attention. Stuss and Benson 
~ ~-""""--.,.,,,., ... , '~' '-'-'~"'·•"' 
(1986) observed that the most frequently used tests are not derived from theories 
of attention. Furthermore, as Van Zomeren and Brouwer (1994) recently 
commented, only a few tests which meet basic psychometric standards have been 
developed. With these caveats in mind, the methods used in the assessment will 
now be described. These methods will be grouped under the various components 
of attention, viz. arousal and alertness, selective attention, strategic control of 
attention, speed of information processing and deficits on stages of information 
processing. Before describing the assessment of these components, a brief 
description will be given of the initial observation and interview, and the tests of 
mental control, as suggested by Van Zomeren and Brouwer (1994). 
Observation and Interview 
The observation of attentional deficits is made from the clinician's own 
contact with the patient, as well as reports from the patient's relatives or other 
acquaintances, and from other health personnel. Reported behaviour may include 
d~sc.r!ptions such as "fidgetiness", "easily distracted", "cannot concentrate" and so 
on. In the interview, rating scales are frequently used. Examples of rating scale are 
the Neurobehavioural Rating Scale (NRS) (Levin, High, & Goethe, 1987) and the 
Attentional Rati~_{iL~_cale (Ponsford and Kinsella (1991 ). The NRS contains items 
like, "Rapidly fatigues on challenging cognitive tasks or complex activities, 
lethargic." One of the items on the Attentional Rating scale is "was unable to pay 
attention to more than one thing at once." In addition to rating scales, interview 
questionnaires are also frequently used. Van Zomeren and Van Den Burgh (1985) 
developed the.Trauma Complaints List. Sample items from this questionnaire are 
"Do you think that you respond mofe slowly in a conversation?" and "Has your 
tolerance for bustle decreased?" 
The tests of mental control are easy-to-use procedures that can be used at 
the bedside, and require no specific equipment. They are frequently used by 
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neurologists as screening tests. Th~~~~sts include counting ~a.ck from 19. More 
frequently used is the Serial Sevens test (Smith, 1967; Luria, 1966), and the Digit 
--------~ ...... ____ -·--~--~--- -
Span Forward and Backward (Wechsler, 1981 ). It has been shown that after head 
•"'" ....... ,,___, __ ~_,..,,,,,.~-- ~ ~ <' - - ~ 
injury, some patients who pass the Digit Span Forward may fail the Digit Span 
Backward {Brooks, 1984). Weber (1988) recently developed the Attentional W 
Capacity test, a mental control test consisting of eight subtasks of increasing 
difficulty. Tests specific to components of attention will now be enumerated. 
Detailed descriptions of the individual tests will not be given because these tests 
are\.well described in neuropsychology texts such as Lezak {1995). The purpose 
here is simply to give an overview. 
Arousal and Alertness 
As previously described, arousal and other components of attention 
including alertness and effort are associated with autonomic nervous system 
~ --- -. ___ ., _____ / 
activity. Arousal can be .ascertained from EEG spectral analysis. For example, 
hippocampal theta rhythm is associated with heightened attention {Adey, 1969). 
The indices of autonomic activity following phasic arousal include changes in pupil 
size, heart rate, and electrodermal response (Beatty, 1982). Apart from measures 
of autonomic activity, other measures of arousal include the critical flicker fusion 
frequency (Smith & Misiak, 1976), and reaction time measures (Van Zomeren, 
1981 ). Tonic arousal may be assessed through behavioural observation, but 
probably only at its extremes. Whyte ( 1992b) suggests that these measures may 
be confounded by neuropsychological underarousal which may sometimes lead to 
behavioural overarousal, agitation, and restlessness. 
Reaction time measures have been used to assess phasic arousal by 
comparing an individual's performance with and without a warning signal. Costa 
{1962) showed that in normal controls, the presence of a warning signal led to a 
,. 
reduction in reaction time but this was not the case with brain damaged 
individuals. The difference between patients and normal controls on warned 
versus unwarned tasks is more evident in choice reaction time tasks (Craig, 
Davies, & Matthews, 1987; Lansman, Farr, & Hunt, 1984) . 
. Selective Spatial Attention 
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Whyte (1992a) described various measures of selective spatial attention. 
These include pencil and paper tests of hemi-spatial inattention such as Line 
Bisection (Schenkenberg, Bradford, & Ajax, 1980), Letter Cancellation·(Diller & 
Weinberg, 1977), and the drawing of symmetrical figures such as clocks 
(Battersby, Bender, Pollack, & Khan, 1956). For patients who are not able to read 
and write, tests such as the Motor Free Visual Perception tests have been used 
(Colarusso & Hamill, 1972). 
Focused Attention 
The Stroop Word Colour Test (Stroop, 1935) is one of the oldest measure 
of focussed attention. Focussed attention is usually assessed in the auditory and 
visual areas (Van Zomeren & Brouwer, 1994). Auditory attention can be tested 
using the dichotic listening tasks (Cherry, 1953) which were previously described. 
Visual tests include the Letter Cancellation Task (Diller et al., 1974), the Trail-
making tests (Reitan, 1958), reaction time tests with distraction (Van Zomeren, 
1981 ). The visual focused attention tasks take the form of visual search of a target 
stimuli in a field of distractor stimuli (Van Zomeren & Brouwer, 1994). 
Divided Attention 
Deficits in divided attention are frequently evidenced by reduced speed in 
the performance of tasks (Ponsford & Kinsella, 1992). This reduced performance 
·-···· ···-···-·····. . ,.. . 
c~0 __ t_~~.~ ~~ ~-~~-~0strated through~ reaction time t~sts (Van Zomeren, Brouwer, & 
Deelman, 1984). A commonly cited measure of divided attention is the Paced 
Auditory Serial Addition Test (PASAT) (Gronwall & Sampson, 1974). Gronwall and 
Sampson reported that recently concussed patients performed significantly more 
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poorly on the PASAT compared to normal controls, and nonconcussed accident 
victims. Furthermore, the degree of impairment on the PASAT correlated positively 
with the severity of injury. Patients with mild concussion produced performances 
which were three times as slowed as those of normals. The severely injured were 
found to be five times as slow as normal people. 
Many subsequent studies have confirmed the slowing of mental processes 
as measured by the PASAT (Levin, High, Goldstein, & Williams, 1988; Stuss, 
Stethem, Hugenholtz, & Richard, 1989). Gronwall and Wrightson (1981) showed 
tha\the return of PASAT to normal correlated with the recovery from concussion 
symptoms and improvement of cognitive functions except memory. Dyche & 
Johnson (1991) used the children's version of the PASAT, the CHIPASAT, and 
found that the its scores yielded low but significant correlations with Arithmetic and 
Digit Span subtests of the WISC-R. These WISC-R scores are known to be 
diagnostic of attention problems. 
Sustained Attention 
One of the earliest tests developed to assess sustained attention is the 
Continuous Performance Test (CPT) developed by Rosvold, Mirsky, Sarason, 
Bransome, and Beck (1956). These researchers found that patients were impaired 
in sustained attention as compared to normal controls. In the past, the visual 
modality was used in these continuous performance tasks. Recently, Baker, 
Taylor, & Leyva (1995) showed that auditory presentation of stimuli made the task 
more difficult, and thus increased its sensitivity. 
Van Zomeren and Brouwer (1994) propose that sustained attention deficits 
,.,_c_ •-~··-•-••-'" ••·•--·-- .~.~,--• •-• ---·---~----
present as time-on-task effects, lapses of attention, and intraindividual variability. 
Time-on task effects refer to a decrement in performance over time. For example, 
in a reaction time task, the patient takes a longer to respond, ~he longer he Of_~h~ 
·········· ··-·· -......... .. j ... . . . .. . . 
has been involved in the task. lntraindividual variability means that in a continuous 
task, the individual shows fluctuations in performance. Lapses of attention are a 
special form of variability of performance. Van Zomeren and Brouwer define such 
lapses as "sudden dips in level of performance lasting a few seconds at the most" 
(p. 38). They suggest that on continuous reaction time tasks, a lapse is any 
response that exceeds two standard deviations. 
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Other tests for sustained attention are the cancellation tasks such as the 
Letter Cancellation tests (Talland, 1965; Talland & Schwaub, 1964;), Digit 
Vigilance tests (Lewis & Kupke, 1977) and perceptual Speed (Moran & Mefferd, 
1959). 
Strategic Control of Attention 
\ 
As stated by Kahnemann (1973), the effort component of attention controls 
the other components so that attention is allocated in accordance with one's 
ongoing intentions and plans. Shallice (1982) referred to this as the supervisory 
attentional control. The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Drewe, 197 4; Heaton, 1981) 
is a widely used measure of this supervisory control. The other measures of 
supervisory control are Digits Backwards (Wechsler, 1981 ), Serial Sevens (Smith, 
1967), PASAT (Gronwall & Sampson, 1974), the Tower of London task (Shallice, 
1982) and the Trail-making test (Reitan & Wolfson, 1985). Van Zomeren and 
Brouwer (1994) point out that the strategic control of attention is not routinely 
assessed in current clinical practice. 
Assessment of Deficits on Stages of Information Processing 
Most of the neuropsychological tests used in assessing attention have only 
a tenuous link with cognitive psychology. This idea was discussed in Chapter 1. 
According to Mirsky, Anthony, Duncan, Ahearn, and Kellam (1991 ), the concepts 
of attention that these tests supposedly measure, such as concentration, are 
global and less concrete than measures of the elements or components of 
. attention. Assessing the impairments on stages of information processing is one 
7 
way of usir:ig more clearly defined cognitive concepts. In the past few years, the 
additive factors method for assessing stages of information has been used on 
clinical populations, as the following examples show. The major studies that have 
been reported using the additive factors method on patients with brain damage are 
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those of Stokx and Gaillard (1986), and Shum, McFarland, Bain, and Humphreys 
(1990). 
Stokx and Gaillard (1986) carried out their study with the aim of attributing 
the slowness displayed by chronic patients to a particular stage in information 
processing. They carried out three experiments to investigate four stages of 
information processing, viz, stimulus encoding, memory comparison, response 
selection, and motor preparation. These four stages were respectively identified 
through the manipulation of the task variables of stimulus degradation, set size, 
stirl'Wlus-response compatibility, and time uncertainty. The main effects of the four 
task variables were found to be significant, suggesting the existence of four 
independent processing stages. However, there was no significant difference 
between the experimental groups of closed head injury and normal controls on any 
of the task variables. Contrary to expectation then, this study failed to provide 
evidence that a specific stage in information processing is impaired in victims of 
closed head injury. 
Shum, McFarland, Bain and Humphreys (1990) also set out to attribute the 
mental slowing to a particular stage of information processing. They criticized the 
study by Stokx and Gaillard (1986) for two reasons. Firstly, the study had used a 
small sample. Because of this, the study lacked sufficient experimental power to 
identify differences between the groups and the experimental variables. Secondly, 
the four task variables were manipulated in three separate experiments. The 
results therefore, could not show conclusively that the effects of the four variables 
when considered together were additive. The method that these researchers used 
was described earlier in this chapter. Shum et al. confirmed the existence of four 
information processing stages. Furthermore, contrary to the findings reported by 
Stokx and Gaillard (1986), Shum et al. found that different groups of patients were 
impaired on different stages of information processing. The severe short-term 
group (GCS at admission< 8; and duration since injury less than 12 months) were 
F 
impaired on identification and response execution. The severe long-term group 
(GCS at admission< 8; and duration since injury at least 12 months and not more 
than 54 months) was impaired only on the response execution stage. There was 
no evidence of impairment on any of the information processing stages for the mild 
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short-term group (GCS on admission > 8). 
In addition to the above two studies, follow-up studies include that by 
Murray, Shum, and McFarland (1992), which confirmed the existence of 
independent stages of information processing in head-injured children and normal 
controls. The severely injured children were found to be significantly more 
impaired in response selection and motor execution than the normal controls. 
Another study utilizing the additive factors method on head-injured subjects 
was reported by Schmitter-Edgecombe, Marks, Fahy and Long (1992). This study 
showed that not all stages of information processing are impaired after severe 
head injury. The severely head-injured were significantly more impaired than 
normals on the stage of decision making/response selection. There was no 
significant difference on the memory comparison stage. Schmitter-Edgecombe et 
al. conclude from this that some processes are more resilient than others to the 
effects of severe head injury. In concluding the discussion of the different tests of 
attention, note is taken of the warning by Van Zomeren and Brouwer (1994) that 
each test will inevitably tap several aspects of attention: 
Thus if we describe a test that seems appropriate for studying the capacity 
to divide attention, it should be born in mind that the subject in this 
particular situation must be alert, perceiving selectively, and able to sustain 
attention for at least several minutes to finish the test. Also, the subject's 
supervisory attentional control must be active during testing. And let us 
hope that he will show no lapses of attention as a result of lack of sleep the 
preceding night (p. 159). 
The proposal that most tests tap several aspects of attention is supported 
by the fact that some tests are used in assessing more than one component of 
attention. For example, as is clear from previous descripti<?ns, Letter Cancellation 
/' 
is used in assessing selective spatial attention, focused attention, and sustained 
attention. Furthermore, It has been suggested (e.g. Cronbach, 1957; Sternberg, 
1977) that the information processing and psychological testing approaches 
should be used in a complementary fashion. Shum et al. (1994a) recently 
110 
attempted this. They used Posner and McLeod's (1982) Cognitive Correlates 
Method. The cognitive correlates method is based on the assumption that "if 
elementary cognitive processes (as inferred from specific experimental tasks) are 
involved in the performance of more complex cognitive operations (as measured 
by psychological tests), then the subjects' performances on the tasks and tests 
should correlate with each other" (p. 532). Shum et al. showed that three 
components of attention, visual-motor scanning, sustained selective visual 
scanning, and sustained auditory scanning, could be predicted by six indices of 
information processing. The indices were mean reaction time, mean movement 
time, feature extraction, identification, response selection, and motor adjustment. 
Summary 
As a research topic, attention was popular with the earliest experimental 
psychologists such as James ( 1890) and Titchener ( 1908). Attention fell into 
disfavour in the 1920s due to the rise of behaviourism and gestaltism. There was a 
resurgence of interest in attention after the influential publications of Hebb (1948) 
and Broadbent (1958) and the rise of cognitive psychology in general. 
From the early days of the revival of attention a research topic, it has 
become clear that attention is a heterogeneous rather than a homogeneous 
concept. Moray (1969) identified six meanings of attention used by researchers. 
These were mental concentration, vigilance, selective attention, search, activation, 
and set. After Moray, various attempts have been made to break down the 
concept of attention into its components rather than to continue using ill-defined 
concepts such as mental concentration. 
One of the earliest such attempts was the breaking down of the concept of 
r 
attention into the overlapping components of alertness, selectivity, and processing 
capacity (Posner, 1975; Posner & Boies, 1971). Zubin (1975) suggested the 
components of selectivity, focus, and shift. Pribram and McGuinness (1975) 
proposed that attention was related to the processes of arousal, activation, and 
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effort. The distinction between automatic and controlled attentional processes was 
introduced by Shiffrin and Schneider (1977). More recently, Posner, Walker, 
Friedrich, and Rafal (1984) suggested that attention can be split into the 
components of disengage, move, and engage. Posner and Petersen (1990) 
dealing specifically with visual attention identified the components of orienting to 
sensory events, detecting signals for focal attention, and vigilance. Finally, Mirsky, 
Anthony, Duncan, Ahearn and Kellam (1991) used factor analysis on the results of 
performance on neuropsychological tests to confirm the existence of the 
cor'ftponents of focus-execute, sustain, encode, and shift. Recently, Plude, Enns & 
Brodeur (1994) identified orienting, filtering, searching & expecting, as components 
of selective attention. Of the above sets of components, the following were 
discussed at some length: arousal; alertness; selectivity; focus, sustain, encode, 
and shift; automatic and controlled processing; and effort and the strategic control 
of attention. 
Overall, components of attention are associated with multiple brain areas. 
This is consistent with Luria's writings regarding the involvement of the three 
functional systems of the brain in all psychological processes. Luria's approach to 
attention was described. This was followed by a description of Mesulam's (1981, 
1990) suggestion of neural networks as the neurological basis of attention. 
In an attempt to describe the mechanism of attention, two sets of theories 
have been proposed. There are the bottleneck theories, and the capacity models 
of attention. The bottleneck theories state that individuals are continuously 
exposed to multiple sources of information and it is always necessary to select 
some channel(s) and ignore others. The bottleneck theories are further subdivided 
into those which favour early selection (Broadbent, 1958), and those which favour 
a two-stage (Treisman, 1961) selection or late selection (Deutsch & Deutsch, 
1963; Deutsch, Deutsch, & Lindsay, 1976). The idea that there is a bottleneck in 
information processing has recently been crWcized because it is not consistent 
with the physiological properties ot'the brain (Meyer et al., 1995). With respect to 
the early versus late selection, early selection has received support from the ERP 
studies. 
The capacity models began with Kahneman (1973) who theorized about 
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effort as a component of attention. These models state that the resources for 
processing information are limited. For this reason, when an individual attempts to 
carry out two or more tasks simultaneously, there will be mutual interference in 
performance. Some capacity theorists have suggested that there are several 
processing mechanisms, and not just one. For this reason, tasks will only interfere 
with each other if they compete for the same resources (Allport, Antonis, & 
Reynolds, 1972; Wickens, 1984). Finally, suggestions have been made by 
theorists like Navan (1984), that all information processing is resource free. The 
deterioration of performance in dual tasks is due to outcome conflict between two 
processes. Meyer et al. ( 1995) suggested that the reason why people may not be 
able to do more than two tasks at once is that there is a limitation of the peripheral 
sensory and motor mechanisms, and not limited cognitive capacity. 
The relationships between information processing concepts and attention 
were dealt with next. It was shown that both the bottleneck and capacity theories 
of attention deal with information processing. Reaction time tasks have been used 
extensively as an experimental paradigm for measuring speed and accuracy in 
information processing. The two main methods in assessing information 
processing stages are the subtractive method and the additive factors method. 
Both methods rely on the use of reaction time tasks. The subtractive method was 
the first to be developed (Donders, 1969). Several pertinent criticisms were 
levelled against this method and it was eventually dropped and replaced by the 
additive factors method (Sternberg, 1969), This method is also liable to several 
pertinent criticisms. It has however continued to be used because of its practical 
value (Sanders, 1980, 1990). 
Consistent with the fact that normal attention has a complex neural base, 
attention deficit was also found to have a complex neural base. All three 
functional systems of the brain (Luria, 1966, 1976) are implicated in one or other of 
the components of attention. Special note was made of the contributions of the 
. frontal lesions, fronto-limbic and relicular lesions, and the parietal lobe lesions. 
The final major section of the chapter dealt with the assessment of 
attention. Whyte (1992) has argued that there are no pure tests of attention. 
Rather, indirect measures of individuals' performance on a wide variety of 
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conscious tasks. The assessment of attention is also conceptualized as taking 
place on a continuum of levels, from the firing of individual neurons through to 
symptomatology. The levels vary in their degree of accuracy and clinical utility. In 
clinical practice, many tests, some of which were empirically rather than 
theoretically derived, are frequently used. These tests are described in many 
textbooks of clinical neuropsychology, for example Lezak (1995). 
The assessment tests used in the attention components of arousal, 
focussed attention, selective attention, and the strategic control of attention were 
ent:illlerated. The chapter ended with a review of the assessment of attention 
through the analysis of deficits on stages of information processing. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
Summary and Aims 
In the preceding four chapters, a review of the literature on traumatic brain 
injury, the postconcussion syndrome, and attention, was carried out. From the 
review, it was shown that traumatic brain injury is a significant health problem in 
South Africa (Nell & Brown, 1991 ). It was also shown that even so-called minor 
head injury can lead to significant structural and/ or functional abnormalities of the 
brain (Gordon, 1994). 
One of the most frequently reported clinical conditions after traumatic brain 
injury is the postconcussion syndrome, which was reviewed in Chapter 3. Factor 
analytic studies, such as those by Levin, Gary et al. ( 1987) have shown that the 
symptoms of the postconcussion syndrome load onto meaningful and clear-cut 
clusters. The aetiology of the postconcussion syndrome has been a controversial 
topic for more than a century, with the two major positions being the organic and 
the psychological perspectives (Evans, 1994). Many contemporary writers argue 
that the postconcussion syndrome is the product of an interaction between organic 
and psychological factors (Bohnen & Jolles, 1992). 
One of the symptoms in the postconcussion syndrome is attention deficit, 
which patients spontaneously report as concentration difficulties or slowness of 
thought processes (Evans, 1992; Whyte, 1992a). Deficits of attention are also 
suspected to be involved in other postconcussion symptoms, notably memory 
problems (Nissen, 1986). BecausEl of the prominence of this deficit in the 
postconcussion syndrome, the nature and mechanisms of attention were 
discussed at some length in Chapter 4. It was shown that attention is not a unitary 
aspect of cognition, but rather, comprises of a variety of interacting processes and 
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functions (Stablum, Leanardi, Mazzoldi, Umilta, & Morra, 1994). It is comprised of 
many components (Posner, 1975; Plude, Enns, & Brodeur, 1994). 
Also discussed in Chapter 4 were the various procedures for the 
assessment of attention deficits after traumatic brain injury. These procedures 
differ in the degree of precision and immediate relevance to behaviour (Whyte, 
1992b ). Assessment of impairments on sta!Jes of information processing offers a 
way for operationally defining attention deficits more precisely than the commonly 
used neuropsychological tests and test batteries (Shum et al., 1994a). Although 
the\assessment of deficits on stages of information processing are a promising 
approach, serious criticisms have been levE~lled against it (Sanders, 1990). 
The aim of the present study is to determine whether postconcussion 
symptoms differ in the extent to which they correlate with experimentally 
determined cognitive deficits. Previous neuropsychological studies have mostly 
attempted to demonstrate that patients with the postconcussion syndrome have 
more cognitive deficits as compared to controls (Gfeller, Chibnall, & Duckro, 
1994). In the present study, the focus is not on the difference between patients 
and controls. The comparison of interest is that between patients who report 
different symptoms on cognitive tasks as indexed by reaction time. 
The reaction time tasks were adapted from those previously used by Shum 
et al. (1990), in their investigation of deficits on stages of information processing. 
These tasks were described and illustrated in Chapter 4 (Figure 2). To 
recapitulate, these tasks involve the manipulation of four task variables, signal 
quality (degraded vs undegraded stimulus), stimulus-response compatibility 
(compatible vs incompatible), stimulus discriminability (similar vs dissimilar), and 
foreperiod uncertainty (fixed foreperiod vs variable foreperiod). The difference 
between the Shum et al. study and the present study is that in the former, the 
experimental design was factorial, whilst in the later the design is nonfactorial. In 
other words, the task conditions were not combined two at a time as is the case in 
factorial designs (see Table 1 ). lnslead, only the original eight tasks conditions 
were used. These are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Nonfactorial task conditions 
Task variable Nonfactorial task 
conditions 
Signal quality Degraded vs 
Undegraded 
Signal Similar vs Dissimilar 
discriminability 
' 
signal-response Compatible vs 
compatibility Incompatible 
Foreperiod Fixed foreperiod vs 
uncertainty Variable foreperiod 
The advantage of factorial designs is that statistical procedures are 
available for identifying stages of information processing from the reaction time 
data. The disadvantage of this design is that there are more task conditions, and 
these conditions are more complex. For example on the task variable signal quality 
there are only two task conditions, viz. degraded and undegraded. In the factorial 
design on the other hand, there are twelve possible task conditions as shown in 
Row 2 and Row 3 of Table 1. The tasks are more complex because they involve 
two task conditions, and not one, as in the nonfactorial design. For example, for 
the task nonfactorial design a stimulus is simply degraded or undegraded. In the 
factorial design on the other hand the task may be degraded and incompatible. 
Because of the complexity and the number of tasks in the factorial design, it 
takes relatively longer to test each subject than in the nonfactorial design. In the 
study by Shum et al. (1990), testing each participant took approximately one and a 
half hours. This excluded the time for the interview and the filling out of 
questionnaires. Spending more th~ one and a half hours on each participant was 
considered impractical in the outpatient settings in which this study was going to 
be carried out. After consulting with the doctors, patients are normally anxious to 
leave the hospital to catch their transport home. They would not be willing to wait 
for hours at the outpatient department to be tested for research purposes. 
117 
The advantage of using the nonfactorial task design is that a much larger 
sample can be used. Furthermore, if any differences are found between groups, 
there would be a strong case for suspecting that differences would also be found 
on the more complex tasks of the factorial designs. There would then be a 
justification for planning more expensive and time consuming factorial studies 
investigating deficits on stages of information processing. At the same time, this 
simpler experiment would help to highlight errors to be avoided, and new 
strategies to be used, in future factorial designs. To achieve the above aims, the 
foll&wing hypotheses were formulated. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 
Patients who have sustained a concussion will show greater frequency and 
intensity of postconcussion symptoms than controls; and patients will be slower in 
performing reaction time tasks. 
Previous studies such as those by Bohnen et al., (1992) and Wong, (1994) have 
shown that symptoms similar to those found after a concussion are also common 
in the general population. Furthermore, these symptoms are also found in non-
head injured patients (Fullerton et al., 1981; Gouvier, Uddo-Crane, & Brown, 1988) 
and in the psychiatric population (Fox, Lees-Haley, Earnest, & Dolezal-Wood, 
1995). The first prediction of Hypothesis 1 is that patients will report greater 
frequency and intensity of symptoms. There are at least three reasons why 
patients may have greater symptomatology. First, because of the concussion, 
patients may have organic pathologies that increase the probability of symptoms. 
For example, as was indicated in the literature review (Chapter 3), abnormal 
cerebral circulation may contribute to postconcussion headaches (Evans, 1992; 
Packard & Ham, 1994). Secondly, the stresses associated with traumatic brain 
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injury may lead to more symptoms (Mittenberg, Zielinski, & Fichera, 1993; 
Mclelland, Fenton & Rutherford, 1994). Finally, as Mittenberg, DiGiulio, Perrin, & 
Bass (1992) recently found, the expectation that one will experience symptoms 
after head injury may contribute to the emergence of those symptoms. 
The second prediction of Hypothesis 1 is that patients will be slower on 
reaction time tasks. The slowness of patients compared to controls is due to the 
fact that traumatic brain injury can lead to damage to brain structures and systems 
known to be crucial for some cognitive processes. For example, in the literature 
rev'iew, it was indicated that the frontal and temporal lobes are particularly 
vulnerable to injury (Adams, Graham, Scott, Parker, & Doyle, 1980; Chu, Lin, 
Huang & Lee, 1994 ). Damage to the temporal lobes may result in memory 
problems (Cooke & Kausler, 1995). Because of this deficit, the patient may have 
difficulties remembering instructions, and this will result in errors or slowness of 
response (Tromp & Mulder, 1991 ). Traumatic brain injury also leads to several 
kinds of attention deficit. For example, damage to the first functional unit of the 
brain (Luria, 1973), may lead to reduced arousal and alertness; damage to 
posterior brain regions leads to deficits in spatial attention (Mesulam, 1990); and 
damage to the frontal lobe leads to loss of ability to inhibit responses to irrelevant 
stimuli (Luria, 1973). Furthermore, traumatic brain injury may lead to reduced 
processing capacity, which gives rise to the need to exert more effort (Gronwall & 
Wrightson, 197 4 ). Increased effort in turn leads to fatigue, which further 
compromises performance on reaction time tasks (Van Zomeren, 1981 }. 
Hypothesis 2 
For both patients and controls, the symptoms tend to form clusters. 
However, the clusters identified for the patients differ from those 
identified for the controls. 
J 
Previous factor analytic studies have already shown that postconcussion 
symptoms tend to form clusters (Van Zomeren & Van Den Burgh, 1985; Levin, 
Gary et al., 1987). There is no reason to believe that the symptoms of patients in 
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South Africa do not also form clear-cut clusters. However, as Levin, Mattis et al. 
(1987) showed, the aggregation of symptoms reported differ from centre to centre, 
even in the same country. The postconcussion symptom patterns also change 
over time (Rutherford, 1989). It is therefore difficult to determine apriori the number 
and the constituent symptoms of the clusters of symptoms in the present sample. 
The present hypothesis was included in order to establish the actual symptoms 
reported and the manner in which they cluster in this particular sample. 
None of the reviewed studies compared the symptom clusters between 
patients and controls. It is proposed here that the symptom clusters will not be 
identical. There may be similarities between some of the clusters, namely, the 
constellations of symptoms arising from stress (Mclelland, Fenton & Rutherford, 
1994). However, because the patients have an additional traumatic insult to the 
brain, it is to be expected that there will be additional symptoms that are not found 
in the control group. 
Hypothesis 3 
For both patients and controls, level 1 tasks will be associated with 
significantly longer response times than level 2 tasks. 
As was described in the literature review, there are four task variables, each 
with two levels or tasks conditions (Shum et al., 1990). For each task variable, one 
of the task conditions is meant to be more difficult than the other. The more difficult 
task will lead to longer reaction time than the easier task. In this study, the more 
difficult task condition will be referred to as level 1, and the less difficult will be 
referred to as level 2. The level 1 and level 2 task conditions for the four task 
variables are shown in table 3. 
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Table 3: Level 1 and level 2 task conditions 
Level 1 
Degraded 
Incompatible 
Similar 
Variable foreperiod 
Level2 
Undegraded 
Compatible 
Dissimilar 
Fixed foreperiod 
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The hypothesis states the obvious, in that the tasks were designed with the 
express aim of making the level 1 tasks more difficult than the level 2 tasks. 
Previous studies have used similar tasks, with the same aim of having significant 
differences in performance on the two levels (Shum et al., 1990; Stokx & Gaillard, 
1986; Murray, Shum, Bain, & Humphreys, 1992; Shum, McFarland & Bain, 
1994b ). It is nevertheless important to confirm that this is the case for the present 
sample, before testing other hypotheses which rely on this assumption. 
Hypothesis 4 
The magnitude of the difference between level 1 and level 2 tasks will be 
significantly greater for patients than it is for controls . 
In hypothesis 3, it was suggested that the level 1 task is more difficult than 
the level 2 task. This means that subjects are expected to be faster in their 
reaction times on level 2 than on level 1. It is predicted here that this difference will 
be significantly greater for patients than for controls. This expectation is based on 
the fact that previous research has suggested that brain damage is associated 
with greater sensitivity to increased complexity on reaction time tasks (Van 
Zomeren & Brouwer, 1987). Because of the limited processing capaCity after 
traumatic brain injury, patients often have to exert more effort than controls in 
order to cope with even simple tasks (Gronwall & Sampson, 197 4; Hinkely & 
• Corrigan, 1990; Van Zomeren, Brouwer, & Deelman, 1984). With the more difficult 
tasks, it is reasonable to expect that even more effort will be required. As more 
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effort is exerted, there will be more fatigue, which in turn will lead to significantly 
slower responses. 
. Hypothesis 5 
The number of correlations between postconcussion symptoms and indices 
of reaction time varies as a function of the subjective ratings of symptom 
frequency, intensity, and duration. 
Jakobsen, Baadsgaard, Thomsen, and Henriksen ( 1987) showed that it is 
possible to predict the persistence of postconcussion symptoms from the subjects' 
performance on reaction time tasks a few days after injury. Lishman (1988) also 
found that there is a positive correlation between postconcussion symptoms and 
slowing on reaction time tasks, but this correlation disappeared after three months. 
More recently, Arcia and Gualtieri (1993) also showed that symptom presence is 
associated with deficits on a number of neuropsychological tests. For this study it 
is proposed that more cognitive deficits would be identified if the symptoms are 
quantified beyond just endorsing the fact that they are present. The way to 
quantify the symptoms is to record the patient's subjective rating of each 
symptom's frequency and intensity. Gouvier, Cubic, Jones, Brantley, and Cutlip 
(1992) have suggested that recording symptom frequency, intensity and duration 
increases the conciseness of assessing postconcussion symptoms. 
The indices of reaction time are classified into four groups: Reaction time 
(RT, the duration from the presentation of a stimulus to the lifting of the subject's 
finger from the home button), movement time (MT, the duration from the lifting of 
the finger from the home button to the depressing of the response button), total 
reaction time (TT, the sum of RT and MT), and subtraction score (SB, the 
respective differences between the RTs, MTs, and TTs of level 1 and level 2 task 
conditions). There will thus be eigttt RT scores, eight MT scores, eight TT scores, 
and 12 SB scores. The total number of reaction time indices for 8 task conditions 
will be 36. In this study then, both the symptoms and the reaction times are broken 
down into specific aspects. This large number of indices was used because, as 
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Houlihan, Campbell, and Stelmach (1994) suggested, predictive power is 
increased when several reaction time measures are used. 
\. 
Hypothesis 6 
The various postconcussion symptoms will differ in the extent to 
which they correlate with reaction time, movement time, total reaction 
time, and subtraction scores. 
In the literature review, it was indicated that different components of 
reaction time, viz., reaction time (RT) and movement time (MT), involve different 
capabilities, namely decision time and response execution (Jensen & Munro, 
1979). Decision time was referred to as the cognitive component of reaction time. 
The postconcussion symptoms have also been classified into cognitive and 
noncognitive ones (Bohnen, Twijnstra & Jolles, 1992; Levin, Gary, et al., 1987). In 
this hypothesis, the prediction is that symptoms will correlate either with RT or with 
MT depending on whether they are cognitive or not. Total reaction time and SB 
scores are both derived from RT and MT. It is predicted that likewise, symptoms 
will differ in the extent to which they correlate with total reaction time and SB. 
The specifics of the relationships between postconcussion symptoms and brain 
lesions is not yet fully understood (Gouvier, Cubic, Jones, Brantley, & Cutlip, 
1992). Some of the proposed neural bases of the postconcussion symptoms were 
discussed in Chapter 3. For example, some forms of depression after traumatic 
brain injury may be attributable to frontal lobe damage (Jorge et al., 1993a). The 
cognitive component of reaction time, notably response selection, has also been 
attributed to frontal lobe damage (Decary & Richer, 1995). An overlap in the 
neurological aetiology of depression and deficits on the cognitive component or 
reaction time may lead to a strong correlation between the two. Establishing 
J 
correlations between the various postconcussion symptoms and indices of 
reaction time may help to suggest the underlying neurological bases of both. 
\ 
Hypothesis 7 
The various postconcussion symptoms will differ in the extent to 
which they correlate with the task variables signal quality, signal 
discriminability, S-R compatibility, and foreperiod uncertainty 
According to the stage theories of information processing (Sternberg, 
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1969), the different task variables require different cognitive operations. In factorial 
experiments (Table 2), signal quality involves feature extraction, signal 
discriminability involves identification, S-R compatibility involves response 
selection, and foreperiod uncertainty involves motor adjustment (Shum et al., 
1990). In the postconcussion syndrome, some symptoms are cognitive, whilst 
others are not (Bohnen, Twijnstra & Jolles, 1992). It is expected that symptoms will 
differ in the extent to which they relate to the various cognitive demands inherent 
in these tasks. For example one can expect that patients with visual problems will 
have more difficulties with signal quality than other patients. Because a 
nonfactorial design was used in the present study, any significant relationships 
found can only suggest, rather than confirm, relationships between specific 
symptoms and stages of information processing. 
Hypothesis 8 
The various symptom clusters will differ in the extent to which they 
correlate with reaction time, movement time, total reaction time, and 
subtraction scores. 
J 
This hypothesis is an extension Hypothesis 6. The only difference here is 
that one is considering collections of symptoms, rather than individual symptoms. 
It is important to investigate clusters of symptoms because postconcussion 
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symptoms do not typically occur in isolation (Levin, Gary et al., 1987; Mureriwa, 
1990). It is anticipated that symptoms with a common aetiology may show similar 
cognitive deficits. For example, low noise and low light tolerance are both 
associated with cranial nerve abnormalities (Cohen & Rein, 1992; Bohnen, 
Twijnstra, Wijnen, & Jolles, 1991; Waddell & Gronwall, 1984). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PILOT STUDY 
Aims 
\. 
The aims of the pilot study were as follows: 
1. To provide the researcher with experience in the administration of the 
reaction time tasks as well as the research questionnaires. 
2. To test the computerized reaction time programme which was custom-
made for this research. 
125 
3. To determine what difficulties, if any, patients may have in taking part in the 
computerized reaction time tasks. 
4. To obtain an indication of the distribution of the reaction time data on a 
South African hospital sample. In previous research on stages of 
information processing, most reaction time data is reported to be positively 
skewed (Shum, McFarland, Bain, & Humphreys, 1990). In other words, in a 
normal distribution curve, the scores tend to pile up to the left of the curve. 
It was considered necessary to determine if this was the case on the 
present sample, so that the research tasks could be redesigned as 
necessary. 
J 
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Method 
Subjects 
To obtain patients to take part in the pilot study I requested referrals from 
neurosurgeons at the Ga-Rankuwa and HF Verwoerd hospitals in Pretoria. The 
patients were to have the following characteristics: 
\. 
1. History of traumatic head injury 
2. Age: 18-40 years 
3. Sex: both 
4. Symptoms: All patients complaining of one or more postconcussion 
symptoms (Appendix E). 
5. No history of neurological conditions such as epilepsy or previous head 
trauma, or a history of psychiatric disorders. 
6. Ability to communicate in English. 
A total of 22 patients were referred but only 16 were included in the study. 
The six patients who were excluded had been referred from the adult male 
neurosurgical ward at Ga-Rankuwa hospital. They were excluded because, 
although they were considered well enough to be discharged from hospital, when I 
tested them, they were unable to follow the instructions. In other words they did 
' 
not appear to understand what was required and continued to make incorrect 
responses in spite of these mistakes being pointed out to them. Of the subjects 
that remained, nine were from Ga-Rankuwa hospital (eight from the neurosurgical 
outpatient department and one from the male neurosurgical ward), and seven 
were from the neurosurgical outpatient department at HF Verwoerd hospital. 
The control subjects took paft in response to advertisements placed on 
notice boards at the Medical University of Southern Africa (Medunsa). No payment 
was offered for taking part. 
127 
Instruments 
1. A 16 MHZ 386 desktop Astra computer with colour monitor. 
2. A wooden reaction time box (Hick Box)(Fig. 3). This consists of 1 square 
home button and 4 square target (or response) buttons. The five buttons 
measured one square centimetre each. Each of the target buttons was 
located 16cm from the home button, 
3. Questionnaires 
\. 3.1 Demographic Data Form (Appendix A) . This form was specifically 
designed for the present study. It elicited demographic information 
such as sex and age. Information about the dates of admission and 
discharge was obtained from the patient's files. The last four 
questions were for establishing hand dominance. These were 
borrowed from Nell (1990). 
3.2 Trauma Details Form (Appendix B) . This form was also specifically 
designed for the present study. The aim of the form was to obtain 
information from the patient about the source and severity of injury. 
The answers to questions 10 to 15 were obtained from the patients' 
hospital files. 
3.3 Screening Questionnaire (Appendix C). This questionnaire was 
adapted from the World Health Organization's (1986) 
Neurobehavioural Core Test Battery by Nell and Taylor (1992). The 
information it obtains relates to previous head injuries, and the 
presence of other medical conditions. 
3.4 Pretest Questionnaire (Appendix D). (World Health Organization, 
1986). The pretest questionnaire asks about the amount of sleep in 
the past 24 hours, as well as the consumption of fluids and drugs. 
3.5 Postconcussion Symptom Checklist 1 (Appendix E ). This is a list of 
postconcussion symPtoms compiled by myself from the literature 
reviewed in Chapter 3. 
Figure 3. Computer and Hick Box 
\ 
Computer screen 
with 8 stimulus lines ~ 
Hick Box with 4 response 
buttons and a home button 
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Procedure 
At the time that this project began, I was employed as a Senior clinical 
psychologist and Senior lecturer at Ga-Rankuwa hospital and Medunsa. I also had 
an honorary appointment as a clinical psychologist at the HF Verwoerd hospital. 
Apart from carrying out the research project, I provided service to these patients 
as part of my employment. The service included doing clinical assessments, filling 
in medico-legal forms, counselling, and referring patients on to other specialists. 
\. 
Questionnaire Administration 
The first questionnaire to be administered was the Demographic Data form 
(Appendix A). Information on dates of admission and discharge was obtained from 
the hospital files. For the controls, the questions relating to hospitalization were not 
asked. The next form was the Trauma Details (Appendix 8). This was 
administered to patients only. The first nine questions were asked from the 
patients directly, and the answers to the remaining questions were obtained from 
the hospital files. All information provided by the patients was double-checked 
against the information in the hospital files. The Screening Questionnaire 
(Appendix C), and the Pretest Questionnaire (Appendix D) were administered to 
both patients and controls. 
The administration of the Postconcussion symptom checklist 1 was more 
involved than the first four questionnaires. I sat next to the patients and placed the 
questionnaire in front of them. I would then say: 
On this form I have a list of symptoms that you may or may not have been 
experiencing since your injury." As I said this I would indicate the column on 
the form labelled symptom. "I would like you to indicate to me how 
frequently this symptom botfiers you" (pointing to the column frequency). If 
this symptom never bothers you we will give it a score of 0. If it bothers you 
only sometimes we will give it a score of 1. If the symptom bothers you 
most of the time we will give it a score of 2. 
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Finally, I would like you to indicate in this column (pointing to the column 
intensity) how intense this symptom is for you. If the symptom is not a 
problem at all to you we will give it a score of 0. If it is a mild problem we will 
give it a score of 1. If it is moderate we will give it a score of 2; and if it is 
severe we will give it a score of 3. 
After these instructions, I filled in the questionnaire according to the 
responses indicated by the patients. Further explanations of the scoring rules were 
giv~n as required by the patients. Some patients responded that the symptoms 
"used to be present" but were not currently present. Only current symptoms were 
endorsed on the form. 
Reaction Time Tasks: Task Variables and Task Conditions 
The reaction time experimental procedure closely followed that used by 
Shum, McFarland, Bain, and Humphreys (1990). This experiment was described in 
chapter 4. A diagrammatic illustration of the four task variables was given in Figure 
2, chapter 4. For each of the 8 task conditions there were two signals. The first 
one was a warning signal. It was a 256 Hz beep from the computer, lasting .07 
seconds. The second signal was the imperative signal, a 1 Ocm luminous line on a 
dark screen background. This line appeared in the centre of the screen pointing in 
the direction of one of the four response buttons. The next pair of signals 
appeared 2 seconds after the response button had been depressed. With the 
exception of the variable foreperiod condition, the warning signal was presented 
1.5 seconds before the appearance of the imperative signal. 
The following instruction was given at the beginning of the experiment: 
I am going to use this comp~er and this Hick Box to measure how fast you 
are in responding. You will make all your responses on this Hick Box. The 
pictures that you must respond to will appear on this computer screen. As 
you make your responses, the computer will calculate how fast you are 
responding. You must use only the index finger of one hand for doing this 
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(This would be the preferred hand as established by the hand dominance 
examination). Try to respond as quickly as you can without making 
mistakes. Now we can begin .... 
· After the subject was seated comfortably in front of the experimental 
equipment, the researcher typed in the appropriate commands on the computer 
keyboard. This led to the appearance of eight luminous lines on the computer 
screen with a degraded background (See Fig. 4). Four of the lines were thick and 
cle~ly visible. The other 4 were faint and difficult to discriminate against the 
background. The subject was then asked "Do you see these eight lines on the 
screen?" If the answer was yes, the subject was told: "Please point to each of 
those lines in turn." 
If the subject was unable to point to all eight lines correctly, he or she would 
be excluded from the study for visual reasons. If, on the other hand the subject 
pointed to all the lines correctly, the experimenter said: "These lines are going to 
appear on the screen one at a time. I would like you to show me which of these 
lines has appeared by pressing down on one of the four buttons on this Hick Box. 
Let me show you how we are going to do this ... " 
The experimenter then pressed the ENTER key on the keyboard. This 
brought on another screen page, with the prompt for providing the patient's name. 
After the subject's name had been logged on, the familiarization practice for the 
subject would begin. This was meant to familiarize the subject with the position of 
the home button and the target buttons. It was also meant to give the subject 
practice in responding to the warning and the imperative signals. The 
familiarization practice consisted of nine trials. The instructions for doing this 
practice were shown on the computer screen and were as follows: 
On the wooden box in front of you there are five black buttons. The one at the 
.! 
centre, situated below the other four is the "start" button. The four buttons 
arranged in a semi-circle near the top of the box are the "target buttons." These 
are numbered 1, 2, 3, & 4. 
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In order to start the experiment, you must place your forefinger on the start button 
and keep it pressed down. After a few seconds a beep will sound from the 
computer to warn you that the experiment is about to begin. The beep will be 
followed by an arrow appearing on the computer screen. This arrow will be 
pointing in the direction of one of the four target buttons. As soon as possible after 
the appearance of the arrow, lift your finger from the start button and depress the 
button corresponding to the direction of the arrow. Try to respond as quickly as 
you can without making a mistake. Tell me when you are ready to begin ... 
\. 
After the familiarization practice, the formal tests began. The eight task 
conditions were presented in random sequence. The instructions for carrying out 
each reaction time task appeared on the computer screen and were read out and 
explained to the subject. The instructions were for each of the eight task conditions 
were as follows: 
1. Undegraded 
*Keep your forefinger pressing down on the start button. 
* When the arrow appears on the screen lift your forefinger and quickly 
depress the target button corresponding to the direction of the arrow. 
2. Degraded 
Keep your forefinger pressing down on the start button. 
* When the arrow appears on the screen lift your forefinger and quickly 
depress the target button corresponding to the direction of the arrow. 
J 
3. Dissimilar 
*Keep your forefinger pressing down on the start button. 
* When the arrow appears on the screen lift your forefinger and quickly 
depress the target button corresponding to the direction of the arrow. 
4. Similar 
\. *Keep your forefinger pressing down on the start button. 
* When the arrow appears on the screen lift your forefinger and quickly 
depress the target button corresponding to the direction of the arrow. 
5. Compatible 
*Keep your forefinger pressing down on the start button. 
* When the arrow appears on the screen lift your forefinger and quickly 
depress the target button corresponding to the direction of the arrow. 
6. Incompatible 
*Keep your forefinger pressing down on the start button. 
* When the arrow appears on the screen lift your forefinger and quickly 
depress the target button AT THE POSITION OPPOSITE TO THE 
DIRECTION OF THE ARROW. 
In other words, when the arrow points:-
- In the direction of button 1 
* You should depress button 4. 
J 
- In the direction of button 2 
* You should depress button 3. 
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- In the direction of button 3 
* You should depress button 2. 
- In the direction of button 4 
* You should depress button 1 
8. Foreperiod Uncertaintv 
\ 
In this part of the experiment, the length of the waiting period between the 
beep from the computer and the appearance of the arrow on the screen will 
vary. Sometimes the waiting period will be short and sometimes it will be 
long. 
*Keep your forefinger pressing down on the start button. 
* When the arrow appears on the screen lift your forefinger and quickly 
depress the target button corresponding to the direction of the arrow. 
The testing was discontinued if a subject made five consecutive errors. To 
discontinue, the experimenter said, "That will be enough for today. Press this 
button" (Indicating either ESC, in order to abort the test without saving results, or 
'Q' for quitting and saving results up to this point). These subjects would be 
excluded from the study. 
Results 
Questionnaires 
,. 
There were no problems with the forms eliciting personal details, and the 
Screening Questionnaire. Patients were able to understand the requirements of 
the Postconcussion Symptom Checklist. An impression was gained however, that 
a fuller description of the symptoms would be obtained if patients were asked to 
rank their symptoms in some way. Patients found it difficult to estimate duration of 
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loss of consciousness or post-traumatic amnesia. They tended to repeat what 
someone else had told them. Most were unable to tell the time of the accident or 
the assault. 
Reaction Time 
The testing of normal controls was abandoned after four respondents had 
been tested because, the computer, a large desktop computer, broke down. The 
bre'akdown occurred due to the fact that the computer equipment had to be 
frequently connected and disconnected and transported in the car between the 
office and the hospital clinics. Failure to test more normal controls was not 
considered as a serious setback because no significant problems had been noted 
when testing normal subjects during the practice phase. 
Several observations were made about the way in which the reaction time 
tasks were performed: Judging by its face value, it had been expected that the 
incompatible task condition would be the most difficult for the subjects. Subjects 
were observed to make many errors on this task. However, the subjects who were 
able to perform the task seemed to find it more interesting than all the other task 
conditions. When asked for comment, subjects indicated that they enjoyed this 
task because it involved more challenge than the other tasks. 
It was observed that for most subjects, the response required for the 
incompatible task condition tended to be carried over to whichever task condition 
followed. In other words, the subjects tended to respond by depressing the button 
opposite to the direction of the arrow, thus resulting in error scores. Many subject 
also made errors on the similar task condition. Those who had difficulties in this 
task seemed to find it unpleasant and frustrating. 
Some subjects who had quick reaction time (RT) nevertheless recorded 
slow movement time (MT). The delay in depressing the response buttons was due 
J 
to one of two factors: On some occasions, subjects clearly aimed for the correct 
target button but missed it. They would hit the Hick Box in the vicinity of the button 
first then move over to depress the correct button. On other occasions, subjects 
touched the correct button but did not depress it firmly enough. They would then 
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either realize the problem and depress the button for the second time, or would not 
realize the problem and go back to the home button. With practice however, this 
problem was eliminated . 
. Error Counts. Whenever the subject failed to depress the required response 
button on each trial, this was recorded as an error. The number of errors made on 
each condition were counted. These are shown in Table 4. 
There were high error rates on three task conditions, compatible, 
incompatible, and similar. In experiments on stage analysis, of which this study is 
a rTtodification, the aim is to have as low an error rate as possible (Shum, 
McFarland, Bain, & Humphreys, 1990). This is because identification of stages is 
based on calculations on correct responses, which should be at least 90%. Errors 
Table 4 :Percentages of errors on task conditions 
Task condition Errors% 
Degraded 6.64 
Undegraded 7.03 
Compatible 10.55 
Incompatible 22.27 
Similar 19.14 
Dissimilar 7.03 
Fixed foreperiod 7.03 
Variable foreperiod 6.64 
are always eliminated. The high error rates on some of the task conditions are 
therefore not acceptable. It is proposed that the errors could have been less if the 
subjects had been given more practice trials. 
Distribution of Reaction Time Measurements. For the pilot study, only RT 
scores were used in the following analyses. 
Except for the dissimilar task condition, the reaction times were positively 
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Table 5: Measures of central tendency 
Condition Mean Median S.D. Skewness 
Degraded 89.73 61.00 86.44 4.10 
Undegraded 56.37 49.00 53.65 12.47 
Similar 61.90 60.00 26.44 0.71 
Dissimilar 45.67 50.00 44.45 -2.16 
Fix1'd foreperiod 61.57 55.00 21.28 1.43 
Variable foreperiod 71.61 65.00 27.90 1.40 
Compatible 60.31 50.00 43.04 4.52 
Incompatible 66.33 55.00 42.64 5.18 
skewed. This is consistent with previous studies, which have shown that reaction 
time data tends to be positively skewed (Shum, McFarland, Bain & Humphreys, 
1990; Stokx & Gaillard, 1986; Murray, Shum, & McFarland, 1992; Shum, 
McFarland, & Bain, 1994). Positive skewness indicates that the tasks are not too 
difficult for the subjects (Shum, McFarland, Bain & Humphreys, 1990). The 
negative skew found for the dissimilar task condition is surprising, because one 
would have expected this task condition to be the easiest. Perhaps the task was 
too easy, and as such was not sufficiently arousing for subjects to exert maximal 
attention. It did not capture the subjects' attention (Berlyne, 1960). 
Outliers. An outlier is any score which is 2 standard deviations higher or 
lower than the mean for each condition (Shum, McFarland, Bain & Humphreys, 
1990). When analysing reaction time data for identifying stages of information 
processing, the accepted practice is to eliminate outliers (Tabachnick & Fiddell, 
1983). Sternberg (1969) noted that one way of handling the positive skewness in 
RT distributions was to use logarithmic transformations. He however did not 
recommend logarithmic transformalion because such transformation would 
destroy meaningful additive or interactive relations between variables. Shum, 
McFarland, and Bain (1994) suggested that deletion of outliers allows a more 
direct interpretation of results. In the present study it was decided to eliminate 
outliers in order to be consistent with previous studies. The number of outliers as a 
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percentage of correct responses is shown in Table 6. 
The percentage of outliers is comparable to that of previous studies (Shum, 
McFarland, Bain, & Humphreys, 1990; Stokx & Gaillard, 1989; Murray, Shum, & 
McFarland, 1992). For example, in Shum, McFarland, & Bain, (1994), the 
percentage of outliers ranged from 3.32% to 7.18%. 
Mean differences between level 1 and level 2 tasks. All incorrect responses 
and outliers were eliminated for the reasons outlined above. From the remaining 
responses, the average scores for each subject on each condition were 
calOulated. After this was done, all the cases which had less than 10 responses 
out of 16 (62,25%) on any of the four task conditions were excluded from further 
analyses. From the original 16 subjects, 11 remained. T-tests for repeated 
measures were used to compare the means for the level 1 and level 2 tasks. The 
level of each task condition is shown in brackets in Table 7. 
There were two significant differences and two nonsignificant differences. 
The lack of significance is probably due to the smallness of the sample. Such 
small samples have, as was previously stated, been one of the criticisms of 
research in stage analysis (Lezak, 1985). Furthermore, the lack of significance 
may be attributable to the unacceptably high error rate in the task conditions 
compatible, incompatible and similar (Table 4). Because of the high error rate on a 
small sample of subjects, it means that only a few responses were used in the 
calculations. The validity of the result thus becomes questionable. 
Procedural Modifications 
On the basis of the results of the pilot study, the following modifications 
were adopted for the main study. 
1. The postconcussion symptom checklist would be modified to include a 
J 
ranking of symptoms 
2. The subjects would be given more intensive practice on all task conditions. 
As was previously stated, it is desirable in this kind of experiment that the 
error rate be as low as possible (Shum, McFarland, Bain, & Humphreys, 
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1990). The focus is on speed and not on accuracy. Increased practice 
would help to eliminate errors and increase the number of trials that could 
finally be included in the calculations. In this way, there would be a greater 
chance of detecting significant differences if they exist. Giving sufficient 
practice in this way, is the strategy used by previous researchers such as 
Shum et al. 
3. When subjects showed perseveration after completing the incompatible 
task condition, this was pointed out to them. They would further be allowed 
\ to practice the new condition until they obtained 5 successive correct 
responses. 
4. If a subject knew the correct response but made the mistake of hitting the 
side of the response button or not depressing it hard enough, they would be 
allowed to restart the trial. If the problem was persistent however, the 
subject would be excluded from the study. 
Table 6: Percentages of outliers on task conditions 
Task condition Outliers (%) 
1 Degraded 2,73 
2 Undegraded 3,9 
3 Compatible 3,13 
4 Incompatible 1,95 
5 Similar 3,91 
6 Dissimilar 4,30 
7 Fixed foreperiod 5,86 
8 Variable foreperiod 9,38 
_J 
Table 7: Mean task condition differences (N = 11). 
Task condition Mean Correlation t-value df p 
Degraded (1) 73.89 0.93 3.27 10 0.008 
Undegraded (2) 52.70 
Incompatible (1) 58.30 0.64 -1.72 10 0.11 
Compatible (2) 51.91 
Similar (1) 
\ 
54.70 0.86 -1.32 10 0.215 
Dissimilar (2) 50.50 
Variable 66.50 0.902 - 3.40 10 0.007 
foreperiod (1) 
Fixed foreperiod (2) 57.50 
6. A portable computer would be used instead of a desktop computer. This 
was mainly for the ease of transportation of the equipment. It was also 
envisaged that there was less chance of a further breakdown when 
transporting a smaller computer. 
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7. In order to increase the subject pool, permission was sought to find patients 
at 1 Military Hospital in Pretoria. 
J 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
METHOD 
Subjects 
\ 
A total of 144 subjects were involved in the study. Of these, 90 were 
patients and 54 were controls. The patients were consecutive outpatients from Ga-
Rankuwa Hospital, HF Verwoerd Hospital and 1 Military Hospital. These patients 
were referred in response to a request made to neurosurgeons at the three 
hospitals as was done in the pilot study. 
From the original 144 subjects, two control subjects were eliminated from 
the study because they could not follow instructions. None of the controls were 
excluded for reasons such as history of mental illness or previous head injury 
(Appendix C). Thirty six patients were excluded from the study for reasons stated 
in Table 8. 
Table 8: Reasons for exclusion 
Reason N 
Could not follow instruction and/ or poor mastery of English 18 
Currently on medication 8 
Poor vision (Failed to identify 8 lines in screen of Fig. 3). 3 
Injury to right hand 4 
Other neurological condition (2 epilepsy, 1 history of stroke). 3 
_j 
TOTAL 36 
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I did not ask the doctors to keep records of the subjects that they did not 
refer to me because of the exclusion criteria that I had given them. The reason for 
this was that the doctors in these clinics work under a great deal of time pressure, 
and I needed to reduce the paper-work they did for me to a minimum. No records 
are therefore available on the number of subjects who the doctors did not refer for 
reasons such as previous head trauma. 
The majority of the subjects were excluded because they could not follow 
instructions. This was in spite of the fact that these patients were judged fit enough 
for ~ischarge by the medical personnel. From the Screening Questionnaire 
(Appendix C), none of the subjects indicated that they had a history of psychiatric 
illness. As a result of the exclusions, a total of 106 subjects remained. These 
comprised 54 patients and 52 controls. 
The control subjects took part on a voluntary basis in response to 
advertisements. Written advertisements were placed on notice-boards at the 
University of South Africa (Unisa), the Medical University of Southern Africa 
(Medunsa), and Ga-Rankuwa Hospital. Subjects from these three locations were 
invited to encourage friends and relatives to take part. As a result of this, a number 
of subjects were seen from the surbubs of Mabopane and Mamelodi in Pretoria, 
and Fourways in Johannesburg. Subjects from Mabopane, Mamelodi, and 
Fourways were seen at houses belonging to my friends in those surbubs. 
Research locations. The research locations for the patients and control 
subjects are shown in Tables 9 and 10. The majority of patients were seen at HF 
Verwoerd Hospital. 
Table 9: Treatment hospitals and sex distribution for patients 
Hospital Males Females Total 
Ga-Rankuwa 12 3 15 
HFVerwoerd 22 J 3 25 
1 Military 14 0 14 
TOTAL 48 6 54 
142 
Table 10 Control subjects by research location 
Location Males Females Total 
Ga Rankuwa 3 2 5 
Hospital 
HFVerwoerd 0 1 1 
hospital 
1 Military hospital 7 1 8 
Mabopane 6 3 9 
Mamelodi 6 6 12 
Medunsa 7 0 7 
Johannesburg 0 6 6 
Unisa 3 1 4 
TOTAL 32 20 52 
Demographic Characteristics 
The age distributions for both patients and controls are shown in Table 11. 
No significant difference in mean age between patients and controls were found at 
the 5% level (t = -0.82; df = 104; p = 0,41 ). 
Education 
The mean number of years at school for patients was 9.98 years (SD= 
1.2), and that for the control group was 8.6 years (SD = 2.0). The controls had a 
significantly higher mean number of {ears at school-than patients (1=4.03; df = 
104; p = 0.05). 
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Table 11: Age distributions for patients and controls 
Category Mean SD N 
Patients 
Males 26.35 6.05 48 
\ Females 26.80 8.15 6 
Total 26.40 6.23 54 
Controls 
Males 24.32 4.47 32 
Females 27.21 7.41 20 
Total 25.43 5.88 52 
Hospitala 
GR 24.36 4.31 15 
HF 27.54 7.01 25 
1 Mil 26.16 5.70 14 
Total 25.92 6.05 106 
•GR = Ga Rankuwa Hospital; HF = HF Verwoerd Hospital; 1 Mil = 1 Military Hospital. 
J 
Occupation 
The occupational groupings of the subjects are shown in Table 12. Important 
differences between patients and controls in respect of their occupations are 
apparent from this data. There were more unskilled workers amongst the patients 
than amongst the controls. Only one patient was a professional but there were 
seven amongst the controls. There were twice as many soldiers amongst the 
patients than amongst the controls. Finally, considerably more controls had high 
school and tertiary level education than patients. Overall, controls were of a higher 
occupational status than patients 
Table 12: Occupational groupings 
Occupation Controls Patients 
Unskilled 10 16 
Semiskilled 4 5 
Technician 3 2 
Professional" 7 
Security officer 1 3 
Soldier 8 14 
Primary school student 1 2 
High school student 5 2 
Tertiary student 12 6 
Administrative 1 3 
Totals 52 54 
r 
"The professionals were 3 nurses, 2 teacher$, an economist, and a student advisor. 
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Hospital Data 
Brain Injury Data 
The Trauma Details Form (Appendix D) was used to obtain the brain injury 
data of patients. Where patients were unable to provide the required information, 
the data was obtained from the hospital files. For patients who could provide the 
information, their answers were double-checked against the information in the 
file~ 
Mechanisms of Injury 
Data on the source of injury was available on 52 patients. The other 2 
patients were not able to provide such information and there was no information 
available in the patients' files. The distribution of the mechanisms of injury is 
shown in Table 13. 
Table 13: Sources of trauma (N=52) 
Hosp8 MVAb Sport Assault Falls Total 
GR 5 0 8 1 14 
HF 13 1 9 1 24 
1 Mil 8 3 3 0 14 
Total 26 4 20 2 52 
1Hosp = Hospital; GR = Ga-Rankuwa hospital; HF = HF Verwoerd Hospital; 1 Mil = 1 Military 
Hospital; bMVA = Motor vehicle accident. 
J 
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Consistent with previous South African studies (Nell & Brown, 1991 ), the 
majority of injuries were sustained in motor vehicle accidents and assaults . 
. Duration of Loss of Consciousness 
Ga-Rankuwa Hospital. The duration of loss of consciousness was 
estimated from the information provided by the patient about the time of the 
accident and the time of regaining consciousness (Trauma Details Form, Appendix 
8). "fhe same information was also sought from the hospital file, especially the 
"Nurses' Notes", to confirm the patient's report. Some patients regained 
consciousness after they had been to theater, and this made it impossible to 
determine whether or not the duration was affected by the procedures and 
medications given there. 
HF Verwoerd Hospital: The same strategy as at Ga-Rankuwa hospital was 
used. A notable problem at this hospital was that patients often had more than 
one hospital file, the original one and one or more temporary files. The relevant 
information was frequently not present in the file the patient was currently using. 
For such patients, there was no way of verifying the patient's report about loss of 
consciousness. 
1 Military Hospital. The same problems as at Ga-Rankuwa hospital were 
encountered. Furthermore, once a patients had been discharged, it was no longer 
possible to access their files. 
Estimates of the duration of loss of consciousness based on the patients' 
reports and perusal of the patients' files for all the hospitals are shown in Table 14. 
Because of the difficulties pointed out above, these results should be considered 
only as rough estimates. 
Information on the duration of loss of consciousness (LOC) was not 
available for more than 50% of the .sample. Data was available on only 25 
~ 
patients. Using criteria described in chapter 2 (Russell, 1971; Bond, 1983; Kay et 
al, 1993), the number of patients with mild (LOC ~ 30 minutes), moderate (LOC = 
1-24 hours) and severe(> 24 hours) brain injury was nine, seven, and nine 
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Table 14: Estimates of duration of loss of consciousness (N = 51) 
Duration N 
Briefly dazed 3 
Few minutes to 30 minutes 6 
1 hour to 24 hours 7 
> 24 hours to 14 days 9 
Information not available from any source 26 
TO JAL 51 
respectively. On this subsample at least, the patients were evenly d!stributed 
between mild, moderate and severe. This result suggests that this sample was 
heterogeneous with respect to severity of injury. 
Duration of Post-traumatic Amnesia 
The presence of post-traumatic amnesia was assessed in terms of whether 
patients had a post-traumatic history of short-term memory deficits, 
inattentiveness, disinhibited behaviour, and restlessness (Appendix B). None of 
the patients could confidently state for how long these symptoms lasted. The 
nurses notes did indicate, in some instances, that a patient had these symptoms at 
some time. It was also not possible to reliably determine the dates when 
symptoms began and the dates on which the symptoms abated. Because of these 
difficulties, the attempt to get estimates of PTA was abandoned. 
Diagnoses 
The diagnoses were not recorded at the time of interviewing the patient. 
This information was sought after completing the experimental part of the study. 
The reason for this was so that the most up-to date opinion on the diagnosis, such 
as the discharge diagnosis, could be obtained. 
Ga-Rankuwa Hospital. At this hospital, the International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD) (World Health Organization, 1992) diagnostic criteria are used for 
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classifying patients. Diagnostic and other information on all patients is kept on a 
computerized data base. Of the 15 Ga-Rankuwa Hospital patients who took part in 
the study, the diagnoses of only eight patients was available on the database. 
There were three patients diagnosed as cerebral oedema; three were diagnosed 
as fracture, vault of skull; and two were diagnosed as having had a skull defect. 
H.F. Verwoerd Hospital. As was indicated when discussing estimates of 
duration of loss of consciousness, patients often did not bring a file with the 
original diagnostic information. Follow-ups were made at the hospital records 
offiee. Diagnoses for only nine patients were found. These are listed in Table 15. 
From this table it is clear that the diagnoses at HF Verwoerd Hospital were highly 
variable. 
Table 15: Patient diagnoses at H.F. Verwoerd Hospital CN = 9) 
Diagnosis N 
Temporal contusion 1 
Subdural haematoma 2 
Broca's aphasia 1 
Anterior fossa defect 1 
Skull fracture-occiput 1 
Base of skull fracture 1 
Bilateral frontal contusion 1 
Frontal lobe injury 1 
I Military Hospital. No information can be provided for diagnoses at 1 
Military Hospital. It was not possible to access these patients' records once they 
had been discharged. 
On the basis of the limited nurhber of records available from the three 
hospitals, the patients in this study were heterogeneous in terms of diagnoses. 
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Instruments 
1. A 486 DX66 Sunrace colour notebook computer 
2. Hick Box. (Fig. 3) 
3. Questionnaires 
3.1 Demographic Data Form (Appendix A). 
3.2 Trauma Details Form (Appendix B). 
3.3 Screening Questionnaire (Appendix C). 
\ 3.4 Pretest Questionnaire (Appendix D). 
3.5 Postconcussion Symptom Checklist 2 (Appendix F). Several 
changes were made to the checklist as used in the pilot study. An 
additional column was added for the patient to indicate a ranking of 
symptoms. Features of the concussion syndrome checklist used by 
Gouvier, Cubic, Jones, Brantley, and Cutlip (1992) were also 
incorporated into the new form: The frequency of symptoms column 
was increased from a three-point rating to a four-point rating; a 
column for rating the duration of symptoms was added. 
3.6 Symptom Ranking Matrix form (Appendix G): This form which I 
designed after the pilot study was only used for subjects who had 
difficulty in ranking symptoms. Its use is explained below. 
Procedure 
As was the case for the pilot study, subjects were seen after being referred 
by the neurosurgeons for neuropsychological assessment. 
J 
Questionnaires 
Questionnaires 3.1 to 3.4 (Appendixes A, B, C, and D) were administered in 
the same way as for the pilot study. 
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The Postconcussion Symptom Checklist 2 (Appendix F) was administered 
in the same way as the Postconcussion Symptom Checklist 1 (Appendix E). The 
following aspects were added. After the form had been completed for ratings of 
frequency, duration, and intensity, subjects were asked to rank their symptoms. 
They were given the following instruction: 
"We have just finished identifying the symptoms that bother you. You have 
reported that you are frequently bothered by .... (A list of all symptoms 
\ reported as present would be restated). Look at the symptoms indicated on 
this form again and tell me which of these symptoms bothers you most or is 
the most serious problem for you" 
After the subject had indicated a symptom, the subject was asked to identify 
the second most bothersome symptom. This process continued so that the subject 
could identify the third and subsequent most bothersome symptoms. For subjects 
who found it difficult to rank their symptoms, I used the ranking matrix form 
(Appendix G) as a basis for discussing symptom rankings. The symptoms that the 
subject would have endorsed were ticked on both axes of the form. The subject 
was then asked to compare 2 symptoms at a time: 
I would like you to think of two of your symptoms at a time and tell me which 
of the two bothers you more or is a more serious problem for you than the 
other. Between the two symptoms headache and dizziness (for instance) 
which you mentioned, which would you say is the more serious?" 
If the subject identified one of the symptoms as being more serious than the 
other, that symptom would be written down in the cell where the two symptoms 
intersect. If the subject responded that the symptoms were the same neither of the 
i 
symptoms would be counted. After ail the comparisons had been made the 
number of times that each symptom had been rated more severe than another 
was counted. I would then say to the subject: "From what we have just been 
doing, you mentioned headache (for instance) as a serious problem more 
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frequently than all the other symptoms. Is it your experience that it is the most 
serious problem?" 
The same strategy was used to identify the second, and subsequent, most 
bothersome symptoms. 
Reaction Times 
As a result of the observations made during the pilot study, the following 
modifications were made to the reaction time testing procedure: In addition to the 
familiarization practice, the computer programme now had the facility for the 
subject to have more practice trials at the beginning of each task condition. If a 
subject made any mistake at the beginning of each trial the experimenter said: " 
That last response was incorrect, let me give you a chance to practice again 
before beginning the full test." The experimenter then pressed the letter R (for 
repeat) on the keyboard and the experiment would restart from trial number one. 
Previous responses on this condition would automatically be erased. If the subject 
was still unable to perform the task, after a further five trials, the experimenter 
said: "Good, that will be all for today. You can stop now." By pressing the escape 
button, the experiment would end for this subject. 
After the subject had understood the instructions, he or she was told: "You 
can now start. The first few trials are only for practice." The subject would then 
begin. If he or she made mistakes these would be pointed out, and the subject told 
to retry. If a subject managed five correct responses successively, he would be 
told: "I think you can now do this well. Let us now start the full set of trials from the 
beginning." The experimenter then pressed the 'R' button on the keyboard in order 
to (R) repeat the trial. The full set of 16 trials would then follow. From this point 
onwards any further errors made would be pointed out to the subject, but the 
experiment would continue until all the 16 trials had been done. 
J 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Questionnaires and Postconcussion Symptoms 
\, 
Administration of the questionnaires presented no problems except for one 
item on the Concussion Symptoms Checklist 2 (Appendix F). After the pilot study, it 
had been decided to use an additional column for subjects to rate the duration of the 
symptom. It became apparent from the beginning of the attempts to ask for this rating 
that it was meaningless for several symptoms. For example, whilst it makes sense to 
ask someone for how long he or she has had memory problems, it does not mean 
much to ask how long the forgetfulness lasts. Similarly, for the symptoms light 
sensitivity and noise sensitivity, the problems naturally last for as long as the irritating 
stimulus is present. The item duration on this questionnaire was therefore omitted in 
assessing all subjects. 
The postconcussion symptoms that were endorsed as present by patients as 
well as controls are shown in Table 16. It is clear from the table that some symptoms 
had very low counts. For the patients, the symptoms with very low counts included 
auditory problems, nausea, alcohol sensitivity, and vomiting. The controls had even 
more of these low count symptoms. The significance of these low symptom counts is 
that some of the findings reported in this study may be an artefact of small samples. 
Another potential difficulty is the question of how accurately subjects reported 
symptoms, and the validity of the symptom constructs. As is the case with most of the 
available symptom checklists, the ymptoms are subjectively, rather than objectively 
assessed. The accuracy and truthfulness of these reported symptoms is thus not 
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Table 16: Frequency of symptoms endorsed as present by patients and controls. 
Patients (N=54) Controls (N=52) 
Symptoms Frequency % Frequency % 
' Headache 32 59.30 23 44.20 
Fatigue 28 51.90 9 17.30 
Dizziness 22 40.70 6 11.50 
Memory 22 40.70 14 26.90 
Irritability 20 15.40 8 15.40 
Visual 18 33.30 9 17.30 
Noise sensitivity 17 31.50 8 15.40 
Concentration 16 29.60 18 34.60 
Drowsiness 16 29.60 0 0.00 
Depression 13 24.10 8 15.40 
Light sensitivity 12 22.20 6 11.50 
Anxiety 11 20.40 10 19.20 
Auditory 6 11.10 0 0.00 
Nausea 6 11.10 0 0.00 
Alcohol sensitivity 2 3.70 2 3.80 
Vomiting 2 3.70 0 0.00 
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known. Because the symptoms are not operationally defined, each patient may have 
a different understanding of the meanings of the symptoms (Bohnen & Jolles, 1992). 
It is feasible that some subjects may confuse the meaning of one symptom with the 
meaning of another symptom. For example, on the Postconcussion Symptom 
Checklist 2 (Appendix F) the following symptoms could be mistaken to mean the 
same thing: fatigue and drowsiness; visual problems and light sensitivity; noise 
sensitivity and auditory problems; anxiety and depression. Furthermore, as was 
pointed out in Chapter 4, symptoms such as dizziness do not have a precise medical 
deffnition. Dizziness for example, is often confused for vertigo, near-syncope, and ill-
defined lightheadedness (Anderson, Yolton, Reinke, Kohl, & Lundy-Ekman, 1995). 
The other problem relates to the validity of symptom constructs. The 
Postconcussion Symptom Checklist 2 (Appendix F) was designed for American 
subjects (Gouvier, Cubic, Jones, Brantley, & Cutlip, 1992). The question is whether 
those symptoms mean the same thing to the South African sample used in this study. 
Nell (in press) argues that the problems of construct comparability multiply as one 
moves across cultures. Two of these difficulties were identified by Nell, Myers, Colvin, 
& Rees (1993) whilst attempting to administer the Profile on Mood States (POMS) on 
a sample of factory workers whose mother tongue was Zulu or Sotho. The first 
difficulty that the test administrators noted was that the number of synonyms in these 
African languages was inadequate for all the synonyms in the POMS on a given 
dimension. "For example, fatigue is described by the terms worn out, listless, 
sluggish, weary, bushed; anger is described by the terms peeved, grouchy, annoyed, 
ready to fight, and bad-tempered" (Nell et al., 1993, p. 310). The second difficulty was 
that the subjects had difficulties distinguishing between traits and states. They tended 
to respond in terms of their current state, and not the mood trait. 
In the present study, because of the problem of small samples, and the 
potential problems in the comparability of constructs just described, the findings 
based on the symptom checklist (~pendix F) ought to be treated as tentative. 
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Preliminary Analyses of Reaction Time Data 
_Errors and Outliers 
As was the case with previous studies using these tasks (Shum, McFarland, 
Bain, & Humphreys, 1990), the number of errors and outliers was calculated. The 
percentage of errors and outliers made by patients and controls is shown in Tables 17 
and 18. 
The percentage of errors was much less than that found in the pilot study. The 
highest error rate was for the similar condition, where the number of correct 
responses was just under 90%. On all the other task conditions, the correct response 
rate was more than 90%. The error rate was now comparable to that found in 
previous studies (Shum, McFarland, Bain, & Humphreys, 1990; Murray, Shum, & 
McFarland, 1992; Shum, McFarland, & Bain, 1994). 
The percentages of outliers for the eight task conditions are shown in Table 18. 
It is clear from this table that the percentage of outliers for all eight tasks was very 
low. They are comparable to previous studies (Shum, McFarland, Bain & Humphreys, 
1990). This means that very few responses would be eliminated during statistical 
analyses. 
Data Skewness 
The positively skewed nature of reaction time data was discussed in the pilot 
study. As a result of this positive skew, it has been suggested that outliers should be 
eliminated (Tabachnick & Fiddell, 1983). In the present data set, after the errors and 
outliers had been eliminated, the skewness of the data for the eight different tasks 
was as shown in the Table 19. The task conditions are grouped in pairs, with the level • 
J 
1 tasks recorded first. 
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Table 17: Percentages of errors on reaction time tasks 
Task Patients Controls Combined 
Degraded 2.87 1.68 2.32 
Undegraded 2.87 1.56 2.27 
' Compatible 2.25 1.08 1.71 
Incompatible 4.41 4.09 4.26 
Similar 10.25 8.89 2.43 
Dissimilar 1.23 2.64 1.88 
Fixed foreperiod 1.84 1.08 1.49 
Variable foreperiod 1.23 1.32 1.27 
J 
Table 18: Counts of outliers as a percentage of correct responses. 
TASK PRT8 PMTb CR~ CMrt CORTe COMT' 
Degraded 4.54 2.22 1.22 0.12 3.00 
Undegraded 6.54 1.48 1.22 0.24 4.07 
' 
Compatible 5.14 4.19 1.94 1.09 3.66 
Incompatible 6.86 5.57 1.75 2.63 4.51 
Similar 6.39 4.79 0.92 1.98 3.57 
Dissimilar 5.81 0.93 1.11 0.12 3.66 
Fixed foreperiod 5.01 1.36 1.09 0.36 3.20 
Variable foreperiod 7.78 1.35 1.22 0.00 4.76 
Note 
• PRT = Patients' reaction time; b PMT = Patients movement time 
c CRT = Controls' reaction time; d CMT = Controls movement time 
• CORT = Combined reaction time (Patients & Controls). 
'COMT = Combined movement time (Patients and controls). 
J 
1.25 
0.91 
2.76 
4.22 
3.23 
0.56 
0.90 
0.73 
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Table 19: Skewness: Reaction time. movement time. and total reaction time 
Task condition Reaction time Movement time Total reaction time 
pa p c p c 
Degraded -0.06 1.44 0.47 0.85 0.15 2.08 
Undegraded -0.09 0.58 1.01 0.71 0.35 0.58 
Incompatible 0.26 0.14 0.52 0.64 0.38 0.54 
Compatible -0.17 0.41 0.57 0.29 0.28 -0.09 
Similar 0.04 0.55 0.45 0.39 0.36 0.03 
Dissimilar 0.05 0.36 0.84 0.19 0.46 0.40 
Variable foreperiod 0.02 0.25 0.86 0.21 0.70 0.24 
Fixed foreperiod 0.01 0.65 0.47 0.32 0.43 0.47 
Note: ap = patients; C = controls 
J 
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With the exception of the reaction time indices of the degraded, undegraded, 
and compatible task conditions, as well as the total reaction time for the task condition 
compatible, all scores were positively skewed. This suggests that the tasks were 
relatively easy for the subjects. Furthermore, with the exception of reaction time and 
total reaction time scores of the degraded task for controls, and the undegraded 
movement time for patients, all the scores were less than one. They thus approached 
normality, which makes them suitable for inferential statistics. 
\. Tests of the Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 
Patients who have sustained a concussion will show greater frequency and 
intensity of postconcussion symptoms than controls; and patients will be slower 
in performing reaction time tasks. 
There are two parts to this hypothesis. In the first part, it is predicted that there 
are significant differences between patients and controls with respect to the ratings of 
the frequency and intensity of postconcussion symptoms. The second part of the 
hypothesis states that patients will be slower than controls. The results for each 
portion of the hypothesis will be reported in turn. 
Frequency and Intensity of Postconcussion Symptoms 
Cross tabulations to establish the distribution of the subjects according to the 
ratings of symptom frequencies and ratings of symptom intensities were performed. 
These entailed 3 x 2 tables (3 rating categories for frequency/ intensity and 2 groups 
ie patients and controls). The cross tabulations resulted in 16 tables. Of these, 11 
,. 
tables had some cells with frequencies less than 5. Chi-square tests were therefore 
not suitable for comparing patients and controls. 
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As an alternative to the chi-square, 1-tests for independent measures were 
performed on the means of the frequency ratings and intensity ratings. From the 16 
symptoms, a total of 321-tests were attempted (16 for symptom frequency ratings+ 
16 for symptom intensity ratings). It was not possible to compute 1-tests on 8 ratings 
because of empty cells in one or other of the groups. These were the frequency 
ratings for drowsiness, hearing problems, nausea, and vomiting; and the intensity 
ratings for drowsiness, anxiety, nausea, and vomiting. There thus remained 24 
comparisons. The results of the t-tests for independent measures comparing patients 
and controls are shown in Tables 20 and 21. 
The first part of Hypothesis 1 was confirmed for symptom frequencies (Table 
20). Of the nine symptoms that were used in analyses, seven showed significant 
differences between patients and controls. In four out of these symptoms, patients 
reported greater frequency, and in two of the symptoms, controls reported greater 
frequency. These results indicate that overall, patients report greater symptom 
frequencies than controls. This finding is contrary to some previous studies which 
found that patients and controls report these symptoms equally (Bohnen et al., 1992; 
Wong, 1994 ). There is at least one possible reason why differences may have been 
detected in the present study, contrary to some previous studies. In the present study, 
there was greater conciseness, in that symptom frequency ratings, rather than mere 
symptom presence were used for making the comparisons. 
Symptom intensity ratings were analysed in the same way as symptom 
frequency ratings. The results are shown in Table 21. Hypothesis 1 was also 
confirmed for symptom intensities. Comparisons were made for 11 symptoms. There 
were significant differences for seven symptoms and no differences were found for 
four symptoms. The symptoms for which there were no differences are poor 
concentration, alcohol sensitivity, anxiety, and depression. On all the symptoms on 
which there was a significant difference, patients had greater mean intensities than 
j 
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Table 20: t-tests for independent samples on symptom frequencies. 
Symptom Mean• t df 2-tail p 
Headache 1.0 
0.5 2.94 90.79 0.004 
Dizziness 0.05 
' 0.1 3.93 70.68 0.000 
Memory 0.6 
0.2 2.69 89.25 0.009 
Fatigue 0.8 
0.1 4l45 75.36 0.000 
Noise sensitivity 0.05 
0.2 1.99 91.15 0.05 
Irritability 0.75 
0.19 3.46 70.46 0.001 
Concentration 0.5 
0.4 0.7 90.19 0.4 
Visual 0.6 
0.2 2.2 90.22 0.02 
Anxiety 0.29 
0.21 0.75 98.32 0.45 
Note 
•For each symptom, the mean for the patients is reported in the first row and the mean for the controls 
are in the second row. 
J 
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Table 21: !-tests for independent samples on symptom intensities. 
Symptom Mean• t df 2-tail p 
Headache 1.2 
0.5 3.59 88.39 0.001 
Dizziness 0.8 
.... 
0.1 4.4 65.04 0.000 
Fatigue 0.9 
0.1 4.72 69.24 0.000 
Noise sensitive 0.5 
0.1 2.6 76.61 0.01 
Irritability 0.85 
0.23 3.2 74.58 0.001 
Light sensitive 0.3 
0.0 2.5 73.50 0.01 
Concentration 0.6 
0.5 0.5 101.1 0.57 
Alcohol sensitive 0.09 
0.03 0.76 70.01 0.07 
Visual 0.64 
0.21 2.57 83.72 0.01 
Anxiety 0.38 
0.26 0.81 99.32 0.42 
Depression 0.46 
0.30 0.92 99.84 0.35 
Note 
'For each symptom, the mean for the patients is reported in the first row and the mean for the controls 
are in the second row. J 
controls. For symptom intensity ratings then, as for symptom frequency ratings, 
patients had higher scores than controls. 
Differences on Reaction Time Indices 
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Patients and controls were compared on their performance on three reaction 
time indices. These are reaction time (RT), movement time (MT), and total reaction 
time (TT). To test for the differences, 1-tests for repeated measures were used. The 
results are shown in Tables 22, 23, and 24. 
There were significant differences for all eight task conditions for the three 
reaction time indices (RT, MT, and TT). The second part of Hypothesis 1 was 
therefore confirmed, so that, overall, Hypothesis 1 was confirmed. It can further be 
observed that patients performed slower than controls on all the conditions. 
Hypothesis 2 
For both patients and controls, the symptoms tend to form clusters. However, 
the clusters identified for the patients differ from those identified for the 
controls. 
Hypothesis 2 was confirmed, as will be clear from the results presented below. 
For this analysis, the symptoms were coded into six levels of severity. Initially it was 
intended that the level of severity would be determined by symptom rankings, 
symptom frequency, and symptom intensity as shown on the Postconcussion 
Symptom Checklist 2 (Appendix F). On this basis, the most severe symptom would 
be one with a rank of 1, a frequency rating of 3, and an intensity rating of 3. When this 
criterion was applied to headache, which was reported most frequently by both 
patients and controls (Table 16), the symptom was coded as most severe by only 8 
patients and 2 controls. Because of the small number of subjects involved, the use of 
Table 22: t-tests for independent samples on reaction time CRD. 
Task condition Mean• SD t df 2-tail p 
Incompatible 56.70 13.05 
47.62 11.18 3.76 104 0.000 
ComPatible 46.05 9.23 
39.99 8.16 3.46 104 0.001 
Undegraded 50.30 10.19 
40.38 8.54 5.33 104 0.000 
Degraded 62.03 16.25 
46.15 13.08 5.53 100.5 0.000 
Similar 51.52 12.19 
44.26 8.49 3.25 101.5 0.002 
Dissimilar 47.29 9.47 
39.44 8.49 4.41 104 0.000 
Variable foreperiod 62.11 12.05 
51.48 10.08 4.80 104 0.000 
Fixed foreperiod 56.56 11.16 
46.11 9.51 5.07 104 0.000 
Note 
8For each task condition, the mean for the patients is reported in the first row and the means for the 
controls in the second row. 
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Table 23 t-tests for independent samples on movement time (MD. 
Task condition Meana SD t df 2-tail p 
Incompatible 48.54 15.75 
40.23 10.82 3.17 94.18 0.002 
Compatible 46.14 13.69 
36.30 8.25 4.41 88.32 0.000 
Undegraded 48.89 16.54 
36.95 9.73 4.55 86.35 0.000 
Degraded 50.50 15.72 
38.07 10.00 4.84 90.33 0.000 
Similar 51.23 15.60 
41.71 11.88 3.52 104 0.001 
Dissimilar 47.69 14.89 
36.58 8.52 4.82 84.96 0.000 
Variable foreperiod 48.03 16.15 
36.47 8.72 4.61 82.13 0.000 
Fixed foreperiod 46.22 14.45 
36.80 8.62 4.09 87.07 0.000 
Note 
a For each task condition, the mean for the patients is reported in the first row and the means for the 
controls in the second row. 
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.. Table 24: t-tests for independent samples on total reaction time CTD. 
Task condition Mean• SD t df 2-tail p 
Incompatible 104.82 22.96 
87.64 16.95 4.37 104 0.000 
Compatible 91.97 18.48 
76.67 11.24 5.17 88.06 0.000 
' 
Undegraded 99.22 22.04 
77.19 12.83 6.32 85.84 0.000 
Degraded 111.80 26.86 
84.37 17.80 6.22 92.39 0.000 
Similar 102.11 22.99 
86.03 16.36 4.16 95.85 0.000 
Dissimilar 94.88 20.34 
76.03 13.39 5.65 92.04 0.000 
Variable foreperiod 109.56 24.68 
87.84 14.91 5.51 87.68 0.000 
Fixed foreperiod 102.52 22.89 
82.88 13.96 5.35 88.21 0.000 
Note 
a For each task condition, the mean for the patients is reported in the first row and the means for the 
controls in the second row. 
J 
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rankings was dropped as a severity rating criterion. Only symptom frequency and 
symptom intensity ratings were subsequently used. The categories of ratings using 
this system are shown in Table 25. 
The symptom clusters were analysed at different durations since injury. The 
different durations since injury were assessed cross-sectionally, and not 
longitudinally. For each patient, the duration since injury was calculated by subtracting 
the date of trauma from the date of assessment (Trauma Details Form, Appendix B). 
Taking into account the durations since injury was done in view of previous 
research reports, such as that by Rutherford (1989), which indicate that symptoms 
Table 25: Classification of symptoms according to severity". 
Intensity 
Frequency 0 1 2 3 
0 0 x x x 
1 x 1 2 4 
2 x 2 3 5 
3 x 4 5 6 
Note. 
a Symptom severity from 0 = no symptoms; to 6 most severe. In the no symptom category (0), the 
symptom has zero frequency and zero intensity; In the most severe category (6), the symptom has a 
frequency rating of 3 and an intensity rating of 3. 
change over time. Initially, it was proposed to make cut-off points at two weeks (acute 
stage), three months, and more than three months. The cut-off at three months was 
made because it has been reported that there are generally low correlations between 
organic indices of brain injury and postconcussion symptoms after three months 
(Lishman, 1988). It was thus important to make this demarcation, with a view to 
comparing reported symptoms an'!ferformance on reaction time. 
When two weeks since injury was used as the cut-off point for acute injury, 
only 12 patients met the criteria for being at that acute stage. This number was 
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considered too small for factor analyses. To increase the number of patients in the 
earliest duration since injury, the cut-off was moved to 21 days. This stage was 
referred to as acute/subacute. The next cut-off point was at three months (90 days). 
Only patients whose date of injury could be ascertained were included in the 
analyses. Because of low counts, the symptoms auditory problems, nausea, alcohol 
sensitivity, and vomiting were excluded from factor analyses. Symptoms clusters 
were identified by principal components analysis with varimax rotation. The results of 
factor analyses for patients and controls are descried below. 
\ 
Patients 
Factor Analyses for 1 to 21 Days Since Injury 
The results for the acute/subacute stage are shown in Table 26. Factor 1, 
which explains 36. 7% of the variance was labelled as somatic because of the 
prominence of the symptoms headache and dizziness. The factor label somatic has 
been used for headache and dizziness by previous researchers such as Levin, Gary 
et al. (1987). Factor 1 was also called cognitive because of the symptom memory. 
This cognitive nature of this factor is strengthened by the fact that poor concentration, 
on Factor 3, also loaded highly on Factor 1. Furthermore, memory also loaded highly 
on Factor 3, which has a cognitive component. The association between cognitive 
symptoms and somatic symptoms can be explained in terms of the coping hypothesis 
(Gronwall & Wrightson, 1974; Hinkely & Corrigan, 1990; Van Zomeren, Brouwer, & 
Deelman, 1984) which was described in Chapter 3. To recapitulate, the coping 
hypothesis states that traumatic brain injury may be associated with cognitive 
problems, specifically slowed information processing. In order to cope with this 
Table 26: Symptom clusters 1- 21 davs since injury CN = 15). 
Symptoms Factor 1 Factor 2 
Somatic/ Visual/ 
cognitive arousal 
Dizziness ,85 ,12 
Headache ,75 ,10 
Fatigue ,69 ,21 
Memory ,64 ,07 
Noise ,53 -,10 
Light ,18 ,82 
Drowsiness ,46 ,72 
Visual ,12 ,68 
Anxiety ,15 -,61 
Irritability ,29 -,02 
Depression -,13 ,33 
Concentration ,46 ,39 
Note. 
Factor Eigenvalue % of Variance Cum % 
1 
2 
3 
4,41 
1,75 
1,36 
36,7 
14,6 
11,3 
36,7 
51,3 
62,6 
Factor 3 
Cognitive I 
depression 
,10 
,09 
-,00 
,56 
,39 
-,08 
,02 
,19 
-,26 
,78 
,74 
,58 
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impairment, patients exert more effort when dealing with cognitive tasks. The 
increased effort is stressful, and leads to somatic symptoms such as headache and 
dizziness. The coping hypothesis does not imply that cognitive deficits are the only 
cause of the somatic symptoms. As the review of the literature in Chapter 4 showed, 
numerous factors, both organic and psychological, contribute to these symptoms. 
Increased coping effort may lead to somatic symptoms in some cases, and an 
exacerbation of somatic symptoms in other cases. 
At first glance, it appears that fatigue and noise sensitivity do not fit in easily 
with the other symptoms on Factor 1. However, as the literature review in Chapter 3 
suggested, fatigue and symptoms such as dizziness (Montgomery, Fenton, 
McClelland, MacFlynn, & Rutherford, 1991 ), and noise sensitivity (Bohnen, Twijnstra, 
Wijnen, & Jolles, 1991) may all have brainstem dysfunction in common. 
Factor 2 has two visual symptoms, namely light sensitivity and visual problems, 
and an arousal symptom (drowsiness). For this reason, the factor was labelled as 
visual/arousal. The importance of arousal for Factor 2 is further suggested by the fact 
that fatigue, another arousal symptom, which loads on Factor 1, also loaded 
moderately on Factor 2. The symptom anxiety had a negative loading on Factor 2, 
suggesting that it does not belong with the other symptoms that load here. 
Factor 3 was called cognitive/depression because of the symptoms poor 
concentration (cognitive) and depression. Levin, Gary et al. (1987), cited in Chapter 3, 
also found a similar factor. Irritability may be an emotional reaction to either or both of 
these two symptoms. Poor concentration also loads high on both Factor 1 and Factor 
2. The reason for the loading of poor concentration, a cognitive symptom, with 
somatic symptoms in Factor 1 has already been discussed. It is also reasonable that 
poor concentration should load with arousal problems. The brain injuries that lead to 
arousal deficits affect the brain diffusely (Luria, 1973). Such injuries are also bound to 
affect cognitive processes, including concentration, as was discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Factor Analyses for 22-90 Days Since Injury 
The symptoms loaded onto three factors as shown in Table 27. Three subsets 
of symptoms are discernible in Factor 1. They are arousal (drowsiness and fatigue), 
cognitive (memory and concentration), and somatic (headache and dizziness). 
Possible explanations for the associations between arousal, somatic, and cognitive 
symptoms were already given in the discussion for Table 26. Irritability may be an 
emotional reaction to any of the other symptoms, or a combination of symptom. 
Mittenberg, Zielinski, and Fichera (1993) have suggested that one of the most 
frequent causes of irritability and poor concentration is fatigue, which also loads on 
this factor. The symptom drowsiness has almost as high a loading on Factor 1 as it 
has on Factor 2. 
Factor 2 has two visual sense symptoms (light sensitivity and visual problems), 
and two emotional symptoms (anxiety and depression). The presence of light 
sensitivity together with visual problems may be the result of the poor operational 
definitions of symptoms in the study. It is feasible that the sensitivity to light that some 
of the patients complained of were the visual problems that they also endorsed on the 
questionnaire. Anxiety and depression have also been found to load together after 
traumatic brain injury in some previous studies (Bohnen, Twijnstra, & Jolles, 1992). 
There is no readily apparent reason why the emotional symptoms in Factor 2 should 
load together with visual problems. 
Noise sensitivity is the only symptom on Factor 3. It is notable that the somatic 
symptoms headache and dizziness (Factor 2) also load highly on Factor 3. A possible 
explanation for the association is that brainstem damage may be associated with both 
dizziness (Montgomery, Fenton, McClelland, MacFlynn, & Rutherford, 1991 ), and 
noise sensitivity (Bohnen, Twijnstra, Wijnen, & Jolles, 1991; Waddell & Gronwall, 
1984). 
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Table 27. Symptom clusters 22 - 90 days after injury (N = 16) 
Symptoms Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Arousal/ Visual/emotional Noise sensitivity 
Cognitive/Somatic 
Memory ,94 ,02 -,18 
Co~bentration ,92 ,16 ,22 
Irritability ,92 -,03 -,01 
Fatigue ,85 ,14 ,05 
Headache ,76 ,02 ,57 
Dizziness ,68 ,00 ,63 
Drowsiness ,68 ,67 ,14 
Light ,02 ,96 ,17 
Anxiety ,11 -,83 ,03 
Depression ,16 ,67 -,32 
Visual ,63 ,63 -,13 
Noise -,05 -,06 ,85 
,,.. 
Note. 
Factor Eigenvalue % of Variance Cum% 
1 5,86 48,8 48,8 
2 2,62 21,8 70,6 
3 1,43 11,9 82,5 
j 
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Factor Analyses for 91 Days or more Since Injury 
The results for the duration 91 days or more after injury are shown in Table 28. 
Five factors were identified. Factor 1 was labelled arousal/ somatic because of the 
arousal symptom fatigue, and the two somatic symptoms headache and dizziness. 
The two somatic symptoms did not load highly with any other factor. Fatigue had a 
moderately high loading on factor 3. Factor 2 was labelled cognitive because of two 
symptoms, memory, and concentration. Anxiety loaded negatively with this factor. 
Noise sensitivity had a low loading, and furthermore also loaded on both Factor 2 and 
Factor 5. Factor 3 was made up of two visual symptoms (light sensitivity and visual 
problems), and the one arousal symptom (drowsiness). The reason for the 
association between visual problems and arousal is not readily apparent. This 
association was also reported for the duration 1 to 21 days (Table 26). 
There was one symptom each for Factor 4 and Factor 5. It is notable that depression 
loads on the irritability factor (0.27), and irritability likewise loads on the depression 
factor (0.27). This suggests that these symptoms have something in common. It could 
be that depression gives rise to irritability. Another possibility is that the two 
symptoms have a common aetiology, notably damage to limbic structures (Mclelland, 
1988), as was discussed in Chapter 3. 
Controls 
The results for the controls are presented in Table 29. Three factors were 
identified. For Factor 1 there were three sets of symptoms. Headache and dizziness 
are classified as somatic complaints as was done for patients. Levin, Gary et al. 
( 1987) classified noise sensitivity as a sensory symptom. The same label was 
adopted here. The other sensory symptom is light sensitivity. Irritability, which also 
loads moderately on Factor 2 is possibly partly an emotional reaction to the somatic 
J 
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Table 28: Symptom clusters 91 davs +after injury (N = 19). 
Symptoms Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Arousal/ Cognitive Visual/ Depression Irritability 
Somatic arousal 
Fatigue ,85 -,05 -,34 ,18 -,06 
Dizziness ,79 -,02 ,13 -,12 ,06 
Headache ,76 -,02 ,17 ,06 ,13 
' 
Concentration ,01 ,88 ,06 ,42 -,05 
Anxiety ,28 -,70 ,20 -,03 ,01 
Memory ,62 ,67 ,04 -,13 ,21 
Noise ,46 ,59 ,12 -,37 ,36 
Light ,09 -,09 ,81 -,29 ,14 
Visual -,06 -,07 ,79 ,21 ,09 
Drowsiness ,26 ,37 ,64 ,39 -,36 
Depression ,03 ,14 ,05 ,91 ,27 
Irritability ,17 ,07 ,13 ,27 ,92 
Note 
Factor Eigenvalue % of Variance Cum Pct 
1 3,35 27,9 27,9 
2 2,09 17,4 45,3 
3 1,87 15,6 60,8 
4 1,33 11,1 72,0 
5 1,09 9,1 81,0 
.! 
Table 29: Symptom Clusters for Controls (N = 52) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Somatic/se'nsory Cognitive/ arousal 
& irritability & visual 
Noise sensitivity ,84 -,10 
Irritability ,81 ,23 
\. 
Light sensitivity ,65 ,12 
Headache ,62 -,04 
Dizziness ,46 -,01 
Memory 
-, 11 ,79 
Visual ,22 ,76 
Concentration -,20 ,63 
Fatigue ,07 ,49 
Depression ,19 ,19 
Anxiety 
'11 -,01 
Note 
Factor Eigenvalue % of Variance Cum Pct 
1 2,83 25,7 25,7 
2 2,18 19,8 45,5 
3 1,38 12,6 58,1 
J 
Factor 3 
Anxio/depressive 
,01 
-,07 
,14 
,04 
,26 
,19 
-,12 
,50 
,03 
,87 
,86 
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and sensory symptoms. Factor 3 has three sets of symptoms, cognitive, arousal and 
visual. These are memory problems and poor concentration (cognitive), fatigue 
(arousal), and visual problems. Factor 3 consists of two emotional symptoms, that 
were classified as anxioldepressive. 
Hypothesis 2 was confirmed by the results presented in Tables 26, 27, 28, and 
29. None of the symptom clusters identified for the patients were identical to the 
clusters for controls. It is notable however, that for both patients and controls, 
headache and dizziness always loaded on the same factor. This suggests that there 
is a ,strong relationship between these two symptoms, which have been classified as 
somatic. 
Hypothesis 3 
For both patients and controls, level 1 tasks will be associated with significantly 
longer response times than level 2 tasks. 
The results for this hypothesis were analysed in terms of three categories of 
indices of reaction time. These were reaction time (RT), movement time (MT), and 
total reaction time (TT). To test for differences, !-tests for repeated measures were 
applied. The results are shown in Tables 30, 31, and 32. The RT differences are 
shown in Table 30. For both patients and controls, one tailed !-tests for independent 
samples revealed that Level 1 tasks had significantly longer response 
times than level 2 tasks. The hypothesis was thus confirmed for RT. 
The hypothesis was not confirmed for movement time (Table 31 ). From the 
eight comparisons, there were five significant differences and three nonsignificant 
differences. For both patients and controls, no significant differences were found for 
the signal quality (degraded vs undegraded) conditions. Furthermore, for the controls, 
there were no significant differences for the foreperiod uncertainty (fixed foreperiod 
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Table 30: Mean reaction time CRD differences between Level 1 and Level 2 tasks for patients CN = 54; 
df = 53) and controls CN = 52: df = 51) 
TASKSa Groupb MEAN SD r t p 
Incompatible p 56.7 13.05 
c 47.62 11.18 
Compatible p 46.05 9.23 0.74 -9.00 0.000 
c 39.99 8.16 0.65 -6.51 0.000 
\ 
Similar p 51.52 12.19 
c 44.26 8.49 
Dissimilar p 47.29 9.47 0.65 -3.36 0.001 
c 39.44 8.49 0.67 -4.53 0.000 
Variable p 62.11 12.05 
c 51.48 10.08 
Fixed p 56.56 11.16 0.81 -5.71 0.000 
c 46.11 9.51 0.87 -7.87 0.000 
Degraded p 62.03 16.25 
c 46.15 13.08 
Undegraded p 50.3 10.19 0.76 8.15 0.000 
c 40.38 8.54 0.76 4.85 0.000 
• For each pair of reaction time tasks, the scores for the level 1 tasks are reported in the first row, and 
those for the level 2 tasks are reported in the second row. 
b p = patients; C = controls. 
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Table 31: Mean movement time CMD differences between Level 1 and Level 2 tasks for patients (N = 
54: df = 53) and controls (N = 52: df = 51) 
TASKS• Group• MEAN SD r t p 
Incompatible p 48.54 15.75 
c 40.23 10.82 
Compatible p 46.14 13.39 0.85 -2.12 0.03 
c 36.60 8.25 0.83 -4.30 0.00 
\ 
Similar p 51.23 15.60 
c 41.71 11.88 
Dissimilar p 47.89 14.89 0.83 -2.79 0.00 
c 36.58 8.52 0.81 -5.26 0.00 
Variable p 48.03 16.15 
c 36.47 8.72 
Fixed p 46.22 14.45 0.94 -2.44 0.01 
c 36.80 8.62 0.84 0.49 0.62 
Degraded p 50.50 15.72 
c 38.07 10.00 
Undegraded p 48.89 16.54 0.83 1.21 0.23 
c 36.95 9.73 0.58 0.90 0.37 
a For each pair of reaction time tasks, the sc~es for the level 1 tasks are reported in the first row, and 
those for the level 2 tasks are reported in the second row. 
b P = patients; C = controls 
/ 
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Table 32: Mean total reaction time differences between Level 1 and Level 2 tasks for patients (N = 54: 
df = 53) and controls CN = 52: df = 51) 
TASKSa Group• MEAN SD r t p 
Incompatible p 104.82 22.96 
c 87.64 16.95 
Compatible p 91.97 18.48 0.81 -7.05 0.00 
c 76.67 11.24 0.82 -8.01 0.00 
Similar p 102.11 22.99 
c 86.03 16.36 
Dissimilar p 94.88 20.34 0.79 -3.78 0.00 
c 76.03 13.39 0.73 -6.48 0.00 
Variable p 109.56 24.68 
c 87.84 14.91 
Fixed p 102.52 22.89 0.92 -5.42 0.00 
c 82.88 13.96 0.86 -4.71 0.00 
Degraded p 111.80 26.86 
c 84.37 17.80 
Undegraded p 99.22 22.04 0.88 7.29 0.00 
c 77.19 12.83 0.70 4.10 0.00 
Note. 
• For each pair of reaction time tasks, the scores for the level 1 tasks are reported in the first row, and 
those for the level 2 tasks are reported in the second row. 
b P = patients; C = controls. 
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and variable foreperiod) task conditions. Because MT does not contain decision time, 
(Jensen & Munro, 1979), the hypothesis was not confirmed for response execution 
only. On total reaction time, Hypothesis 3 was supported for both patients and 
controls. 
The results from Tables 30, 31, and 32, are illustrated graphically in Figure 4. 
From these graphs, a number of observations can be made about the trends of the 
relationships between level 1 tasks and level 2 tasks in patients and controls. 
1. , All the plots, with the exception of movement time for foreperiod uncertainty 
(fixed - variable )of the patient group, sloped upwards from level 2 to level 1. 
This suggests that for both patients and controls, level 1 tasks were more 
difficult than level 2 tasks. 
2. The line representing the patients lies higher than that for controls on all tasks. 
This suggests that the response times for patients are longer than those for 
controls on all tasks. 
3. Wider gaps between the two plots are found for total reaction time than for 
either reaction time or movement time. This suggests that total reaction time 
discriminates between patients and controls better than movement time and 
reaction time. 
4. The gaps between patient plots and control plots are wider in some tasks than 
others. In reaction time and in total reaction time, the gaps for signal quality 
(Undegraded - Degraded) and foreperiod uncertainty (Fixed - Variable) are 
wider than those for stimulus discriminabilty and S-R compatibility. These 
J 
Figure 4. Graphical representation of mean differences between task conditions. 
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features suggest that signal quality and foreperiod uncertainty discriminate 
between patients and controls better than the latter two task variables. 
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5. The slope of the plots appears greatest for total reaction time followed by 
reaction time. Movement time has the smallest slope of all the three categories 
of reaction time indices. The smallness of slopes in movement time are 
.,_«..-. 
particularly evident on the foreperiod uncertainty and the signal quality tasks. 
From these graphs, it seems that total reaction time enhances the differences 
, between level 1 and level 2 tasks more than either reaction time or movement 
time alone. 
6. The slopes for the patients and controls are generally not parallel. Foreperiod 
uncertainty RT and S-R total reaction time appear to be the exceptions. This 
suggests that generally, the magnitude of the differences between level 1 and 
level 2 tasks is different for patients and controls: On reaction time, the 
magnitude of the difference for patients is greater than that for controls on all 
tasks. On movement time, the results appear to be mixed. For S-R 
compatibility and stimulus discriminability, the magnitude of the differences 
appears to be greater for the controls than for the patients. The magnitude of 
the difference for foreperiod uncertainty is greater for patients and controls. For 
signal quality the trend is unclear. Finally, on total reaction time the results are 
also mixed. The slopes are parallel for S-R compatibility. For stimulus 
discriminability, the magnitude of the difference is greater for controls than for 
patients. For foreperiod uncertainty and signal quality, the magnitude is greater 
for the patients. These shapes suggest that contrary to predictions, controls 
perform relatively worse than patients when the conditions are made more 
complex in some tasks. 
For both patients and contr6'ls, level 1 task conditions were found to be 
relatively more difficult than level 2 tasks in terms of reaction time (RT) and total 
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reaction time (TT). This did not however hold true for the movement time (MT) scores 
of the task variables foreperiod uncertainty (controls), and signal quality (controls and 
patients). 
Hypothesis 4 
The magnitude of the difference between level 1 and level 2 tasks will be 
significantly greater for patients than it is for control subjects. 
Difference scores between the level 1 tasks and the level 2 tasks were 
computed by subtracting the latter from the former. !-tests for independent measures 
were then performed on these new scores, comparing patients and controls on the 
reaction time, movement time, and total reaction time. The results appear in Tables 
33, 34 and 35. As the results in Table 33 show, Hypothesis 4 was not confirmed for 
RT. There were significant differences for the foreperiod uncertainty tasks, and signal 
quality, but not for the S-R compatibility tasks or the stimulus discriminability tasks. 
Hypothesis 4 was also not confirmed for movement time (Table 34) and total reaction 
time (Table 35). The result shows that even though controls are faster than patients 
on all tasks (Tables 22, 23, and 24), the two groups respond similarly to a change in 
the difficulty levels on the latter two task variables. 
Hypothesis 5 
The number of correlations between postconcussion symptoms and indices of 
reaction time varies as a function of the subjective ratings of symptom 
presence, frequency, intensity, and severity. 
_f 
Table 33: The magnitude of the difference between level 1 and level 2 tasks 
on reaction time for patients (N = 54) and controls (N = 52) (df = 104) 
Task pairs Groupa Mean SD t p 
Compatible/ 1 10.70 8.84 1.83 0.70 
Incompatible 2 7.60 8.44 
Di~imilar/ 1 4.14 9.41 0.04 0.68 
Similar 2 4.81 7.67 
Fixed/ 1 1.81 5.46 2.13 0.03 
Variable 2 -0.33 4.85 
Degraded/ 1 11.92 10.66 3.27 0.00 
Undegraded 2 5.77 8.58 
Note 
1 1 = patients; 2 = controls. 
J 
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Table 34: The magnitude of the difference between level 1 and level 2 tasks 
on movement time: Patients CN = 54) Vs controls CN = 52) (df = 104). 
Task pairs Group• Mean SD t p 
Compatible 1 2.39 8.29 -0.87 0.38 
Incompatible 2 3.62 6.08 
Dissimilar 1 3.33 8.77 -1.16 0.24 
Similar 2 5.13 7.03 
FiXed 1 1.81 5.46 2.13 0.03 
Variable 2 -0.33 4.85 
Degraded 1 1.51 9.19 0.22 0.82 
Undegraded 2 1.12 8.98 
Note 
• 1 = patients; 2 = controls. 
Table 35: The magnitude of the difference between level 1 and level 2 tasks 
on total reaction time: Patients CN = 54) Vs Controls CN = 52) (df = 104) 
Task pairs Group• Mean SD t p 
Compatible 1 12.85 13.40 0.82 0.41 
Incompatible 2 10.97 9.88 
Dissimilar 1 7.23 14.01 -1.12 0.26 
Similar 2 9.99 11.12 
Fixed 1 7.03 9.55 1.24 0.21 
Variable 2 4.95 7.58 
Degraded 1 12.57 12.67 2.19 0.03 
Undegraded 2 7.17 12.62 
Note J 
•1 = patients; 2 = controls. 
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Symptom Presence 
Symptom presence means that the subject reported experiencing the 
symptom, irrespective of the symptom's frequency or intensity. One tailed partial 
correlations controlling for age and education were performed for controls. The same 
calculations were done for patients with age, education and duration since injury 
controlled. 
Because of the need to control for age, education, and duration since injury, 
the ,number of cases used in calculations was reduced. For that reason, it was 
decided that calculations would not be carried out for cases with frequencies less than 
..... 
10. For the patients, these were auditory problems, nausea, alcohol sensitivity, 
and vomiting. For the controls the symptoms were drowsiness, dizziness, and light 
sensitivity. Correlations between symptom presence and indices of reaction time for 
controls are shown in Table 36. Only three symptoms in the control group had 
significant correlations with reaction time. Two of the symptoms, poor memory and 
irritability had negative correlations. This finding is surprising because it suggests that 
control subjects with these two symptoms have less reaction time deficits than 
subjects without deficits. As was shown in Table 17, the error rate for the similar task 
condition was higher relative to the other task conditions. Calculations of the 
correlation co-efficients with poor memory were thus based on relatively fewer 
reaction time scores. This may explain the unexpected finding. The likely reason for 
the negative correlations between the task condition compatible and irritability is the 
small number of control subjects who endorsed this symptom. Overall, because of the 
small number of symptoms endorsed by the controls, relative to patients, the 
correlation co-efficients reported need to be interpreted with caution. 
The results for the patients are shown in Tables 37 and 38. These results are 
summarized in Table 50, where they are discussed together with the results from 
symptom frequency, intensity, and severity. 
_f 
Symptom Frequency Ratings 
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One tailed partial correlations between the subjects' frequency ratings for each 
symptom and the reaction time indices were performed. Age and education were 
controlled for in the control group. In the patient group, age, education and duration 
since injury were controlled for. For the patients, the symptom headache was found 
not to correlate with any of the reaction time indices. The symptoms for which 
significant correlations were found are listed in Tables 39, 40 and 41. The results fr<:>m 
these three tables are included in the summary in Table 50, where they are discussed 
together with results from symptom presence, intensity, and severity. 
For the control subjects, correlations between reaction times and 
headache, dizziness, memory, irritability, alcohol sensitivity, visual problems, and 
auditory problems were found to be nonsignificant. The symptoms with which there 
were significant correlations are shown in Table 42. Five symptoms were found to 
correlate with reaction time indices for the control group. Four of these symptoms 
were associated with the task variable signal quality, and one was associated with an 
index from the task variable S-R compatibility. All the indices were subtraction scores. 
This means that if only the conventional indices of RT, MT, and total reaction time 
had been used, no significant correlations would have been found. 
Symptom Intensity 
The symptom intensity results for controls are shown in Table 43. The 
symptoms headache, fatigue, irritability, noise sensitivity, alcohol sensitivity, 
concentration, and visual problems, were not found to correlate significantly with any 
of the reaction time indices. As was the case for symptom presence, memory had a 
negative correlation with the stimulus discriminability tasks. Anxiety, and depression 
were the only other symptoms that correlated with reaction time indices. All but one of 
J 
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Table 36: Symptom presence and reaction time indices for controls 
Symptom Task condition Index 
Memory Similar/ 
Dissimilar MT/SB -0.4288** 
Fixed/ 
\. Variable MT/SB 0.3229* 
Irritability Compatible RT -0.3184* 
Depression Degraded/ 
Undegraded MT/SB 0.3057* 
Note 
a MT/SB = movement time, subtraction score; b RT= reaction time; c • p < 0.01, •• p < 0.001 
J 
Table 37: Symptom presence and reaction time indices for patients: dizziness. memorv. drowsiness. 
irritability, and noise sensitivity 
Symptom Task condition lndex3 
Dizziness Similar RT 0.3692* 
Incompatible RT 0.3154* 
Degraded/ 
Undegraded MT/SB 0.3040* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar MT/SB -0.3192* 
Degraded/ 
Undegraded TT/SB 0.3395* 
Memory Similar/ 
Dissimilar TT/SB 0.3167* 
Similar RT 0.3669* 
Drowsiness Dissimilar MT 0.3470* 
Incompatible MT 0.3457* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT/SB 0.3390* 
Irritability Similar RT 0.3522* 
Noise sensitivity Degraded/ 
Undegraded MT/SB 0.2486* 
Note 
a RT= reaction time; MT/SB = movement time (subtraction);TT/SB = total reaction time (subtraction); 
MT= movement time; RT/SB= reaction ti91e (subtraction). 
b * p < 0.01 
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Table 38: Symptom presence and reaction time indices for patients: light sensitivity, concentration. 
anxiety. and depression 
Symptom Task condition Index" 
Light sensitivity Compatible MT 0.3053* 
Dissimilar MT 0.3688* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar MT/SB 0.3385* 
Concentration Similar RT 0.3378* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT/SB 0.5090** 
Anxiety Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT/SB 0.3794* 
Depression Similar RT 0.3417* 
Undegraded RT 0.3252* 
Note 
•RT= reaction time; MT/SB= movement time (subtraction);TI/SB =total reaction time (subtraction); 
MT= movement time; RT/SB= reaction time (subtraction). 
b * p < 0.01; ** p < 0.001 
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Table 39: Symptom frequency ratings and reaction time indices for patients: memory 
Symptom Task condition lndex8 
Memory Similar RT 0.3528* 
Compatible MT 0.3138* 
Degraded MT 0.3083* 
Fixed MT 0.3568* 
Similar MT 0.3364* 
Variable MT 0.3340* 
Degraded TT 0.3300* 
Undegraded TT 0.3258* 
Compatible TT 0.3156* 
Similar TT 0.4392** 
Fixed TT 0.3676* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT/SB 0.3680* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar TT/SB 0.3146* 
•RT= reaction time; MT= movement time; TT= total reaction time; RT/SB= reaction time (subtraction 
score); TT/SB= total reaction time (subtraction score). 
b • p < 0.01; •• p < 0.001 
J 
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Table 40: Symptom frequency ratings and reaction time indices for patients: fatigue 
Symptom Task condition lndex8 
Fatigue Compatible MT 0.3503* 
Degraded RT 0.3096* 
Degraded MT 0.3321* 
Fixed RT 0.3109* 
Fixed MT 0.3247* 
Similar MT 0.3575* 
Variable MT 0.3184* 
Incompatible MT 0.3327* 
Undegraded MT 0.4254** 
Degraded TT 0.3915* 
Undegraded TT 0.4124* 
Compatible TT 0.3558* 
Incompatible TT 0.3024* 
Similar TT 0.3186* 
Fixed TT 0.3526* 
Variable TT 0.3240* 
Note 
•RT= reaction time; MT= movement time; TT= total reaction time. 
b * p < 0.01; ** p < 0.001 
_J 
Table 41: Symptom (other than memory and fatigue) frequency ratings and reaction time indices for 
patients: 
Symptom Task condition lndex8 r' 
Dizziness Similar RT 0.3151* 
Drowsiness Dissimilar MT 0.3449* 
Similar RT 0.3644* 
Similar TT 0.3728* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT/SB 0.3863* 
Irritability Similar RT 0.3354* 
Noise sensitive Degraded/ 
Undegraded MT/SB 0.3511* 
Light sensitive Compatible MT 0.3104* 
Degraded MT 0.3432* 
Dissimilar MT 0.3395* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT/SB 0.3058* 
Concentration Similar RT 0.3004* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT/SB 0.4583** 
Visual Similar RT 0.3240* 
Anxiety Undegraded MT 0.3075* 
Depression Similar RT 0.3631* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT/SB 0.3753* 
Note 
•RT= reaction time; MT= movement time; TT= total reaction time, RT/SB =total reaction time 
(subtraction score); MT/SB= movement time (subtraction score). 
b ... p < 0.01; ...... p < 0.001 
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Table 42: Symptom frequency ratings and reaction time indices for controls 
Symptom Task condition lndet' 
Fatigue Degraded/ 
Undegraded TT/SB 0.3333* 
Noise sensitive Compatible/ 
Incompatible MT/SB -0.3400* 
Concentration Degraded/ 
Undegraded MT/SB 0.3360* 
Anxiety Degraded/ 
Undegraded TT/SB 0.3119* 
Depression Degraded/ 
Undegraded TT/SB 0.3161* 
Note 
•TT/SB= total reaction time (subtraction score); MT/SB= movement time (subtraction score). 
b * p < 0.01; - p < 0.001 
J 
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the reaction time indices were subtraction scores. The results for patients are shown 
in Tables 44, and 45, and 46. These results are summarized in Table 50, where they 
are discussed together with results summarized from symptom presence, frequency, 
and severity. 
Symptom Severity 
For every subject, each symptom was coded for severity using the symptom 
rankings, symptom frequency, and symptom intensity ratings derived from the 
Postconcussion Symptom Checklist 2 (Appendix F). The symptom were rated 1 to 4 
in terms of severity as follows: 
1. Symptoms subjectively ranked as 1 and rated 2 or 3 on both symptom 
frequency and symptom intensity. 
2. Symptoms with a rating of 2 or 3 on both frequency and intensity, irrespective 
of the subjective ranking. 
3. Symptoms with a rating of 2 or 3 on either frequency or intensity irrespective of 
subjective ranking. 
4. Symptoms with a subjective ranking greater than 1, frequency less than 2, and 
intensity less than 2. 
To test the hypothesis, 1-tailed partial correlations between tasks and 
symptoms were performed. For the patient group, age, education, and duration since 
injury were held constant, and for the controls, age and education were held constant. 
In the control group, the symptoms headache, fatigue, noise sensitivity, alcohol 
sensitivity, concentration, and auditory problems were not found to correlate with any 
of the reaction time indices. The symptoms that correlated with reaction time indices 
are shown in Table 47. Some symptoms had negative correlations, whilst others had 
r 
positive correlations. Only negative correlations were anticipated because the 
measures of severity decrease from 1 (highest) to 4 (lowest). As was argued for 
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symptom presence (Table 38), the positive correlations are probably due to the small 
number of control subjects who endorsed these symptoms. These results must 
therefore be interpreted with caution. 
For the patients, no significant correlations were found for headache, and 
auditory problems. The symptoms that correlated with reaction time indices are 
indicated in Tables 48 and 49. These results are summarized in Table 50, together 
with correlations for symptom presence, frequency, and intensity. 
Summary of Correlations Between Symptom Presence. Frequency. and Intensity. 
with Indices of Reaction Time. 
The number of times that correlations were found between reaction time 
indices and symptom presence, symptom frequency, symptom intensity, and 
symptom severity were counted. These are shown in Table 50. Hypothesis 5 was 
confirmed by these results, which show that the number of correlations with reaction 
time indices varies as a function of the subjective ratings of symptom presence, 
frequency, intensity, and severity. When one looks at the totals, it is clear that 
symptom intensity ratings had the highest number of correlations with reaction time 
indices. Symptom frequency ratings had the second largest number of correlations. 
Symptom presence and symptom severity had an almost equal number of 
correlations. The totals for the symptoms indicate that symptoms varied widely in the 
number of correlations they had with reaction time indices. Inspection of this table 
suggests that the symptoms can be classified into two groups, those with multiple 
correlations (15-26 correlations) and those with few correlations (3-9 correlations). 
The two groups are shown in Table 51. 
J 
Table 43: Symptom intensity ratings and reaction time indices for controls 
Symptom Task condition Index" 
Memory Similar/ 
Dissimilar MT/SB -0.3944* 
Anxiety Degraded/ 
Undegraded TT/SB 0.3054* 
Depression Degraded MT 0.3503* 
Degraded/ 
Undegraded MT/SB 0.4030* 
Degraded/ 
Undegraded TT/SB 0.3054* 
Note 
•MT/SB= movement time (subtraction score); TT/SB= total reaction time (subtraction score); MT= 
movement time. 
b * p < 0.01 
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Table 44: Symptom intensity ratings and reaction time indices for patients: headache. dizziness. and 
memory 
Symptom Task condition Index" 
Headache Degraded/ 
Undegraded MT/SB 0.3004* 
Compatible/ 
Incompatible RT/SB 0.3049* 
Compatible/ 
Incompatible TT/SB 0.3622* 
Dizziness Dissimilar RT 0.3223* 
Similar RT 0.3349* 
Dissimilar TT 0.3220* 
Similar TT 0.4322** 
Fixed TT 0.4165* 
Variable TT 0.2992* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar MT/SB -03400* 
Dissimilar MT 0.3223* 
Memory Compatible MT 0.3211* 
Dissimilar MT 0.3615* 
Fixed RT 0.3551* 
Fixed MT 0.3735* 
Similar RT 0.3856* 
Similar MT 0.3067* 
Variable MT 0.3420* 
Incompatible MT 0.3264* 
Degraded TT 0.3836* 
Undegraded TT 0.3329* 
Note 
• MT/SB= movement time (subtraction score); RT/SB= RT(subtraction score) 
TT/SB= total reaction time (subtraction score); RT= reaction time; MT movement time. 
b * p < 0.01; ** p < 0.001 
J 
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Table 45: Symptom intensity ratings and reaction time indices for patients: drowsiness. irritability, noise 
and light sensitivity, concentration. visual problems. and depression. 
Symptom Task condition Index" 
Drowsiness Dissimilar MT 0.3257* 
Fixed MT 0.3065* 
Similar RT 0.2603* 
Incompatible MT 0.3331* 
Similar TT 0.2994* 
Fixed TT 0.3238* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT/SB 0.3286* 
Irritability Similar RT 0.3140* 
Undegraded RT 0.3086* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT/SB 0.3163* 
Concentration Similar RT 0.3707* 
Similar TT 0.3319* 
Similar RT 0.5399** 
Visual Similar RT 0.3094* 
Depression Similar RT 0.3140* 
Undegraded RT 0.3086* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT/SB 0.3163* 
Note 
•MT= movement time; RT= reaction time; RT/SB= reaction time (subtraction score). 
b * p < 0.01; ** p < 0.001 
J 
Table 46: Symptom intensity ratings and reaction time indices for patients: noise and light sensitivity 
Symptom Task condition Index" 
Noise sensitivity Degraded/ 
Undegraded MT/SB 0.3064* 
Light sensitivity Compatible MT 0.3130* 
Degraded MT 0.3737* 
Dissimilar MT 0.3863* 
Fixed MT 0.3215* 
Variable MT 0.3096* 
Incompatible MT 0.3158* 
Undegraded MT 0.3619* 
Undegraded TT 0.3535* 
Dissimilar TT 0.3108* 
Similar TT 0.3205* 
Fixed TT 0.3273* 
Variable TT 0.3179* 
Note 
• MT/SB = movement time (subtraction score); MT = total reaction time; TT = total reaction time. 
b • p < 0.01 
_f 
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Table 47: Symptom severity ratings and reaction time indices for controls 
Symptom Task condition lndex3 
Memory Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT/SB 0.3705* 
Irritability Compatible RT 0.3184* 
Compatible TT 0.3016* 
Visual Similar RT -0.2961* 
Compatible/ 
Incompatible MT/SB -0.3096* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT/SB 0.2549* 
Anxiety Degraded TT/SB 0.3535* 
Depression Degraded MT -0.3397* 
Degraded/ 
Undegraded MT/SB -0.4410** 
Degraded/ 
Undegraded TT/SB -0.3603* 
Note 
a RT/SB = reaction time (subtraction score; RT = reaction time; TT =total reaction time; MT/SB = 
movement time (subtraction score); MT = movement time; TT/SB = total reaction time (subtraction 
score). 
b * p < 0.01; ** p < 0.001 
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Table 48: Symptom severity ratings and reaction time indices for patients: Dizziness. memory. fatigue. 
drowsiness. irritability, noise sensitivity. 
Symptom Taskcondmon Index" 
Dizziness Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT -0.3267* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT/SB -0.3044* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar MT/SB -0.3256* 
Memory Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT/SB -0.3147* 
Fatigue Undegraded MT -0.3032* 
Undegraded TT -0.3219* 
Drowsiness Incompatible MT -0.3012* 
Irritability Similar RT -.0.3400* 
Noise sensitivity Degraded/ 
Undegraded MT/SB -0.3219* 
Note 
•RT= reaction time; RT/SB= reaction time (subtraction score); MT/SB= movement time (subtraction 
score); MT = movement time; TT = total reaction time. 
b * p < 0.01; ** p < 0.001 
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Table 49: Symptom severity ratings and reaction time indices for patients: light. concentration. visual. 
anxiety. depression 
Symptom Task condition lndex8 
Light sensitivity Compatible MT -0.3341* 
Degraded MT -0.3508* 
Dissimilar MT -0.3496* 
Incompatible MT -0.3148* 
Undegraded MT -0.3725* 
Concentration Similar RT -0.3076* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT/SB -0.4903** 
Visual Similar RT -0.3168* 
Anxiety Similar RT -0.3185* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT/SB -0.4435** 
Depression Similar/ 
Dissimilar RT/SB -0.3719* 
Similar/ 
Dissimilar TT/SB -0.3575* 
Note 
• MT= movement time; RT= reaction time; RT/SB = reaction time (subtraction score);; TT/SB= total 
reaction time (subtraction). 
b * p < 0.01; ** p < 0.001 
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Table 50: Summary of associations between symptom presence. frequency. intensity and severity. with 
indices of reaction time. 
Symptoms Aspects of Symptoms 
PRE• FRQb IN,-C SEv<I TOTAL 
Headache 0 0 3 0 3 
Dizziness 5 1 8 3 17 
Memory 3 13 10 1 26 
Drowsiness 3 4 7 1 15 
Irritability 1 1 3 1 6 
Noise 1 1 1 1 4 
Light 3 4 12 5 24 
Concentration 2 2 3 2 9 
Anxiety 1 1 0 2 4 
Depression 2 2 3 2 9 
Fatigue 0 16 0 2 18 
Visual 0 1 1 1 3 
TOTAL 20 46 51 21 138 
Note 
a symptom presence; b symptom frequency; c symptom intensity 
d symptom severity 
J 
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Table 51: Classification of postconcussion symptoms based on the number of correlations with indices 
of reaction time 
Group 
Group 1 
Group2 
Correlations Symptoms 
Multiple correlations Memory, light sensitivity, fatigue, drowsiness, and dizziness. 
Few correlations Headache, irritability, low noise tolerance, poor concentration, 
anxiety, depression, visual problems. 
The Group 1 symptoms consist of one cognitive symptom (memory), one 
stimulus intolerance symptom (light sensitivity), two arousal-related symptoms 
(fatigue and drowsiness), and a somatic symptom (dizziness). Group 2 symptoms 
include a somatic symptom (headache), emotional symptoms (irritability, anxiety, and 
depression), a cognitive symptom (poor concentration), stimulus intolerance (low 
noise tolerance), and a sensory symptom (visual problems). 
Both groups have cognitive, somatic, and stimulus intolerance symptoms. The 
main difference is that additionally, Group 1 has the arousal-related symptoms of 
fatigue and drowsiness. Because of potential problem of inaccuracies in reporting 
symptoms that was discussed earlier, it is possible that for some patients, these two 
symptoms are one and the same. However, even if that is the case, the important 
issue is that the symptom relates to arousal. Arousal deficits reflect lesions of the first 
functional unit of the brain, which is responsible for the regulation of cortical tone and 
waking (Luria, 1973). Deficits of the first functional unit affect the brain diffusely. For 
this reason, it is not surprising that Group 1 symptoms are associated with more 
cognitive deficits as indexed by reaction time, than the Group 2 symptoms. 
J 
Hypothesis 6 
The various postconcussion symptoms will differ in the extent to which they 
correlate with reaction time, movement time, total reaction time, and 
subtraction scores. 
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Hypothesis 6 was confirmed by the results. The number of times each 
symptom correlated with reaction time (RT), movement time (MT), total reaction time 
(TT), or subtraction scores (SB, the respective differences between the RTs, MTs, 
and TTs of level 1 and level 2 task conditions) were counted. These counts are listed 
in Table 52. 
The results in Table 52 were analysed qualitatively, with the aim of identifying 
patterns of relationships between symptoms and reaction time indices. The results of 
the qualitative analyses are shown in Table 53. In this table, the reaction time index 
with the highest number of correlations for each symptom determines the pattern to 
which each symptom belongs. 
The Pattern 1 symptoms would have shown no correlations if only the 
conventional reaction time indices (RT and MT) had been used. For this reason, 
subtraction scores can be considered as being more sensitive than the conventional 
indices in detecting correlations between reaction time indices and the symptoms 
headache and low noise tolerance. 
As was indicated in the literature review, the RT scores are associated with the 
decision component of reaction time, and MT scores are associated with the 
response execution component of reaction time (Jensen & Munro, 1979). These 
results thus suggest that the symptoms of Pattern 2 are more closely associated with 
decision making, and those of Pattern 3 are more closely associated with response 
execution. In Pattern 2, the symptom poor concentration is clearly cognitive, and it is 
thus not surprising that it was most frequently associated with RT. 
J 
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Table 52: Summary of correlations between symptoms and indices of reaction time 
SYMPTOM RT" TOTAL 
Dizziness 6 1 4 (3.9)6 17 
Memory 4 11 7 (2.6)4 26 
Drowsiness 2 7 3 (1.9)3 15 
Irritability 5 0 0 (0.6)1 6 
Noise 0 0 0 (2.6)4 4 
Light 0 17 5 (1.3)2 24 
Concentration 5 0 1 (1.9)3 9 
Anxiety 1 1 0 (1.3)2 4 
Depression 5 0 0 (2.6)4 9 
Visual 3 0 0 (0.0)0 3 
Headache 0 0 0 (1.9)3 3 
Fatigue 2 8 8 (0.0)0 18 
TOTAL 33 45 28 32 138 
Note 
• reaction time; b movement time; c total reaction time 
d subtraction score. The score in brackets is the calculated score. The maximum possible score for SB 
is 12, whilst the maximum possible score for RT, MT, and TT is 8 scores each. To make the SB score 
comparable to the other scores, the calculated score was obtained by the following formula: Original SB 
score x 8/12. 
Table 53: Patterns of correlations between symptoms and indices of reaction time. 
Pattern Reaction Time Index 
Pattern 1 Subtraction scores only 
Pattern 2 Most frequent scores RT 
Pattern 3 Most frequent scores MT 
Symptoms 
headache, low noise tolerance. 
Dizziness, irritability, poor concentration, visual 
problems, depression. 
Memory, fatigue, drowsiness, low light tolerance. 
209 
The Pattern 3 symptoms correlated most frequently with the response 
execution component of reaction time (MT). The poor memory symptom, is clearly 
cognitive and seems more appropriately to belong to Pattern 1. Fatigue and 
drowsiness are arousal symptoms. These two symptoms are suggestive of damage 
to the first functional unit of the brain (Luria, 1973). Because damage to the first 
functional unit affects the brain diffusely, one would have expected these symptoms 
to be associated with both decision time and response execution. There is no easily 
apparent reason why low light tolerance should belong with Pattern 3. 
The qualitative data in Tables 52 and 53 needs to be confirmed by quantitative 
analyses. This is done in Hypothesis 8 where symptoms are grouped into clusters 
and are examined at different durations since injury. 
Hypothesis 7 
The various postconcussion symptoms will differ in the extent to which 
they correlate with the task variables signal quality, signal 
discriminability, S-R compatibility, and foreperiod uncertainty 
Hypothesis 7 was confirmed by the results. The scores for the task variables 
are the subtraction (SB) scores. As was explained in Chapter 5, these scores are 
obtained by subtracting the scores of the level 2 task conditions from the scores of 
the level 1 task conditions for each task variable. The number of times that each 
symptom correlated with each of the four task variables was counted. These counts 
are shown in Table 54. From the totals indicated in Table 54, it is clear that the task 
variable signal discriminability had the largest number of correlations with symptoms. 
Signal quality and S-R compatibility had smaller numbers, whilst foreperiod 
uncertainty had no correlations with symptoms. The symptoms fatigue and visual 
problems did not have correlations with any of the task variables. It is noteworthy that 
F 
fatigue and drowsiness differ with~ respect to correlations with task variables. Earlier 
(Hypothesis 5, Table 51 ), it was speculated that for some patients, these two 
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symptoms might be identical in meaning. The present result suggests that the two 
symptoms are distinct. 
The above qualitative analyses of the relationships between symptoms and 
task variables will be confirmed by quantitative analyses for symptom clusters in 
Hypothesis 8. 
Hypothesis 8 
The various symptom clusters will differ in the extent to which they 
correlate with reaction time, movement time, total reaction time, and 
subtraction scores. 
A rating scale of 0 to 6 for symptom severity was used was done in hypothesis 
2. Principal components analysis with varimax rotation was used to identify clusters of 
postconcussion symptoms and reaction time indices (Appendixes H, I, J, and K). The 
data from these factor matrices are summarized in Tables 55, 56, 57, and 58. 
Column 1 of each table contains the Factor number. This is followed by column 
2 which has the percentage of variance explained by each factor. In Column 3 are 
given the reaction time indices that loaded on the respective factor. The maximum 
possible number of indices in the various categories of reaction time are as follows: 
RT (8), MT (8), total reaction time (TT) (8), subtraction scores (SB) (12). There are 
four task variables, viz., signal quality, signal discriminability, S-R compatibility, and 
foreperiod uncertainty. The scores for the task variables are represented by SB. This 
is because SB is the difference between the level 1 and level 2 scores in each task 
variable (see Table 1). SB scores are derived from RT, MT, and TT scores. The 
number of SB scores relating to each task variable will is shown in brackets. In 
factorial experiments, such as those reviewed in Chapter 4 (Table 1 ), deficits on task 
variables correspond to deficits on specific stages of 
J 
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Table 54: Summary of correlations between symptoms and task variables 
Symptom Task Variables 
Quality"Discr' Come Forepd Total 
Headache 1 0 2 0 3 
Dizziness 2 4 0 0 6 
Memory 0 4 0 0 4 
Fatigue 0 0 0 0 0 
Drowsiness 0 3 0 0 3 
Irritability 0 1 0 0 1 
Noise sensitive 4 0 0 0 4 
Light sensitive 0 2 0 0 2 
Concentration 0 3 0 0 3 
Visual 0 0 0 0 0 
Anxiety 0 2 0 0 2 
Depression 0 4 0 0 4 
TOTAL 7 23 2 0 32 
a signal quality; b signal discriminability 
c S-R compatibility; d foreperiod uncertainty. 
J 
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information processing. The results for the present study are based on a nonfactorial 
design (Chapter 5, Table 2). The deficits on specific task variables can therefore only 
suggest, rather than confirm, deficits on the corresponding stages of information 
processing. 
The fourth column gives the components of reaction time. Two components 
are given, decision time, and response execution time (Jensen & Munro, 1979). 
According to Jensen and Munro, in reaction time experiments, the RT scores reflect 
decision time whilst the MT scores represent response execution. The decision as to 
which component of reaction time is associated with each factor depends on the 
reaction time indices reported in Column 2. Where both RT and MT scores are 
represented in Column 2, the component is described as mixed. In the fifth column 
are the symptoms that loaded on each of the factors. 
Controls 
Hypothesis 8 was confirmed for the controls (Table 55). The symptoms loaded 
on two of the four factors on Table 55. Factor 2 consisted of the symptom memory 
and all of the RT scores. This means that memory loaded with decision time, the 
cognitive component of reaction time. Further to reflecting the cognitive component of 
reaction time, Factor 2 also reflected slowing of information processing on the task 
variable foreperiod uncertainty. In factorial studies, slowed responses on the 
foreperiod uncertainty task variable suggests deficits on the motor adjustment stage 
of information processing. 
The remaining symptoms loaded on Factor 4, which reflected both decision 
time and response execution. One would have expected poor concentration, which is 
a cognitive symptom, to load on Factor 2 together with memory. This unexpected 
finding may be related to the problem of the subjects' understanding of constructs 
such as concentration, which was discussed earlier. Finally, for Factor 4, the 
,. 
conventional reaction time indices~ (RT and MT) did not load with the symptoms. The 
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Table 55. Reaction time indices and symptom clusters in controls (N = 52) 
Factor %of Indices component Symptoms 
Variance 
1 8 MT scores Response No symptoms 
5 TT scores execution 
31 2 SB scores (Mn 
- Signal discriminability (1) 
- S-R compatibility (1) 
2 13.4 8 RT scores Decision time Memory 
2TTscores 
1 SB (TT) 
- Foreperiod uncertainty (1) 
3 8.4 6 SB scores (RT & MT) Mixed No symptoms 
- Signal discriminability (2) 
- S-R compatibility (2) 
- Foreperiod uncertainty (2) 
4 7.5 1 TT Mixed Anxiety 
3 SB scores (RT & MT) Dizziness 
- Signal quality (3) Noise sensitivity 
I rrlta bility 
Concentration 
Light sensitivity 
Headache 
Fatigue 
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presence of both RT and MT is detected only because of the SB scores, which 
loaded on this factor. These SB scores were derived from the task variable signal 
quality. The findings of the present study therefore suggest that for controls, with the 
exception of memory, the symptoms are associated with the feature extraction stage 
of information processing. 
Patients 
Factor analyses at 1-21 days since injury. Hypothesis 8 was not confirmed for 
this duration since injury because all the symptoms loaded on one factor (Factor 3, 
Table 56). All the symptoms loaded on Factor 3, which reflects decision time, the 
cognitive component of reaction time. This suggests that in the acute/subacute stage 
after injury, cognitive problems are more prominent than response execution. It is 
striking that the only reaction time indices that loaded with the symptoms were SB 
scores. If only the conventional reaction time indices of RT and MT had been used, 
the cognitive deficits would not have been detected. The task variables that the SB 
scores represent are signal quality and S-R compatibility, which, in factorial studies, 
would suggest deficits on the feature extraction and response selection stages of 
information processing respectively. 
Factor analysis at 22 - 90 days since injury. Hypothesis 8 was confirmed for 
the duration 22 - 90 days after injury (Table 57). Symptoms loaded on three of the 
four factors. The majority of the symptoms loaded on Factor 2, which reflects the 
cognitive component of reaction time. Two of the symptoms, memory and 
concentration, are cognitive, and it is thus logical that they should load with the 
cognitive component of reaction time. These cognitive symptoms loaded with somatic 
(headache and dizziness), and arousal (drowsiness and fatigue) symptoms. As was 
pointed out earlier with respect to Table 27, the symptoms poor concentration and 
irritability are frequently the result Qf fatigue (Mittenberg, Zielinski, & Fichera, 1993), 
which also loads on Factor 2. 
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Table 56. Reaction time indices and symotom clusters in patients (N = 15): 1-21 davs after injurv. 
Factor %of Indices component Symptoms 
variance 
1 24.3 8 MT scores Response No symptoms 
6TTscores execution 
2 20.1 8 RT scores Mixed No symptoms 
1 TT score 
3 SB scores (MT) 
- Signal quality (2) 
- Signal discriminability (1) 
3 15.4 3 SB scores (RT) Decision time Noise 
- S-R compatibility (2) Concentration 
- Signal quality (1) Dizziness 
Memory 
Irritability 
Anxiety(-) 
headache 
Depression 
Light 
Visual problems 
Drowsiness 
Fatigue 
4 9.5 1 TTscore Mixed No symptoms 
6 SB scores (RT & MT) 
- Signal discriminability (2) 
- Foreperiod uncertainty (3) 
- S-R compatibility (1) 
J 
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Table 57. Reaction time indices and symptom clusters in patients CN = 16): 22-90 davs after injury. 
Factor %of Indices component Symptoms 
variance 
1 48.3 8 TT scores Mixed No symptoms 
8 MT scores 
8 RT scores 
2 11.4 2 SB scores (RT & Tl) Decision time Concentration 
- Signal discriminability (1) Irritability 
- Foreperiod uncertainty (1) Headache 
Dizziness 
Memory 
Drowsiness 
Fatigue 
3 8.6 3 SB scores (RT & MT} Mixed Light sensitivity 
- S-R compatibility (1) Anxiety(-) 
- Signal quality (2) Depression 
Visual 
4 8 6 SB scores (MT & Tl) Response Noise sensitivity 
- S-R compatibility (2) execution 
- Signal discriminability (2) 
- Foreperiod uncertainty (2) 
J 
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The symptoms on Factor 2 are similar to the symptoms on Factor 1 {Table 26) 
and are identical to the symptoms found on Factor 1 (Table 27). The cognitive 
symptoms identified by factor analyses on symptoms alone (Tables 26 and 27) 
correlated with the cognitive component of reaction time (Table 57). This is an 
important finding, in that it suggests that the patients understood the constructs on the 
symptom checklist (Appendix F), and reported them accurately. The task variables 
with which these symptoms loaded are signal discriminability and foreperiod 
uncertainty. In factorial studies these would correspond to the identification and motor 
adjustment stages of information processing respectively. 
The symptoms on Factor 3, which are similar to those of Factor 2 in Table 27, 
loaded with both RT and MT. In Table 27 these symptoms were labelled as 
visuaVemotional. Only the SB scores loaded on this factor, and they were derived 
from the task variables S-R compatibility and signal quality. It is significant that the 
visual symptoms (light sensitivity and visual problems) loaded here, together with 
signal quality, a task variable that involves visual abilities (degraded vs undegraded 
task conditions). This finding suggests that the constructs visual problems and light 
sensitivity (Appendix F) were accurately reported by patients. The symptom anxiety 
loaded negatively on this factor, and it may be that the meaning of this symptom was 
not property understood by patients. 
Finally, Factor 4 had only one symptom, noise sensitivity, which was 
associated with response execution. The conventional reaction time indices (RT and 
MT) were absent. Noise sensitivity was associated with three of the four task 
variables, ie, Signal discriminability, S-R compatibility, and foreperiod uncertainty. 
Noise sensitivity is an auditory symptom, and it is significant that the only task 
variable with which it did not correlate was signal quality, which involves visual 
abilities. If this symptom was reported accurately, the present findings suggest that 
noise sensitivity is associated with a wider range of deficits (3 out of 4 task variables) 
than other symptoms. J 
Factor analysis at 91 + days after injury. Hypothesis 8 was confirmed for this 
duration. Symptoms loaded on all four factors (Table 58). Factor 1 has one symptom, 
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anxiety, which, on previous occasions was found to load negatively with other 
symptoms (Tables 26, 27, and 28) and with reaction time indices (Table 57). It also 
is notable that anxiety is the only symptom which loaded with practically all of the 
conventional reaction time indices (8 TT, 8 MT, and 7 RT). Anxiety is thus associated 
with both the decision time and the response execution components of reaction time. 
If anxiety was reported accurately, the present results suggest that this symptom 
becomes more significant in the chronic stages after traumatic brain injury. A similar 
finding for the symptom depression is reported below. 
Factor 2 consisted of fatigue and two somatic symptoms. This factor is 
identical to Factor 1 on Table 28, which was labelled as arousal/somatic. In the 
literature review (Chapter 4), it was suggested that fatigue may be associated with 
injuries to the first functional unit of the brain (Luria, 1973). As Luria suggested, 
deficits of the first functional unit affect functions in widespread areas of the brain. For 
that reason, it makes sense that both the decision time and response execution 
components of reaction time also load on this factor. However, there were more RT 
scores than MT scores. As Appe~dix K shows, of the six SB scores that loaded on 
this factor, only one was an MT score. The symptoms on Factor 2 loaded with three 
of the four task variables, viz, S-R compatibility, Signal quality, and signal 
discriminability. 
There is no easily apparent reason for the loading of visual problems with 
irritability on Factor 3. One possibility is that irritability is an emotional reaction to 
visual difficulties. The two symptoms are associated with both the decision time and 
the response execution components of reaction time. Because of the visual problems, 
one would have expected the task variable signal quality to load here too, but this was 
not the case. However, the signal discriminability task variable which also loaded on 
Factor 3, is visually demanding. 
The six symptoms of Factor 4 loaded with only one reaction time index, 
degraded (MT, SB). If this finding }s not an artefact of small samples, it suggests that 
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Table 58. Reaction time indices and symptom clusters in patients (N = 19): 91 + days after injury. 
Factor %of Indices Component Symptoms 
variance 
1 43.4 8 TT scores Mixed Anxiety 
8MTscores 
7 RT scores 
2 11.1 1 RTscore Mixed Fatigue 
6 SB scores (RT & MT) Dizziness 
- S-R compatibility (3) Headache 
- Signal quality (2) 
- Signal discriminability (1) 
3 8.8 5 SB scores Mixed Visual problems 
- Foreperiod uncertainty (3) Irritability 
- Signal discriminability (2) 
4 7 1 SB score (MT) Response Concentration 
- Signal quality execution Drowsiness 
Memory 
Noise 
Depression 
,, Light 
J 
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in the chronic stages, several of the symptoms become less associated with organic 
deficits, as indexed by reaction time. Furthermore because of the symptoms poor 
concentration and memory, one would have expected these symptoms to load with 
the cognitive component of reaction time, and not with response execution, as was 
the case here. 
The possibility that the aetiology of symptoms is different at different durations 
since injury has been mentioned with respect to anxiety above. This possibility has 
also been investigated in the case of depression. Jorge, Arndt, and Forrester (1993) 
found that whereas acute onset depression is related to brain injuries, late onset 
depression is mediated by psychosocial factors. These findings are consistent with 
previous studies, which report that there are generally low correlations between 
organic indices of brain injury and postconcussion symptoms after three months 
(Lishman, 1988). 
For all the three durations since injury, symptom clusters differed on the 
number of task variables with which they correlated. In terms of the stage theories of 
information processing (Sternberg, 1969; Shum, McFarland, Bain, & Humphreys, 
1990), this suggests that some symptom clusters are associated with more stages of 
information processing than others. None of the clusters in Tables 56 -58 was 
associated with all four task variables. The maximum number of associations was 
three. 
There is a striking difference between the associations of individual symptoms 
and task variables, and that between symptom clusters and task variables. The 
results for individual symptoms, which were reported in Table 54 suggested that most 
symptoms correlated with stimulus discriminability. The task variable foreperiod 
uncertainty was not associated with any symptom. Contrary to the findings for 
individual symptoms, all four task variables were associated with at least one 
symptom cluster (Tables 56-58). 
Another interesting finding iJ that many symptom clusters correlated with 
clusters of subtraction scores more than they did with the conventional indices of 
reaction time (RT, MT, & TT). This finding attests to the usefulness of using a wide 
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variety of reaction time indices (Houlihan, Campbell, & Stelmach, 1994), and the need 
to include amongst these, the subtraction scores. 
_f 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Main Findings 
Correlations Between Symptoms and Reaction Time Indices 
The main finding of this study is as follows: There is a significant positive 
correlation between the kinds of postconcussion symptoms patients report, and 
the kinds of cognitive deficits that they have, as indexed by reaction time tests. 
The two areas in which symptoms differ are on the components of reaction time 
(Table 52 & 53), and on task variables (Table 54). 
With respect to components of reaction time, some symptoms are more 
closely associated with the decision time component of reaction time, while others 
are more closely associated with the response execution component. This result 
confirms the findings from factor analytic studies (Bohnen, Twijnstra, & Jolles, 
(1992) that subjectively reported postconcussion symptoms load onto cognitive 
and noncognitive factors. The importance of the present investigation is that 
symptom factor loadings derived from subjective reports were confirmed by 
experimental assessments of cognitive deficits. 
The task variables used in the present study were signal quality, S-R 
compatibility, stimulus discriminability, and foreperiod uncertainty. As is clear from 
Table 54, most symptoms were associated with stimulus discriminability. The 
symptom headache is the only one ymich correlated with S-R compatibility. In 
factorial experiments (Shum McFarland, Bain, & Humphreys, 1990), these .task 
variables have been used to assesses deficits on stages of information 
processing. The stages of information processing are feature extraction, 
identification, response selection and motor adjustment (Chapter 5, Table 2). 
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Because the present study was nonfactorial in design, the results obtained can 
only suggest, rather than confirm, deficits on specific stages of information 
processing. In this light, the present study suggests that most symptoms were 
associated with the identification stage of information processing. The results in 
Table 54 suggest that feature extraction was associated with only three symptoms, 
headache, dizziness, and noise sensitivity. Headache is the only symptom 
associated with response execution. No symptoms correlated with foreperiod 
uncertainty. In the study by Shum, McFarland, Bain, & Humphreys, (1990), deficits 
after brain injury were found in the identification and response selection stages of 
information processing. 
Factors Moderejting the Correlations Between Symptoms and Indices of Reaction 
Time 
The correlations between symptoms and indices of reaction time are 
moderated by the following factors: characteristics of symptoms (Hypothesis 5, 
Tables 36 - 50), clusters of symptoms (Hypothesis 8, Tables 55 - 58), and duration 
since injury (Hypothesis 8, Tables 56 - 58). 
The characteristics of symptoms that were investigated were the subjective 
ratings of symptom presence, symptom frequency, symptom intensity, and 
symptom severity. It was found that symptom intensity had the largest number of 
correlations with symptoms. This was followed by symptom frequency, symptom 
severity, and symptom presence respectively (Table 50). This finding confirms the 
suggestion by Gouvier, Uddo-Crane, & Brown (1988), that assessing different 
aspects of postconcussion symptoms (frequency, intensity, and duration) gives a 
more concise measure of those symptoms than noting the mere p~esence of a 
symptom. 
The associations between clusters of symptoms and reaction time indices J . 
were assessed at different durations since injury. The component of reaction time 
with which a symptom correlated differed, depending on whether the symptom 
was considered on its own, or as part of a symptom cluster. For example 
considered singly, poor concentration and depression correlated with decision 
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time, because the most frequent score was RT (Pattern 2, Table 52). However, in 
clusters, these symptoms correlated with response execution three months or 
more after injury (Factor 4, Table 58). These findings suggest that interactions 
between symptoms changes the manner in which they correlate with reaction time 
indices. Symptom clusters vary with duration since injury (Table 26, 27, and 28). In 
some cases, the pattern of these clusters changes when indices of reaction time 
are added into the factor analyses (Table 26 vsTable 56; Table 28 vs Table 58). 
Other Findings 
Patients vs Controls 
The focus of this study was not on the differences between patients and 
controls, as was pointed out in Chapter 1. However, the following significant 
findings are restated because they help to place the findings on patients into 
proper perspective, and are of interest in the diagnosis of brain injury. 
1. Patients reported higher frequencies and intensities of on most of the 
postconcussion symptoms than controls (Table 20 & 21). 
2. 
The symptoms for which there were no significant differences were: poor 
concentration and anxiety (frequency); and poor concentration, anxiety, and 
depression (intensity). 
On all reaction time tasks, patients were slower than controls. (Table 22, 
23, &24). 
Previous studies (Jakobsen, Baadsgaard, Thomsen, & Henriksen, 1987; 
Shum, McFarland & Bain, 1994b) have reported similar findings. 
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3. Although patients and controls may report similar symptoms, the clusters 
formed by the symptoms in the two groups are different (Tables 26-28 vs 
Table 29). 
The patients group had a larger number of factors than the control group. 
Because of the imprecise way in which the symptoms are defined, it is 
probable that the symptoms described by patients and controls are only 
similar in name, and are not identical. It was pointed out in Chapter 3 that 
many of the names of many of the symptoms refer to a variety of 
conditions. For example, the symptom dizziness may refer to vertigo, near 
syncope, and ill-defined lightheadedness (Anderson, Yolton, Reinke, Kohl, 
& Lundy-Ekman, 1995). 
4. Overall, the magnitude of the difference between levels of task conditions is 
not significantly greater for patients than it is for controls. 
This finding is contrary to what had been predicted in Hypothesis 4. It 
suggests that even though controls are faster than patients on all tasks, the 
two groups are affected similarly by a change in the difficulty levels of task 
conditions. 
Subtraction Scores 
Subtraction (SB) scores are the product of the differences between Level 1 
and Level 2 tasks in each task condition. They are a measure of the increase in 
complexity between the two levels. These scores are derived from the 
conventional indices of reaction time, namely reaction time (RT), movement time 
(MT), and total reaction time (TT). Each SB score thus always necessarily reflects 
F 
one of these conventional indices.~ 
In this study, many symptoms and symptom clusters showed correlations 
with SB scores and not with any of the conventional indices (Table 53, 55, 56, 57, 
& 58). The SB scores are thus more sensitive in detecting correlations between 
symptoms and reaction time than the conventional indices from which they are 
derived. Many significant correlations would have been missed if only the 
conventional indices had been used. 
Methodological Issues 
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Overall, the aims of the study, to show that cognitive deficits can be 
predicted from reported symptoms was achieved. However there are several 
weaknesses in the study, which could limit the generalizability of these findings. 
These are classified into problems relating to the sample (subjects), the 
instruments, and procedures. 
Subjects 
The interpretation of these results is bound to be affected by the fact that 
the patients were consecutive attenders at outpatient clinics, rather than a random 
sample of head injury patients. The control subjects were volunteers, and were 
thus also not a random sample. Another difficulty with these samples is that they 
were not well-matched demographically. The control group had more subjects with 
higher education and professional occupations (Table 12). However, the crucial 
comparisons in this study were not between patients and controls. The focus was 
on the differences between patients who report different symptoms. 
A nonfactorial design was used with the view to increasing sample size. A 
total of 144 subjects were assessed initially, and it appeared that the sample was 
adequately large. The sample was however eventually reduced to 106 (54 patients 
and 52 controls) for reasons shown in Table 8. These two samples were adequate 
J 
for comparing the reaction time performance of patients and controls. The samples 
were however small, when subjects were classified according to symptoms 
reported. For some symptoms, there was such a low count that they were 
excluded from several analyses. As a consequence of this, the results were 
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available for only 12 of the 16 original symptoms. The number of subjects 
endorsing the remaining symptoms was acceptable, but small, especially when 
subjects had to be matched for age, education, and duration since injury. It is 
important that future studies use much larger samples than were used here. The 
present study has highlighted the need for large initial samples, because many 
subjects eventually have to be dropped, for reasons such as failure to follow 
instructions. 
Instruments 
Symptom Checklists. 
The hypotheses in this study were confirmed by significant but low correlations 
between symptoms and reaction time indices. It is possible that the low 
correlations were the result of the heterogeneity of patients classified under each 
symptom. The Postconcussion Symptom Checklist 2 (Appendix F) asked the 
subject to endorse whether or not he or she experienced a particular symptom. 
These symptoms however, may represent more than one condition. For example, 
Evans (1992) indicated that several types of headache are possible after traumatic 
brain injury. The same applies to memory (Cohen, 1984; Ewert, Levin, Watson, & 
Kalisky, 1989), dizziness (Anderson, Yolton, Reinke, Kohl, & Lundy-Ekman (1995), 
and possibly the other symptoms too. The patients classified under each symptom 
may therefore have been more heterogeneous than was suspected. In future, it is 
important to establish not only that the subject has a headache, but also to 
establish what kind of headache. Some symptoms, notably fatigue and 
drowsiness, may be confused for each other. Future studies need to define 
symptoms operationally, so that they can be understood in the same way by all 
subjects. 
J 
228 
Reaction Time Tasks 
The error rate for the task condition similar was considerably higher than 
that for all the other task conditions (Table 17). This may suggest that this task 
condition was relatively the most difficult. The higher the number of errors on a 
task condition, the less the number of trials used in the calculations of correlations. 
It is noteworthy that this task condition was most frequently associated with 
postconcussion symptoms (Table 54). To avoid this problem in future studies, 
preliminary statistical and psychometric studies ought to be carried out to ensure 
that the tasks variables are equal in level of difficulty. For example, how far apart 
should the lines be in the similar condition as opposed to the dissimilar? Similarly, 
in the task variable signal quality, the task condition degraded, involved the 
degrading of the image on the computer screen by 7%. This is an arbitrary level of 
degradation, which was used here in order to be consistent with previous studies 
(eg Shum, McFarland, Bain, & Humphreys, 1990). In addition to equating levels of 
difficulty, appropriate numbers of practice trials should be determined from trials 
on large numbers of subjects. In the present study, an arbitrary cut-off of 9 trials 
was used. 
A final procedural issue is that more would have been achieved in this 
investigation if it had been a multidisciplinary and prospective study. As a 
multidisciplinary study, the clinical and diagnostic information would have been 
more readily available, and it would have been more accurate. It is desirable that 
neurosurgeons be formally involved in studies of this kind. One of their roles would 
be to use acceptable research and clinical instruments for assigning diagnoses to 
patients. The diagnoses that were available from Ga-Rankuwa hospital had been 
assigned mostly by registrars as part of their routine ward work. There was no way 
of checking on the accuracy of diagnoses. It is for this reason that no hypotheses 
relating to diagnosis and severity °J injury were formulated. 
In a prospective study, more reliable information about indices of severity of 
injury would be obtained. The researcher would be in a position to get information 
from patients and/or their relations about the time of the accident, the behaviours 
and deficits indicative of post-traumatic amnesia, and the evolution of the 
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postconcussion symptoms. With respect to post-traumatic amnesia, scales such 
as the Galveston Orientation and Amnesia Test (Levin, O'Donnell, & Grossman, 
1979), and Westmead Post-traumatic Amnesia Scale (Shores, Marosszeky, 
Sandanam, & Batchelor, 1986) and the Glasgow Coma Scale-Extended (GCS-E) 
(Nell, 1997) would be used prospectively. 
Implications of the Study 
Notwithstanding the methodological constraints just cited, this study makes 
important theoretical and practical contributions to our understanding of the 
postconcussion syndrome. With regard to theory, the study confirmed the 
existence of three classes of symptoms in the postconcussion syndrome based on 
cognitive deficits. These are the symptoms associated with decision time, 
response execution, and those associated with both decision time and response 
execution. The study also suggests that symptoms, and clusters of symptoms can 
be classified in terms of deficits on specific stages of information processing. As 
far as I can tell, no previous study has investigated such associations. The fact 
that certain symptoms and indices of reaction time load together is important 
theoretically because it suggests clues about the aetiology of the postconcussion 
syndrome. Hypotheses for future studies can be formulated for each of the 
symptom/reaction time index clusters (Table 56-58), in the context of what is 
known about the mechanisms of traumatic brain injury (Chapter 2), the aetiologies 
of individual postconcussion symptoms (Chapter 3), and the physiology of 
attention and information processing (Chapter 4). 
The most significant practical implication of this study is that it suggests a 
method for predicting cognitive deficits on the basis of symptoms reported by 
J 
patients. Such predictions are useful because they will provide a framework for 
further assessments, and for the planning of treatment and rehabilitation. In 
assessing the postconcussion syndrome, this study has confirmed the importance 
of considering the duration since injury (Rutherford, 1989). The importance of 
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assessing the frequency and intensity of postconcussion symptoms, instead of just 
reporting on their presence (Gouvier, Uddo-Crane, & Brown, 1988 ) was also 
confirmed. Finally, this study highlighted the importance of subtraction scores in 
detecting cognitive deficits associated with symptoms. 
I 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A 
Demographic Data Form 
1. Date: I I 
2. Surname and Initial: .............................. . 
3. Institution: ............................................. . 
4. Hospital Number: .................................. . 
5. Research Number: ................................ . 
6. Group: Patient/ Normal Control P I C. 
7. Sex: MI F. 
8. Date of Birth: I I 
9. Age: ......... . 
10. Date of Admission: I I 
11. Date of Discharge: I I 
12. Marital status: Married I Single I Divorced I widowed ...... . 
13. Highest education standard attained: ............ Year 19 .. . 
14 Occupation/ profession: ........................... . 
15. Current employment: ............................... . 
Hand Dominance 
Show me how: Left Right 
1. You would hammer in a nail 
2. You would throw a stone 
3. You would write your name 
4. Dominance: Right. ... Left... Mixed ... 
J 
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APPENDIX 8 
Trauma Details Form 
Date: I I 
1. Research Number ...... : ....... . 
2. Date of trauma: I I 
3. Time of trauma: .................. . 
4. Source of Trauma: .. (AssaulU Mva/ Fall/ Falling object 
other ............................................ . 
5. MV A: Driver I Pedestrian I Passenger I NA 
6. Assault: Fight I Unknown assailants I NA I Other ................ . 
7. Assault Instrument. .......................................... . 
8. Loss of consciousness: .. T I F. 
9. Duration loss of consciousness: ....... . 
10. Glasgow coma score on admission: /15 
11. PTA symptoms: (History of deficits in short-term memory, inattentiveness, 
disinhibited, restlessness other .............................................. . 
12. Duration of PT A. .................................... . 
13. Duration of hospitalization: ..................... . 
14. Duration since trauma: ........................... . 
15. Diagnosis ............................................... . 
f 
APPENDIXC 
Screening Questionnaire 
Research Number .............. . 
1. Have you ever been dazed or unconscious as a result of 
A car accident in which you were the occupant 
A car accident in which you were a pedestrian 
struck by a vehicle. 
A blow to the head by a blunt object 
(stick, brick, iron bar, back of axe) 
A penetrating wound on the head (bullet 
knife driven into head, sharp axe wound) 
Accident while playing sport or falling 
Nearly drowning in water 
Suffocating in gas as a result of a gas 
stove or a fire inside the room. 
Suffocating from exhaust fumes from 
a car or tractor. 
Losing consciousness from poison or 
poison gases. 
Losing consciousness while at work on 
the farm or for any reason. 
What happened? ..................................... . 
2. For how long were you dazed or unconscious? ............... . 
3. Did you go to hospital as a result of this injury? 
If yes 
4. How long were you in hospital? ......... (Days/ weeks). 
5. Have you ever had a diagnosis of any of the following 
conditions? 
292 
Date: I I 
Epilepsy (falling sickness, seizures, convulsions) 
Explain: ........................................ . 
A psychiatric diagnosis 
Explain: .......................................... . 
Diabetes 
Any disease affecting your nervous system 
Explain: .......................................... . 
Injury to you arm or hand (specify R, or L) 
by breaking or crushing 
Give details: ...................................... . 
6. Have you ever been admitted to hospital at any time 
in the past? 
(Examiner notes hospital stays of any duration 
for any of the conditions in 5). 
Year: ........................................................... . 
Hospital: .................................................... . 
Conditions for which admitted: .................... . 
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Source: Nell 1992. 
APPENDIX D 
Form 5: Pretest Questionnaire 
Research Number ......... : ....... . 
1. How much sleep did you get last night: 
About the same as usual 
Less than usual 
More than usual 
2. Right now I am feeling: 
_ Energetic 
Fresh 
_Average 
Tired 
Exhausted 
3. In the last 24 hours, my consumption of 
coffee, tea or Coca-Cola has been: 
I do not drink coffee, tea or Coca-Cola 
About the usual amount 
Less than usual 
More than usual 
4. In the last 24 hours, my smoking has been: 
I do not smoke 
About the usual amount 
More than usual 
5. In the last 24 hours, my alcohol intake has been: 
I do not drink 
About the usual amount 
Less than usual 
More than usual 
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Date: I I 
6. Medications: ............................................. Source: NES-2 & WHO-NCTB 
j 
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APPENDIX E 
Postconcussion Symptom Checklist 1 
Research Number: ............. Date: I I 
Ratings 
Symptom Frequency Intensity 
1 Headache 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 
2. Dizziness 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 
3 Memory 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 
4. Fatigue 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 
5. Drowsiness 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 
6. Irritability 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 
7. Noise 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 
8. Light 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 
9. Alcohol 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 
10. Concentration 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 
11. Visual 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 
12. Hearing problems 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 
13. Nausea 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 
14. Vomiting 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 
15. Anxiety 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 
16. Depression 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 
j 
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APPENDIX F 
Postconcussion Symptom Checklist 2 
Research Number ...................... Date I I 
Ratings 
Symptom Rank Frequency Duration Intensity 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Headache 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 
Dizziness 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 
Memory 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 
Fatigue 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 
Drowsiness 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 
Irritability 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 
Noise sensitive 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 
Light sensitive 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 
Alcohol 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 
Concentration 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 
Visual 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 
Auditory 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 
Nausea 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 
Vomiting 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 
Anxiety 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 
Depression 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 
KEY 
I) freguency: 
0 = Never; 1 = sometimes; 2 = most of the time; 3 = all the time. 
ii) Duration: O = not at all; 1 = A few secs; 2 = A few mins; 3 = A few hours; 
4 = constant. 
iii) Intensity: 
0 = None; 1 = mild; 2 = moderate; 3 = severe. 
1 2 
1 x 
2 x 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Key: 
1. Headache 
2. Dizziness 
3. Memory 
4. Fatigue 
5. Drowsiness 
6. Irritability 
3 
x 
7. Noise sensitivity 
8. Light sensitivity 
4 
x 
APPENDIXG 
Symptom Ranking Matrix 
5 6 7 8 9 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
9. Alcohol sensitivity 
10. Poor concentration 
11 . Visual problems 
12. Auditory problems 
13. Nausea 
14. Vomiting 
15. Anxiety 
16. Depression 
J 
10 
x 
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11 12 13 14 15 16 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
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APPENDIXH 
Factor analysis of reaction time indices and symptoms for controls (N = 52) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Compatible (Mn ,94 -,01 ,07 ,04 
Fixed foreperiod (Mn ,94 ,03 ,05 -,05 
Similar(Mn ,94 ,01 ,17 ,09 
Incompatible (Mn ,92 ,14 ,02 ,02 
Variable foreperiod (Mn ,90 ,05 -,11 ,02 
Dissimilar (Mn ,86 ,22 -,11 -,07 
Undegraded (Mn ,86 ,03 -,02 ,13 
Degraded (Mn ,71 -,13 ,18 -,54 
Similar (TT) ,71 ,52 ,40 ,08 
Incompatible (TT) ,70 ,62 -,18 ,06 
Fixed foreperiod (TT) ,69 ,59 -,07 -,02 
Variable foreperiod (TT) ,65 ,62 -,09 ,03 
Undegraded (TT) ,62 ,61 ,06 ,05 
Similar (MT, SB) ,54 -,24 ,43 ,25 
Compatible (MT, SB) ,37 ,26 -,06 -,02 
Compatible (Rn -,05 ,91 ,24 ,03 
Undegraded (Rn -,01 ,88 ,10 -,07 
Variable foreperiod (Rn ,19 ,87 -,05 ,05 
Dissimilar (Rn ,07 ,87 -,24 ,07 
Fixed foreperiod (Rn ,18 ,84 -,15 ,02 
Similar(Rn ,05 ,83 ,45 ,02 
Incompatible (Rn ,18 ,83 -,30 ,07 
Degraded (Rn ,05 ,80 -,19 -,35 
Dissimilar (TT) ,59 ,69 -,22 ,00 
Compatible (TT) ,64 ,65 ,22 ,05 
Memory ,17 -,19 -,01 ,02 
Fixed (TT, SB) -,01 ,12 -,05 ,09 
Similar (TT, SB) ,33 -,07 ,86 '11 
Similar (RT, SB) -,01 ,13 ,85 -,06 
Compatible (RT, SB) ,29 ,23 -,63 ,07 
Compatible (TT, SB) ,47 ,32 -,57 ,04 
Fixed foreperiod (MT, SB) -,04 ,03 -,29 ,13 
Fixed foreperiod (RT, SB) ,04 ,15 ,19 ,07 
Degraded (TT, SB) -,00 ,12 -,12 -,87 
Degraded (MT, SB) -,13 -,18 ,22 -,74 
Depression -,09 -,09 -,18 ,62 
Degraded (TT) ,45 ,52 -,05 -,58 
Anxiety -,17 ,02 '11 ,52 
Degraded (RT, SB) ,09 ,33 -,39 -,47 
Dizziness ,05 ,08 -,17 ,41 
Noise ,02 ,28 ,14 ,35 
Irritability ,14 
J 
,15 ,18 ,32 
Concentration ,04 -,03 -,07 ,28 
Light ,12 ,08 ,15 ,28 
Headache -,01 -,06 ,21 ,22 
Fatigue -,13 ,07 -,03 -,15 
299 
APPENDIX I 
Factor analyses of reaction time indices and symptoms 1 - 21 days after injury. 
Fixed foreperiod (Mn 
Undegraded (Mn 
Degraded (Mn 
Dissimilar (Mn 
Compatible (Mn 
Undegraded (TT) 
Incompatible (Mn 
Similar(Mn 
Fixed foreperiod (TT) 
Variable foreperiod (Mn 
Variable foreperiod (TT) 
Compatible (TT) 
Dissimilar (TT) 
Degraded (TT) 
Degraded (Rn 
Undegraded (Rn 
Variable foreperiod (Rn 
Dissimilar (Rn 
Compatible (Rn 
Incompatible (Rn 
Similar(Rn 
Fixed <Rn 
Degraded (MT, SB) 
Incompatible (TT) 
Degraded (TT, SB) 
Similar (MT, SB) 
Noise 
Concentration 
Dizziness 
Memory 
Irritability 
Compatible (RT, SB) 
Anxiety 
Compatible (TT, SB) 
Degraded (RT, SB) 
Headache 
Depression 
Light 
Visual 
Drowsiness 
Fatigue 
Similar (RT, SB) 
Similar (TT, SB) 
Fixed foreperiod (TT, SB) 
Similar (TT) 
Compatible (MT, SB) 
Fixed foreperiod (SB) 
Fixed fore period (MT, SB) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
,94 -,10 ,04 ,16 
,94 -,24 -,09 -,03 
,93 ,08 -,04 -,09 
,92 ,04 -,04 -, 15 
,90 -,23 -,19 ,16 
,88 ,38 ,10 ,02 
,85 -,32 ,00 -, 19 
,83 -,31 -,20 ,15 
,82 ,38 ,13 ,32 
,82 -,03 f 18 -,06 
,76 ,54 -,05 -,23 
,72 ,37 -,20 ,20 
,66 ,59 -,04 -,28 
,64 ,62 -,17 -,10 
-,06 ,89 -,13 -,04 
,05 ,88 ,27 ,10 
,22 ,85 -,04 -,17 
-,01 ,83 -,06 -,34 
-,06 ,82 -, 11 ,08 
-,24 ,80 ,39 ,01 
-,14 ,75 ,16 ,50 
,14 ,73 ,17 ,31 
,09 ,65 '11 -,13 
,47 ,55 ,42 -,12 
-,16 ,54 -,47 -,22 
,25 ,45 -,23 ,34 
,13 ,12 ,86 ,23 
,09 ,20 ,86 ,17 
-,13 ,01 ,75 -,05 
,02 -,02 ,74 ,52 
-,02 ,15 ,65 ,02 
-,28 ,39 ,64 -,06 
,09 ,06 -,63 ,14 
-,19 ,21 ,60 -,30 
-,17 ,34 -,60 -,20 
-,08 ,22 ,57 ,00 
,12 ,54 ,56 ,10 
,37 -,27 ,50 ,23 
-,13 -,04 ,49 -,15 
,06 -,26 ,43 ,17 
,03 -,28 ,38 -,21 
-,15 ,20 ,23 ,84 
-,03 -,19 ,00 ,82 
-,01 ,27 -,26 -,79 
,53 
J 
,29 -,03 ,67 
,03 -,19 ,32 -,61 
,16 ,42 -,22 -,54 
-,08 ,12 ,32 -,44 
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APPENDIXJ 
Factor analyses of reaction time indices and symptoms: 22 - 90 days after injury. 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Variable foreperiod (TT) ,97 ,02 ,11 ,04 
Fixed foreperiod (TT) ,97 ,16 ,08 -,13 
Fixed foreperiod (MT) ,95 ,15 -,01 ,01 
Compatible (TT) ,95 ,25 ,05 ,14 
Incompatible (TT) ,94 ,16 -,03 -,21 
Degraded (TT) ,94 ,16 '11 ,15 
Variable foreperiod (MT) ,93 ,17 -,06 ,14 
Undegraded (TT) ,93 ,14 -,03 ,10 
Dissimilar (TT) ,91 ,30 ,08 -,12 
Similar (TT) ,91 ,28 ,18 ,20 
Similar(MT) ,89 ,10 ,07 ,35 
Incompatible (MT) ,89 ,24 ,13 -,16 
Variable foreperiod (RT) ,88 -,14 ,27 -,18 
Fixed (RT) ,87 ,20 ,23 -,26 
Degraded (MT) ,86 ,18 ,16 ,18 
Compatible (RT) ,85 ,05 ,17 -,20 
Dissimilar (MT) ,85 ,33 ,09 -,04 
Incompatible (RT) ,85 ,05 -,30 -,25 
Undegraded (TT, MT) ,83 ,30 -,16 ,24 
Degraded (RT) ,81 ,10 ,05 ,09 
Compatible (MT) ,80 ,34 -,06 ,36 
Undegraded (RT) ,80 -,20 ,30 -,19 
Similar (RT) ,78 ,49 ,31 -,05 
Dissimilar (RT) ,72 ,12 ,12 -,23 
Degraded (RT, SB) ,59 ,31 -,17 ,29 
Concentration ,38 ,86 ,10 ,01 
Irritability ,30 ,84 -,03 -,03 
Headache ,11 ,83 ,05 -,03 
Dizziness ,15 ,78 -,03 ,19 
Memory ,38 ,75 -,06 ,09 
Drowsiness ,33 ,69 ,58 -,02 
Fatigue ,52 ,66 ,02 ,27 
Similar (RT, SB) ,38 ,66 ,35 ,20 
Fixed foreperiod (TT, SB) ,37 -,61 ,18 ,05 
Light ,32 ,04 ,88 ,04 
Anxiety -,39 ,26 -,70 -,38 
Depression -,00 ,15 ,69 -,07 
Compatible (RT, SB) ,10 ,01 -,66 -,09 
Visual ,17 ,57 ,59 -,18 
Degraded (MT, SB) -,31 -,28 ,47 -,18 
Degraded (TT, SB) ,27 ,08 ,31 ,15 
Compatible (MT, SB) ,32 -,10 ,31 -,81 
Compatible (TT, SB) ,32 -,13 -,18 -,78 
Similar (TT, SB) ,15 
J 
,02 ,23 ,70 
Similar (MT, SB) -,05 -,41 -,04 ,61 
Fixed fore period (MT, SB) ,33 ,15 -,20 ,57 
Fixed foreperiod (TT, SB) ,38 -,40 , 11 ,51 
Noise -,09 ,15 ,06 ,34 
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APPENDIXK 
Factor analyses of reaction time indices and symptoms 91 days+ after injury. 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Dissimilar (TT) ,98 ,09 -,04 -,03 
Variable foreperiod (TT) ,96 ,16 -,08 ,05 
Compatible <Tn ,94 ,22 -,02 ,00 
Undegraded (TT) ,94 '11 ,07 -,08 
Similar(Mn ,93 ,13 ,06 ,14 
Fixed foreperiod (TT) ,93 ,16 ,26 ,02 
Variable foreperiod (Mn ,92 ,00 -,24 ,07 
Dissimilar (Mn ,90 ,08 -,23 ,13 
Compatible (Mn ,89 ,06 -,25 ,05 
Undegraded (Mn ,89 ,04 -,12 -,04 
Fixed foreperiod (Mn ,88 ,07 ,03 ,18 
Degraded (TT) ,87 ,42 -,12 ,11 
Degraded (Mn ,87 ,15 -,07 ,25 
Similar (TT) ,84 ,29 ,34 ,19 
Dissimilar (Rn ,83 ,09 ,21 -,23 
Variable foreperiod (Rn ,81 ,37 ,13 -,01 
Fixed foreperiod (Rn ,81 ,22 ,46 -,14 
Incompatible (TT) ,78 ,58 ,08 -,05 
Incompatible (Mn ,78 ,40 -,09 ,05 
Undegraded (Rn ,77 ,17 ,28 -,11 
Degraded (Rn ,68 ,58 -,14 -,05 
Compatible (Rn ,62 ,35 ,35 -,07 
Similar(Rn ,56 ,47 ,53 ,18 
Anxiety ,37 ,15 ,13 -,30 
Compatible (TT, SB) ,27 ,84 ,18 -,09 
Compatible (RT, SB) ,31 ,75 ,18 -,25 
Degraded (RT, SB) ,34 ,72 -,46 ,03 
Fatigue ,22 ,70 -,13 '11 
Degraded (TT, SB) ,37 ,68 -,35 ,33 
Compatible (MT, SB) ,21 ,68 ,19 ,02 
Incompatible (Rn ,57 ,64 ,33 -,19 
Dizziness ,40 ,56 '11 ,37 
Headache -,09 ,49 -,04 ,24 
Similar (RT, SB) -,18 ,49 ,43 ,47 
Fixed foreperiod (TT, SB) ,10 ,01 -,84 ,07 
Similar (TT, SB) -,07 ,39 ,70 ,41 
Similar (MT, SB) ,05 ,10 ,68 ,02 
Fixed foreperiod (RT, SB) -,20 ,18 -,65 ,24 
Fixed foreperiod (MT, SB) ,34 -,15 -,64 -,19 
Visual ,13 -,19 ,39 ,32 
Irritability ,15 -,17 ,32 ,23 
Concentration -,29 -,08 -,09 ,80 
Drowsiness -,06 ,12 ,02 ,72 
Memory ,25 ,14 -,15 ,70 
Degraded (MT, SB) ,23 J ,25 ,06 ,58 
Noise ,14 -,10 ,06 ,53 
Depression -,01 ,07 ,16 ,40 
Light -,21 -,20 ,13 ,23 
